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Introduction
This thesis consists of three chapters that analyze stability of financial institutions and
redistributive effects in health insurance markets based on the example of Germany. The
third chapter is based on joint work with my coauthor Benjamin Schickner. My analysis
of financial stability in the first two chapters considers financial institutions which borrow
short-term, liquid debt such as demand deposits and invest long-term in illiquid and risky
assets (maturity and liquidity transformation). These transformations make the financial
institution prone to a liquidity squeeze (run) by uninsured short-term debt investors. Runs
by debt investors may be driven by fears about low future asset returns but also by fears
that a large group of other debt investors might withdraw their deposits. The latter gives
rise to self-fulfilling or panic runs caused by miscoordination. The first two chapters are
concerned with modeling such self-fulfilling runs using the methodology of global games.
Imposition of a specific type of information structure allows the selection of a unique
equilibrium. Ex ante identical agents observe correlated, noisy and private signals before
choosing one out of two possible actions. As typical in global games, the equilibrium has
the nature of a trigger equilibrium. Agents choose action ’withdraw’ if they observe signals
below the trigger and choose action ’wait’ if they observe a signal above the trigger. The
size of the equilibrium trigger determines the expected number of agents choosing either
action. If the number of agents choosing action ’withdraw’ exceeds a critical threshold,
an event is triggered, the financial firm defaults. Chapter one and two are concerned with
how the equilibrium trigger and thus ex ante probability of runs change in the primitives
of the game.
In the first chapter, I analyze how miscoordination on panic runs among debt investors
changes under altering capital structure and market liquidity of firm assets. Investors
draw on a finite, common pool of liquidity. In case of a run, repayment to debt investors is
only partial and endogenous. Taking this endogeneity into account, I show that investors
coordinate in a way such that the probability of a run is in general non-monotone in both
debt and liquidity ratio. When liquidity dries up, increasing short-term financing may
decrease the probability of runs, more short-term debt can discipline debt investors to
better coordinate. If the firm is financed through short-term debt and equity only, the
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result implies that firm stability may decrease in equity. In detail, more short-term debt
financing can alter coordination and hence the probability distribution of debt becoming
due in the future in a way that runs become less likely. This implies, the probability of
runs is non-monotone in liquidity mismatch between assets and liabilities. As a result,
capital and liquidity regulation may harm stability. These results hold under partial asset
liquidation or collateralized borrowing and therefore apply to classic commercial banks but
also to shadow banks such as structured investment vehicles and asset backed commercial
paper conduits.
In the second chapter, I ask the question how national bankruptcy codes and interven-
tions of a lender of last resort impact coordination behavior of debt investors. National
bankruptcy codes and potential intervention by national central banks (lender of last re-
sort) during runs on financial firms impact recovery values after bankruptcy. But while
bankruptcy proceedings impose fixed costs, the intervention by a lender of last resort de-
pends on the scale of the run. As a consequence, recovery values are ex ante random
and endogenous to investors. The second chapter studies how recovery values influence
coordination behavior of uninsured debt investors and thus stability of financial firms. In
particular, the chapter analyzes how the composition of recovery values changes coordina-
tion when recovery value consists of a run-size dependent, endogenous part controlled by
the lender of last resort and a fixed component to model national differences in bankruptcy
code. I find that the composition of recovery value influences how firm stability changes
in capital structure and liquidity mismatch. Run probabilities are monotone in debt or
liquidity mismatch as long as recovery values are proportional to the size of the run. When
recovery values are independent of the magnitude of the run (no lender of last resort) or
include a fixed component independent of the size of the run (intercept), run probabilities
are non-monotone and have unique maxima. The non-monotonicity changes in composi-
tion of recovery value. As a consequence, drops in funding liquidity or capital can have a
stabilizing effect in country A but a destabilizing effect on a company with identical capital
structure in country B due to variations in national bankruptcy code. If a lender of last
resort intervenes more generous in country G compared to country I, liquidity regulation
in country G has to be stricter than in country I to guarantee the same minimum stability
level. These results have policy implications for capital and liquidity regulation under Basel
3 since member countries agree on regulation but firms underlie different bankruptcy codes.
Further, I show that high recovery values achieved by cost efficient bankruptcy proceedings
or generous government interventions are never desirable from a stability perspective and
only sometimes desirable from a consumer welfare perspective since high recovery values
increase the probability of runs.
In the third chapter, Benjamin and I study redistributional effects of competition between
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private and public insurance on health insurance markets based on the example of Ger-
many. In Germany, health insurance is obligatory and provided by a budget-balancing
public insurance and a revenue-maximizing private insurance. Public insurance is regu-
lated, she may charge a fixed contribution rate from customers income up to a cap and
she must operate cost-covering. Public contributions do not depend on customers’ health
risk types. Customers with high income may opt out of public insurance. The regula-
tions and competition with a more flexible private insurance lead to difficulties for public
insurance to find a contribution rate which guarantees a balanced budget. We derive a
condition on the health income distribution of customers and regulator thresholds such
that a unique public contribution rate exists which balances budget. We show that in
equilibrium, healthy, high-income customers insure with private insurance. Further, pri-
vate insurance cream skims customers if possible, that is she selects good risk types. We
identify income redistribution streams in the population and argue that an increase in
the opt-out threshold decreases the costs of health insurance for all customers. Analyzing
changes in the underlying distribution, we show that the equilibrium contribution rate
rises as the positive correlation between health and income increases. We demonstrate,
even a systematic improvement of the populations health and income may lead to a higher
contribution rate. Welfare effects of switching from the contribution-based German sys-
tem to a premium- based flat payment system with only one type of insurance are discussed.
3
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Chapter 1
Capital Structure, Liquidity and
Miscoordination on Runs
1.1 Motivation
This paper is concerned with stability of financial intermediators (’firms’) against runs by debt
investors. Runs on financial institutions have been a recurrent phenomenon in economic history
up to the present. In September 2007, we witnessed a traditional run on UK bank Northern Rock
(Shin, 2009). In September 2008, withdrawals by customers forced a shut down of the US savings
and loan Washington Mutual. In summer 2015, Greek banks were closed in a bank holiday for
several weeks to prevent a run by depositors.
In a debt run, a large number of short-term debt investors rush to withdraw their funds from
the firm. Large cash withdrawals, in response, force the firm to liquidate assets on short notice.
If assets are illiquid1, the firm can sell assets quickly only at a large price discount compared to
their fair value. If the firm relies heavily on short-term financing, potential overall withdrawals
the firm might face in a run exceed total cash the firm can raise through liquidating all assets in
short time. Debt investors’ awareness of this potential liquidity squeeze and its implications for
firm stability and welfare are at the heart of this paper.
In our model, a financial firm finances an investment in a risky, illiquid asset through equity and
short-term debt. The firm promises fixed interest payments to debt investors and the residual
value of investment to equity investors.2 At an interim period, debt investors need to decide
whether to stay invested in the firm (roll over debt) or to withdraw their investment. They
do so after observing imperfect information about the asset’s random return. As debt investors
make their roll over decisions at the interim period, at the initial period the firm faces a random
1An asset’s market liquidity depends on several factor such as market size of the asset, potential
information asymmetries and current economic market conditions (Foucault et al., 2013).
2This is by the ownership structure and seniority of debt.
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withdrawal of short-term debt in the following period. To finance withdrawals of funds, the firm
liquidates a corresponding fraction of her investment in the illiquid asset and by this diminishes
future gross returns.3 If funds available through selling the asset (market liquidity) undercut the
overall amount of potential short-term debt claims the firm might face, the firm is prone to a
liquidity squeeze (run) in the interim period:4 When the number of debt investors claiming their
deposit exceeds a critical threshold, the firm cannot serve all its debt investors and goes into
default. The potential of a run gives rise to a coordination problem between debt investors. The
roll over decision of debt investors is not only based on inferences about the random asset return,
a solvency consideration, but also depends on the expected number of other debt investors rolling
over, a liquidity consideration. As a result, a debt investor might decide not to roll over, not
because the expected asset return is too low but because she expects a too large number of other
investors to not roll over. A panic run or self-fulfilling run occurs if too many investors fear other
investors will not roll over, withdraw, and cause the run.
In this setting, we analyze the question how coordination and the probability of a run by debt
investors depend on firm capital structure and market liquidity of firm assets. As main contri-
bution of the paper, we demonstrate that the probability of a run is in general non-monotone
in short-term debt and that non-monotonicity is in large parts affected by asset liquidity. This
implies, increases in equity financing may harm coordination and increase the probability of runs.
This stands in contrast to the classic literature on bank regulation (Cohen, 1970; Furlong and
Keeley, 1989; Kim and Santomero, 1988) which argues that equity always improves firm stability
by reducing insolvency risk. Firm insolvency occurs if asset value falls below value of debt. This
literature strand however assumes that the firm’s debt structure (maturity and amount outstand-
ing) is exogenous. As a consequence of this assumption, capital regulation decreases insolvency
risk since it guarantees a minimum equity cushion against shocks in asset’s market value when
balance sheets are marked to market.5 In this paper we make a point the other way around. We
assume asset liquidity is deterministic6 but the debt structure is random and in particular endoge-
nous. The probability distribution of short-term debt becoming due tomorrow depends on the
capital structure today. Under these changed assumptions we obtain that capital regulation may
alter coordination and thus the probability distribution of debt becoming due in the near future
in a way that runs become more likely - the illiquidity risk may increase.7 The general intuition
3Our results are robust to allowing the firm to borrow cash by pledging the asset as collateral. By this,
partial liquidation is avoided.
4This scenario is satisfied for ’sufficiently’ illiquid assets but also for liquid assets if promised interest
payments to debt investors are large and if the firm is financed through a proportionally large amount of
short-term debt.
5Insolvency risk is further reduced by capital regulation since banks respond to more ’skin’ (equity) in
the game by investing in less risky assets.
6The assumption that liquidity is deterministic is the major constraint of our model, similar to (Dia-
mond and Dybvig, 1983; Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005).It is however as strong an assumption as assuming
that short-term withdrawals of deposits or other liquid forms of debt are exogenous in maturity and
magnitude.
7In this paper, we follow the definition of illiquidity and insolvency risk by Morris and Shin (2009):
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that more short-term funding and hence exposure to investors having short-term claims lead to
higher short-term withdrawals and liquidity risk in the future is challenged in this article. We
show, more short-term debt can discipline debt investors to better coordinate if assets are illiquid.
A further contribution of our paper is of technical nature. The game structure analyzed here
exhibits only one-sided strategic complementarity between actions (Karp et al., 2007; Goldstein
and Pauzner, 2005) and hence differs from the classic global games structure where actions are
global strategic complements (Vives, 2014; Rochet and Vives, 2004; Ko¨nig et al., 2014; Morris
and Shin, 2009).
The first game structure evolves naturally in bank run games when closely modeling the real
world fact that in the incidence of a run, cash available by asset liquidation is insufficient to
satisfy claims by all debt investors. Investors are only partially repaid, and the payment depends
on the endogenous number of investors trying to withdraw, see Goldstein and Pauzner (2005):
This is because debt investors have a hard claim and draw on a common pool of liquidity. To
withdraw, investors queue in front of the firm and are served one after another. To serve an
investor the firm liquidates a fraction of the asset. The place in the queue is random. In a run,
not the entire queue can be served, service stops when all cash available from liquidating the
firm’s asset is distributed. The more investors try to withdraw the longer the queue and hence
the larger the probability to queue in a position which cannot be served.
As a consequence, the incentive to withdraw versus wait is not largest when all investors withdraw
but when only just as many investors withdraw that put the firm on the edge of a run. Then, the
entire queue is just served while investors who wait and roll over receive zero independently of
the size of the run.8 Conditional on a run, actions are strategic substitutes, in particular actions
are not global strategic complements.9
One-sided strategic complementarity is the key driver for the non-monotonicity results obtained
in this article. Comparative statics under global strategic complements (Morris and Shin, 2009;
Rochet and Vives, 2004; Vives, 2014) are all monotone in this strand of literature (see explicit dis-
cussion of literature and technique below). This article thus demonstrates that in global games,
monotonicity of bank run probability in debt is not robust to one-sided strategic complementarity
between actions.
’Insolvency risk’ is the probability of a default due to deterioration of asset quality conditional on the event
that no run occurs. Credit risk is the unconditional probability that the firm cannot repay debt at some
point in time. Illiquidity risk is the difference between credit and insolvency risk, that is the probability
of a default due to a run if the firm had been solvent in absence of the run. In our setting, illiquidity risk
is the risk that current liabilities realize such that they undercut asset value. For further discussion of the
distinction between insolvency risk and illiquidity risk, see Davydenko (2012)
8Conditional on a run, payoffs to investors who want to withdraw strictly decrease in the number of
investors trying to withdraw while payoff to investors who roll over is fixed at zero.
9Global strategic complementarity between actions implies, that the incentive for an agent to pick a
certain action A versus choosing the other action B increases in the number of other agents choosing that
same action A.
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We now give an intuition for why a departure from the previous literature leads to non-monotone
run probabilities in capital. In detail, the main driver of the non-monotonicity results, and the
main departure from the previous literature on the impact of capital structure and asset liquidity
on runs, is that we impose uncertainty on the action ’withdraw’. Debt investors who simulta-
neously decide to withdraw from the firm might receive zero. In the incidence of a run, when
debt claims by withdrawing investors exceed liquidation value of the asset, the firm may only
distribute the liquidation value of the asset, thus not all investors who want to withdraw can be
served. Consequently, the payoff to withdrawing becomes risky and sensitive to changes in capital
structure:10 In the incidence of a run, the more the firm is (proportionally) financed with equity,
the fewer debt investors have a claim on liquidation value (the shorter the maximum length of
the queue) and the higher the expected payoff from withdrawing. The latter is since positions
in the queue are random, the maximum queue length has decreases but the number of positions
in the queue that can be served at fixed liquidation value of the asset has remained constant.
Thus, equity sweetens withdrawal in uncertain times since it serves as cushion in the incidence
of a run. Equity also benefits debt investors who roll over. The change of equilibrium due to
a marginal change in equity is thus determined by marginal utilities. The following stylized ex-
ample demonstrates that debt investors who withdraw might benefit stronger from increases in
equity than investors who roll over. Thus, a marginal investor who is initially indifferent between
rolling over debt or withdrawing might, after an increase in equity, prefer to withdraw which
leads to increases in the run probability, explained now.
Example: A firm raises $5 in equity and short-term debt to finance a long-term investment in a
risky asset. At an interim period, after observing information about the random asset return debt
investors decide whether to roll over debt or to withdraw. The asset is illiquid, hence premature,
fast liquidation of the asset only yields $1. The firm promises fixed interest payments to debt
investors for every period invested. By the nature of equity, debt investors are paid first and all
remaining revenues go to equity investors.
Setting A) In order to finance the asset, the firm collects $1 equity and $4 short-term debt raised
from 4 different debt investors who each invests $1. At the interim stage markets can either be
up or down. Assume markets are up and the asset pays with high probability. Then, all debt
investors roll over debt, collect their interest payments with high probability in the following
period and all extra returns go to equity investors. If however markets are down and the asset
pays with low probability, all debt investors withdraw which forces the firm to liquidate the asset
at $1. Since 4 debt investors have a claim on this dollar, on average every debt investor receives
$1/4.
Setting B) Now assume, the firm increases her equity ratio by financing the same investment with
$2 equity and $3 debt collected from 3 debt investors. If markets are up, again all debt investors
roll over as they receive promised interest payments with very high probability. If markets are
10Under the assumption that withdrawing yields a safe payoff, changes in capital structure do not change
payoff from withdrawing, hence the payoff to withdrawing is insensitive to changes in capital.
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down however, all debt investors withdraw, the firm liquidates the asset at $1 and on average,
every debt investor receives $1/3 which is larger than $1/4.
Since debt investors’ interest payments are fixed, they do not benefit from the upside potential
of the asset, thus the financing structure of the firm has no impact on debt investors’ payoffs if
asset markets are up. The capital structure however does matter in bad times. If uncertainty
about asset returns is high and debt investors refuse to roll over, by illiquidity of assets cash
available through liquidation does not cover all withdrawals. Comparing both settings of the
example, conditional on a run, the payoff to withdrawing increases in equity from $1/4 to $1/3
since realized liquidation value is allocated among less debt investors. The intuition for this
example is related to the value of debt taking the form of an inverted hockey stick at expiry
(Holmstrom, 2015): conditional on a run, debt is information sensitive with respect to capital
structure and its value increases in equity. Conditional on no run (in good times), debt becomes
information insensitivity towards capital structure and its value is constant in equity.
The model we analyze in the paper has a unique equilibrium which is characterized by a trigger
signal about the asset return. Debt investors will find it optimal to withdraw when observing
signals below the trigger since this signals low asset returns and will roll over debt when observing
signals above the trigger, see Figure (??). Upon observing the trigger signal a debt investor is
indifferent between rolling over or withdrawing (marginal investor). Consider the signal of the
marginal investor in setting A). As the firm changes her financing structure from setting A) to
setting B), the immediate payoff from rolling over stays constant compared to the previous setting
since the financing structure does not impact the asset’s return probability and promised interest
payments to debt investors remain unchanged. But the payoff from withdrawing increases. Hence,
the signal that makes an investor indifferent in setting A) cannot make her indifferent in setting B),
see Figure (??). Instead, at the same signal in setting B) the investor tends towards withdrawing.
*
*
receive 1/3 receive fixed coupons
*
receive 1/3 receive fixed coupons
A
A
A
B
B
no equilibrium
receive 1/4 receive fixed coupons
Figure 1.1: Shift of equilibrium trigger signal due to change in equity
The equilibrium trigger in setting B) is thus larger, investors withdraw for a greater range of
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signals compared to setting A) which increases the ex ante probability of a run although the firm
is financed through more equity.11
As main result of the article, we obtain that the probability of a run is in general non-monotone in
short-term debt and that non-monotonicity is driven by asset illiquidity. When asset liquidity is
high, the probability of runs increases monotonically in debt. As liquidity dries up, the probability
of runs becomes non-monotone. Probability of runs increases in debt for low debt values but
decreases in debt for larger debt values. When the asset becomes perfectly illiquid, monotonicity
is restored but tilted: the probability of a run becomes monotone decreasing in debt and increasing
in equity.
Second, the non-monotonicity result expands to liquidity mismatch. If we measure liquidity
mismatch of assets and liabilities as the ratio of cash the firm can realize by selling the asset
over potential short-term withdrawals, we show that the probability of runs is not monotone in
liquidity mismatch.12
Third, as a consequence of these non-monotonicity results capital and liquidity regulation can
have adverse effects on firm stability depending on asset liquidity. We demonstrate, while capital
and liquidity regulation of financial institutions can improve stability when market liquidity of
assets is high, the identical policy rule can harm stability when liquidity is low or dries up
as its implementation deteriorates the coordination problem among short-term debt investors.
These results have policy implication with respect to Basel 3. Our results imply that capital
regulation should be tailored to particular scenarios for market liquidity or capital regulation
should distinguish between firms according to their target asset liquidity. Further we demonstrate,
under endogenous panic withdrawals by investors, liquidity mismatch is no reliable measure of
liquidity risk since the probability of runs is non-monotone in liquidity mismatch.
Fourth, the non-monotonicity results hold under partial asset liquidation but are robust to collat-
eralized borrowing, where the firm may pledge the asset in the money market and by this prevents
partial liquidation. Our results have thus policy implications with respect to regulation of classic
commercial banks but also structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and asset-backed commercial
paper conduits.
Last, we consider debt investors’ welfare from contracts, taking the coordination behavior of in-
vestors as given in subgames. We demonstrate, for every contract if asset liquidity is high debt
investor suffer from increases in debt ratio. If liquidity is however low, they might benefit from
11Note that while in the example game non-symmetric threshold equilibria might exist, the main game
introduced later will have a unique equilibrium which is a symmetric threshold equilibrium. Further, debt
investors’ signals will differ only by a small, random noise term. As the support of the noise becomes
small, debt investors observe the same signals and hence choose identical actions. For this example, we
have used pro rata shares but the same intuition applies for queuing where conditional on a run agents
receive fixed coupons but with varying probability.
12A liquidity mismatch exists if overall cash that can be raised through selling all assets on short notice
(market liquidity) undercuts the maximum sum of potential short-term cash claims by debt investors. In
this case, we define liquidity mismatch as the ratio of asset market liquidity to potential short-term claims.
An existing liquidity mismatch gives rise to the possibility of runs on the financial firm.
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higher debt ratios since these improve coordination and thus stability.
Related Literature
This paper adds to the growing literature on stability of maturity transforming financial inter-
mediators against runs by short-term debt investors. In a seminal paper, Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) analyze coordination behavior of depositors who share consumption risk by entering in
demand-deposit contracts with a bank. Due to maturity transformation and risk-sharing two
pure equilibria are shown to exist, a bank run and a no run equilibrium. An ex ante probability
for the emergence of each equilibrium cannot be calculated within the model. Postlewaite and
Vives (1987) analyze demand-deposit contracts using a game structure similar to the Prisoner’s
dilemma and deduce parameter constellations under which a unique equilibrium evolves with a
strictly positive probability of a ’run’. While in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), runs are purely due
to panic and always inefficient, Bryant (1980), Chari and Jagannathan (1988) and Jacklin and
Bhattacharya (1988) model information-based runs by introducing asset return risk and interim
information. Our set-up allows for both, runs caused by panic and self-fulfilling beliefs but also
efficient runs driven by bad news about firm solvency. Interim information on the asset return
can reveal a low return probability of the asset and running on the firm can be a dominant ac-
tion. Empirical evidence exists for both types of runs: Evidence for depositors withdrawing when
perceived asset risk is too high is provided by Goldberg and Hudgins (1996, 2002). Foley-Fisher
et al. (2015) investigate the run on U.S. life insurers during the summer of 2007 and find evidence
for self-fulfilling expectations.
To obtain a unique equilibrium, this paper employs technique from global games theory (Carlsson
and Van Damme, 1993; Morris and Shin, 1998, 2001). Private, asymmetric but correlated signals
serve as coordination device among agents and may lead to equilibrium uniqueness and definite
comparative statics.
The model closest to ours is Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) who embed the Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) model in a global game and are hence able to show optimality of risk-sharing even though
it increases the likelihood of runs. Their paper is the first to show equilibrium existence and
uniqueness under only one-sided strategic complementarity with partial, endogenous repayment
given default of the bank. We strongly draw on their existence and uniqueness proof in our
setting. The question we analyze here however differs. Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) analyze
contracts where the bank is fully financed by debt and invests in an asset which is liquid at the
interim period. We allow for a general capital structure, general asset market liquidity and focus
on the effects changes in capital structure and asset liquidity have on the probability of runs.
Further, we concentrate on optimal capital structure from debt investors point of view who take
contracts as exogenously given.
The question, how capital structure and asset liquidity impact coordination behavior of debt
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investors and probability of runs in a global game has been analyzed before in the context of
collateralized funding (Morris and Shin, 2009) and delegated decision making (Rochet and Vives,
2004; Vives, 2014; Ko¨nig et al., 2014). We depart from Rochet and Vives (2004); Vives (2014) and
Ko¨nig et al. (2014) in assuming that decisions are made directly by investors not fund managers.
We depart from Morris and Shin (2009) by assuming that in the incidence of a run the firm
can only partially repay and follows a sequential service constraint as modeled in Goldstein
and Pauzner (2005). This modeling feature changes the game structure and implies that in the
incidence of a run withdrawing investors do not receive their deposit for sure as they would in
Morris and Shin (2009). Hence, the action withdrawing is risky and its payoff becomes sensitive
to changes in capital structure. While Morris and Shin (2009), Rochet and Vives (2004); Vives
(2014) and Ko¨nig et al. (2014) allow the asset liquidation value to depend on the random state,
in our model the liquidation value is exogenous and deterministic.
From a theory perspective, while Morris and Shin (2009); Rochet and Vives (2004); Vives (2014)
and Ko¨nig et al. (2014) analyze a classic global game with global strategic complementarity
between actions (Bulow et al., 1985), the game analyzed here exhibits only one-sided strategic
complements as in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) and Karp et al. (2007).
Further related papers are Eisenbach (2013) and Szkup (2015) who study roll-over decisions by
short-term debt investors in dynamic settings.
1.2 The Model
There are three periods of time 0, 1, 2 and one good (money). We assume no discounting between
periods. There is a financial intermediator, called ’the firm’, and two types of agents: a continuum
of short-term debt investors [0, δ], of measure δ ∈ (0, 1), and a single equity investor. Both types
of agents live for two periods.
At period 0, debt investors are symmetric and each endowed with one unit of the good. Debt
investors are risk-averse and can consume in either period.13 Their utility function u : R→ R is
twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, concave and we normalize u(0) = 0.
The equity investor is risk-neutral and can only consume in period 2. At time zero she is endowed
with measure 1 − δ units of the good. Hence, at time zero there is an aggregate endowment of
measure 1 unit of the good. Debt investors and equity investors finance the firm’s investment in
a risky asset. Agents are born either as equity investor or debt investor, agents may not split
their endowment to finance the firm in both ways.14
Investment There exists a storage technology and a risky, illiquid asset in the economy, T .
Storage yields the initial investment for sure in every period. For every unit invested in period 0,
the asset T yields 0 < l ≤ 1 units if the asset is sold prematurely in period 1. If the investment is
13This is in contrast to Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) where a certain
proportion of agents has to consume in the first period.
14This assumption is for tractability reasons, actions are binary.
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continued until period 2, T yields either payoff H > 1 with probability p or zero with probability
1− p, where p = p(θ) is random and determined by the random state θ ∈ [0, 1] (see information
structure below). The asset’s probability of return p(θ) is continuously differentiable in θ, strictly
increasing for θ ≤ θ and constant p(θ) = 1 on [θ, 1]. θ denotes the boundary to the upper
dominance region, introduced below.
We call l the (market) liquidity15 of the asset. We can also think of l as the fire sales price in the
secondary market in times of crises.16 Liquidity l is exogenously given and deterministic. Debt
investors have no access to asset T , only to storage. Debt investors gain indirect access to T
through investing in the firm. The expected asset return exceeds the return from storage
E[p(θ)]H > 1 (1.1)
The firm The economy has a representative financial intermediary - the firm. The firm’s
balance sheet size is normalized to 1. She raises funds of one unit and invests in asset T .17 The
firm finances an endogenous fraction δ ∈ (0, 1) of her funds through short-term debt and the
remaining fraction 1 − δ with equity. As funds are normalized, we call δ also the firm’s capital
structure or debt ratio and 1−δ the equity ratio.18 The firm is in perfect competition for deposits.
Debt contract and firm structure By entering in a debt contract with the firm, debt
investors can attain higher returns on their investment than through investing in storage. Every
debt contract is characterized by two exogenously given coupons, a period 1 coupon r > 1 and
period 2 coupon rk < H. We henceforth write (r, k) for the contract.
If a debt investor invests in contract (r, k), she hands her endowment to the firm in period 0. The
contract is liquid in the sense that a debt investor may decide spontaneously in period 1 whether
to claim short-term coupon r in period 1 or whether to wait, roll over debt and claim long-term
coupon rk in period 2. For k < 1, the game has the dominant action to withdraw early. To keep
the analysis interesting, in the remainder of the paper we concentrate on k > 1.19
In period 1, debt investor i chooses her action and decides whether to Ai ∈ {withdraw, roll over}
her investment. When a debt investor decides to withdraw, we will also say that she ’runs’ on
the firm. She cannot demand a fraction of her investment. The parameter k ∈ (1, H/r) can be
seen as an implicit forward interest payment which the firm pays to investors for leaving funds
15See Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)
16If the asset as a risky loan, due to information asymmetries a potential buyer is willing to only pay
l < 1 instead of a price that would reflect the fair value of the loan.
17By assumption, the firm commits to investing in the asset no matter how the state realizes. By this,
we exclude signaling in a global game and circumvent multiplicity of equilibria.
18By this normalization, in the analysis of this paper the firm always holds exactly one asset. But the
financing structure of the balance sheet, the composition of equity and short-term debt, changes. By the
normalization, an increase in debt (ratio) is always accompanied by a decrease in equity (ratio).
19The debt contract can be understood as a one-period zero coupon bond with price 1 and face value r
and the option to convert the bond in period 1 to a two period zero coupon bond with face value rk.
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invested for another period.20
Contract (r, k) and asset return probability function p(·) are such that the expected payoff from
rolling over exceeds payoff from withdrawing
E[p(θ)]u(kr) > u(r) (1.2)
Otherwise, running on the firm was a dominant action and the outcome of the game becomes
trivial. Note that r > 1 implies
E[p(θ)]u(kr) > u(1) (1.3)
that is, the expected period 2 payoff from the contract exceeds utility from storage and partici-
pation in the contract is individually rational.
Endogenous Liquidation If the firm has a debt ratio δ and offers contract (r, k) we call
(r, k, δ) the firm structure. At period 1, a firm with structure (r, k, δ) faces potential withdrawals
of short-term debt of value up to δr. As debt is more senior than equity, the firm is committed to
make the coupon payments under the premise of solvency. In this paper, we only consider firms
which are prone to runs. This is no constraint but keeps the game interesting. If the firm is not
prone to runs δr ≤ l, the coordination problem vanishes and the outcome is trivial. For a given
contract (r, k), let the proportion of short-term debt funds δ and promised short-term coupon r
be high such that ex ante a liquidity squeeze (run) cannot be excluded, i.e. it holds
δr > l (1.4)
Let n ∈ [0, 1] denote the endogenous, random equilibrium proportion of debt investors who decide
to withdraw in period 1 (aggregate action). Given the contract (r, k) and the measure of short-
term debt funds δ ∈ (0, 1) collected by the firm, in period 1 the firm needs to pay out the ex
ante random measure δrn of cash to withdrawing debt investors. The firm finances withdrawals
by liquidating the corresponding fraction nδr/l of the asset. A run occurs in period 1, if the
measure of short-term funds claimed back by withdrawing investors exceeds market liquidity of
the asset l, that is if n realizes such that
nδr > l (1.5)
Sequential Service Constraint In the incidence of a run, if asset liquidity undercuts debt
claims by withdrawing investors, the firm cannot honor her debt and goes into default. In that
case, the firm follows a sequential service constraint. Withdrawing investors are served one after
another in a queue and paid their promised coupon payments until all cash raised from liquidation
20The assumption k > 1 is necessary, otherwise we had r > kr and withdrawing early was a dominant
action.
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is distributed. By definition of a run, there are debt investors in the queue, trying to withdraw,
who will not be paid since the firm will run out of cash before it is their turn in the queue.21
There is mass l in cash available for distribution while there is a claim for cash of mass δrn > l.
Payoffs in case of a run to withdrawing debt investors are u(r) with probability l/(δnr) (prob-
ability of getting served in the queue) or 0 with probability 1− l/(δnr). Debt investors who roll
over receive zero in case of a run since all debt investors draw on the same pool of liquidity. We
assume zero recovery costs.
If the firm stays liquid in period 1, all withdrawing investors receive u(r) and the game proceeds
to period 2. In period 2, the return of the asset realizes as either H with probability p(θ) or
zero.22 In case of zero, remaining debt investors receive zero. Conditional on success, gross return
on remaining investment per debt investor equals
V (n) =
(1− δnr/l)H
δ(1− n) (1.6)
By illiquidity of the asset, liquidation diminishes future gross returns. Thus, gross return per
debt investor V may undercut promised long-term coupon kr. Hence, our model allows for the
case where the firm is liquid but insolvent at the same time: In period 1, it might be that debt
claims and thus liquidation of assets at fire sales prices are so extensive, that the debt service
of all claims in the following period becomes a foreseeable impossibility. In period 2, if gross
return per debt investor undercuts kr, the firm is insolvent, and again follows a sequential service
constraint. Debt investor receive u(kr) only with probability
(1− δnr/l)H
δ(1− n)kr < 1 (1.7)
and equity value is zero. If gross return exceeds kr, kr = min(V, kr), debt investors who roll over
receive payoffs u(kr) as promised in the contract, and equity investors obtain the residual value.
Payoffs Debt Investors We assign the following payoffs to agents:
Event/ Action withdraw roll-over
no run,
n ∈ [0, l/(δr)] u(r)
{
u(kr) · q(n), p(θ)
0, 1− p(θ)
run,
n ∈ [l/(δr), 1]
{
u(r) , prob. l/(δnr),
0, , prob. 1− l/(δnr) 0
where
q(n) = min
(
1,
(1− δnr/l)H
δ(1− n)kr
)
(1.8)
21In particular, agents do not receive a pro rata share of their promised coupon for sure but receive their
full claims if they are served in the queue (with a probability strictly smaller one). This assumption is for
tractability reasons.
22For instance, a loan is paid back including interest H or the borrower defaults completely.
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is the probability to obtain period 2 coupon when queuing conditional on investment being suc-
cessful.
Debt investor’s random utility difference between withdrawing in period 2 versus withdrawing
early in period 1 is given by
v(θ, n) =
{
p(θ)u(kr) · q(n)− u(r) if n ≤ lδr (no run)
− lδnr u(r) if n > lδr (run)
(1.9)
Information Structure Here we follow Goldstein and Pauzner (2005). In period zero, the
unobservable state θ ∼ U [0, 1] realizes and determines the return probability p(θ) of the asset.
Debt investors share a common prior about state θ in period 0. In period 1, debt investors observe
private, noisy and asymmetric signals about the state and hence asset return probability
θi = θ + εi, i ∈ [0, δ]
where εi are iid random noise terms, independent of θ and distributed according to U [−ε,+ε].
From the signal structure we see, signals convey information not only about the random asset
return probability p(θ) but also about other investors’ signals.
We assume, there exist states which yield dominant actions (dominance regions).23 There are
states θ and θ such that if θ < θ, withdrawing is a dominant action whereas if θ > θ rolling over
is the dominant action to debt investors. We refer to [0, θ] as the lower dominance region and
call [θ, 1] the upper dominance region. The bound θ depends on the specific contract (r, k) and
is given as the realization of θ such that24
u(r) = p(θ)u(kr)
The assumption of existence of the lower dominance region implies that function p(·) takes values
below u(r)/u(kr) > 0. For high states θ ≥ θ, we impose that the asset earns return H already in
period 1 with certainty, that is with p(θ) = 1. As a consequence of assumption H > kr > r, the
coordination problem vanishes for state realizations in the upper dominance region. To ensure
that debt investors may receive signals from which they can infer that the state has realized in
either of the dominance regions, we assume that noise ε is sufficiently small such that θ(r, k) > 2ε
and θ < 1− 2ε hold. In particular, the bounds to the dominance regions are independent of debt
ratio and asset liquidity.
23Dominance regions are crucial to obtain an equilibrium selection (Morris and Shin, 2001).
24Payoff u(kr) is the maximum payoff debt investors who roll over can obtain. By design of the contract,
if θ realizes below θ, even in the absence of a run the expected payoff to rolling over is smaller than u(r)
for every n ∈ [0, 1], while conditional on a run investors who roll over receive zero.
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Timing In period 0, the state θ and payoff probability p(θ) realize unobservably. Debt and
equity investors invest. In period 1, debt investors observe noisy, private signals and subsequently
choose actions. The aggregate action n (proportion of withdrawing debt investors) realizes and
determines whether the firm defaults due to a run or whether she stays liquid in period 1. In
case of a run, all debt investors receive payoffs according to chosen actions and the game ends.
If the firm stays liquid, the game proceeds to period 2 after paying debt investors who decide
to withdraw. In period 2, the success of the risky investment is determined. Payoffs to equity
investors and debt investors who roll over realize. Note that agents choose actions only in period
1.25
t0 t1 t2
θi private signals realize, 
actions are chosen
Run/ No run   
θ,p(θ) realize, 
investment
asset return
realizes
1.3 Equilibrium
In order to justify the imposition of the information structure described in the outline of the
model we briefly discuss equilibrium behavior in the absence of private, noisy and asymmetric
signals.
The Common Knowledge Game
Without signals, all debt investors share a common prior about state θ in period zero and receive
no further information about the state in period 1. By assumption (2.2), the ex ante expected
utility from rolling over exceeds the utility from withdrawing. The presence of the coordination
problem in period 1 gives rise to a Diamond and Dybvig (1983) type situation. There are two
pure equilibria: In the ’good’ equilibrium all debt investors roll over and there is no run. Due
to assumption (2.3) welfare in this equilibrium is higher than in the outcome where all debt
investors store their endowment. In the bad equilibrium all investors panic and withdraw early
which causes a run. In the run equilibrium, due to u(l) ≤ u(1), aggregate welfare is lower than
in the outcome where all debt investors store their endowment. There is no means to determine
the ex ante probability for selection of the Pareto-efficient no-run equilibrium within the model.
To achieve an equilibrium selection and definite comparative statics on stability we impose the
information structure given in the outline of the model.
25Equity investors do not act in this paper since they hold the residual claim in period 2.
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1.3.1 The Coordination Game
Let (r, k, δ) the firm’s structure and let θi an investor’s private signal. A mixed strategy for
investor i is a measurable function si : [0 − ε, 1 + ε] → [0, 1] which assigns a probability that
the investor withdraws early (runs) as a function of her signal θi. A strategy profile is denoted
by {si}i∈[0,δ]. A fixed strategy profile generates a random variable n˜(θ) ∈ [0, 1] which represents
the aggregate action, the proportion of investors who withdraw early, if the unobservable state
realizes as θ. The equilibrium concept we use is Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
Proposition 1.3.1 (Existence and Uniqueness). The coordination game played by debt investors
has a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium is in trigger strategies.
Denote by θ∗ = θ∗(r, k, δ, l,H, p(·)) ∈ [θ − ε, θ + ε] the equilibrium trigger signal. In the trigger
equilibrium, if an investor observes a signal θi < θ
∗ she withdraws, if she observes a signal θi > θ∗
she rolls over debt. In case θi = θ
∗ she is indifferent. For the equilibrium is a symmetric trigger
equilibrium played by a continuum of debt investors, the endogenous measure of investors who
withdraw is a deterministic function of the random state and the equilibrium trigger signal. Let
n(θ, θ∗) indicate the endogenous equilibrium proportion of investors demanding early withdrawal
in period 1 when the true state is θ and the trigger is θ∗. The function n(θ, θ∗) is given by the
proportion26 of investors who observe a signal below the trigger θ∗ when the true state is θ. By
the uniform distribution of the error term, we have
n(θ, θ∗) =

1
2 +
θ∗−θ
2ε if θ ∈ [θ∗ − ε, θ∗ + ε]
1 if θ ≤ θ∗ − ε
0 if θ ≥ θ∗ + ε.
(1.10)
In Figure (2.2), we have plotted the proportion of investors withdrawing as a function of the
state for fixed trigger θ∗. Given state θ, investors observe signals in the range [θ − ε, θ + ε]. For
a state below θ∗ − ε, all investors obtain signals smaller than the trigger and hence withdraw,
n = 1. Vice versa, for a state above θ∗ + ε, all investors observe signals larger than the trigger
and hence roll over, n = 0.
Having established equilibrium uniqueness, the equilibrium trigger signal is pinned down by the
expected payoff difference between actions conditional on having observed the equilibrium trigger
θi = θ
∗ when all investors use the same trigger θ∗,
D(θi, θ
∗) =
1
2ε
∫ θi+ε
θi−ε
v(θ, n(θ, θ∗)) dθ (1.11)
When observing a signal θi < θ
∗, the expected payoff difference D(θi, θ∗) is negative and the
investor withdraws. When instead she observes θi > θ
∗, the payoff difference D(θi, θ∗) is positive
and she rolls over. When observing a signal equal to the equilibrium trigger a debt investor’s
26As the continuum of debt investors has measure δ, the proportion of investors observing signals below
the trigger differs from its measure by factor δ.
18
lower dominance
region
range of states for potential 
miscoordination
upper dominance
region
Figure 1.2: Proportion of debt investors who withdraw as a function of the state. Note that
while the bounds to the dominance regions, θ and θ, and the critical state θb are states, the
trigger θ∗ is a signal. We have included the trigger here, to give some intuition. Further,
the trigger θ∗ converges to the critical state θb as signals become precise, see Lemma 2.3.1.
posterior beliefs on the state and the proportion of withdrawing investors n need to be such
that in expectation utility from withdrawing equals utility from rolling over. The trigger is thus
implicitly defined by the payoff indifference equality (PIE)
D(θ∗, θ∗) = 0 (1.12)
Graphically, as signals become precise the trigger is located between the dominance regions [θ, θ]
in a way such that the area under the curve in Figure (2.1) equals zero in expectation conditional
on having observed a signal equal to the trigger. Conditional on observing the trigger signal
θi = θ
∗, an investor’s belief about the proportion of withdrawing agents n is uniform over [0, 1]
(Laplacian Belief).27 Consequently, with slight abuse of notation we can write the PIE using
(2.9) and (2.11) as
0 = −
∫ 1
l/(δr)
l
δrn
u(r)dn+
∫ l/(δr)
h∗
p(θ(n, θ∗))
(1− nrδ/l)H
δ(1− n)kr u(kr)− u(r) dn (1.13)
+
∫ h∗
0
p(θ(n, θ∗)) u(kr)− u(r) dn
where θ(n, θ∗) = θ∗ + ε (1− 2n) is the inverse of n(θ, θ∗) for θ ∈ [θ∗ − ε, θ∗ + ε]. The parameter
h∗ given in (1.20) denotes the proportion of withdrawing investors n for which gross return per
remaining debt investor V (n) intersects kr. For low withdrawals n ≤ h∗ the firm is liquid in
27We have P(n < z|θi = θ∗) = P
(
1
2 +
εi
2ε < z
)
= z for z ∈ [0, 1]
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Figure 1.3: Payoff difference function v(θ, n) from equation (2.9) plotted for fixed θ as
function of the endogenous proportion of withdrawing debt investors n. The kink gives
rise to non-monotone comparative statics.
period 1 for sure and solvent in period 2 if investment is successful. For all larger proportions
of withdrawing investors n > h∗, debt investors who roll over cannot be repaid in full and the
firm becomes insolvent in period 2. If the proportion of withdrawing investors n is high and
lies in interval [l/(δr), 1] a run occurs in period 1 and the firm defaults due to illiquidity. For
intermediate withdrawals n ∈ [h∗, l/(δr)) the firm stays liquid in period 1 but the measure of
withdrawn funds is high such that remaining investment cannot earn sufficient interest to pay off
all investors in the next period even if the asset pays off. Hence, for withdrawals n ∈ [h∗, l/(δr))
the firm is liquid but insolvent in period 1.28
Denote by θ˜ the state at which asset liquidations occur to an extent that puts the firm on the
edge of staying solvent in period 2,
h∗ = n(θ˜, θ∗) (1.14)
Then h∗ is the critical measure of withdrawing investors at which investors who roll over debt
just receive their coupon payment u(kr) for sure conditional on successful investment. If the
state realizes such that measure of claimed funds nδr just equals available liquidity l, the firm is
on the edge of becoming illiquid in period 1. We call this state the critical state29 θb,
28By assumption, the firm needs to partially sell the asset and has no access to collateralized borrowing.
Here, our treatment is different from Morris and Shin (2009) who assume the that the firm may pledge
the asset at a hair cut. In a later section, we demonstrate robustness of our results under collateralized
borrowing. Also, we do not allow the firm to replace withdrawn deposits with other funds.
29Under collateralized borrowing, the critical state θb and state θ˜ would be equal. Hence, if the firm
stays liquid she can always repay all investors in period 2 if the asset pays.
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n(θb, θ
∗) = l/(δr) (1.15)
As depicted in Figure (2.2), for state realizations smaller than the critical state a run occurs
because the value of claimed funds exceeds market liquidity of the asset. In the sequel, we say
that signals become precise or noise vanishes, if the support of the idiosyncratic, random shock
collapses to a single point, ε→ 0.
As signals become precise, the critical state converges to the trigger, θb → θ∗ , thus the trigger
directly represents the firm’s risk to become illiquid or insolvent due to extensive asset liquida-
tions.30
Lemma 1.3.1. As signals become precise, the trigger equals both the probability of a run and the
probability of insolvency due to extensive asset liquidations.
To proof the Lemma - a run occurs if the random state realizes below threshold θb. By the
uniform distribution of θ and equation (1.15) the probability of a run is hence given as
P (θ < θb) = θb = θ∗ + ε
(
1− 2 l
δr
)
(1.16)
Equivalently, risk of insolvency due to extensive asset liquidations equals
P
(
θ < θ˜
)
= θ˜ = θ∗ − ε (2h∗(δ)− 1) (1.17)
In either case, when signals are precise the trigger converges to both the ex ante probability of
a run and to ex ante insolvency risk due to extensive asset liquidations. Further, any partial
derivative of the corresponding probability equals the partial derivative of the trigger θ∗ plus ε
times a constant. As noise ε vanishes, the partial derivative of the probability equals the partial
derivative of the trigger. 
As a consequence of Lemma 2.3.1, at the limit state realizations above the trigger lead to suc-
cessful coordination while realizations below the trigger lead to runs. The size of the equilibrium
trigger between the dominance regions determines the quality of coordination in the model. The
larger the trigger, the greater the ex ante risk of a run. Runs for signal realizations in the lower
dominance region are efficient since they are caused by fears about low asset returns, see Figure
(2.3). The range of states between the trigger and the lower dominance region however yields
panic or self-fulfilling runs, which cannot be attributed to asset return risk but failure of coordina-
tion. We are interested in the behavior of the trigger as capital structure and asset liquidity varies.
We say stability increases in debt ratio δ, if the trigger decreases in δ. We say liquidity risk
increases in δ, if the trigger increases in δ. For given contract (r, k) and fixed liquidity l, a debt
30Note that for calculating the general insolvency risk we would further need to take into account the
probability that the asset does not pay off. Capital structure endogenously affects the risk of insolvency
due to extensive asset liquidations but not the payoff probability of the asset.
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NO RUNS
PANIC RUNS
Figure 1.4: The size of the trigger determines the range of states for which panic runs
occur
ratio δ yields higher stability than debt ratio δ˜, if at liquidity l, the ex ante probability of a run
is lower under δ than under δ˜. That is, the trigger under δ is smaller than the trigger under δ˜.
1.3.2 Stability
We now state our main theorem. By the following result, for every contract (r, k) the change of
debt investors’ behavior due to a change in debt ratio depends on the according level of asset
market liquidity. We only consider debt ratios in the range (l/r, 1) since for ratios below l/r the
coordination problem vanishes and the firm is thus not prone to runs.
Theorem 1.3.1 (Stability against Runs). For given contract (r, k) there exist two contract de-
pendent thresholds l˜B(1), l˜A(1) ∈ [0, 1], l˜B(1) ≤ l˜A(1) for liquidity such that
i) If liquidity is high l ∈ (l˜A(1), 1], firm stability monotonically decreases in short-term debt.
ii) If liquidity is moderate l ∈ [l˜B(1), l˜A(1)], there are two disjoint, non-empty intervals for debt
ratio such that stability decreases in short-term debt for lower values δ ∈ (l/r, δu) and stability is
minimized at a higher debt ratio in [δu, 1).
iii) If liquidity is low l ∈ [0, l˜B(1)), there exist three non-empty, disjoint intervals for debt ratio
such that: stability decreases in short-term debt for small values in δ ∈ (l/r, δu) and stability
improves in short-term debt for larger values in δ ∈ (δd, 1). Stability is smallest at some interior
debt ratio in [δu, δd].
(iv) The smaller liquidity, the wider the interval (δd, 1) over which stability improves in short-
term debt and the lower the position of the interval [δu, δd] which contains the debt ratio yielding
lowest stability.
(v) As liquidity dries up, l→ 0, stability monotonically improves in short-term debt and deterio-
rates in equity.
The proof is conducted using the Implicit Function Theorem on the PIE. Direct comparative
statics of the trigger (stability) in debt ratio are non-monotone and depend on the general return
probability function p(·) of the asset. To prove Theorem 1.3.1 we proceed by deriving an upper
and lower bound for the slope of the trigger to cast off the general function p(·). The bounds for
slope have a very similar functional form. By analyzing the cross derivatives of these bounds in
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liquidity we see that both bounds satisfy single-crossing in debt ratio if liquidity is sufficiently
low. 31
Our main Theorem is in contrast to Morris and Shin (2009), Rochet and Vives (2004), Vives
(2014) and Ko¨nig et al. (2014). Rochet and Vives (2004) and Vives (2014) obtain monotone
comparative statics in the firm’s balance sheet decomposition: The probability of firm failure is
strictly decreasing in equity ratio. Similarly, Ko¨nig et al. (2014) obtain a default point that is
monotone in debt. Morris and Shin (2009) show that ex ante illiquidity risk decreases in liquidity
ratio and thus increases in short-term debt.
Figure 1.5: Stability as function of liquidity and debt ratio
Figure (1.5) depicts the results of Theorem 1.3.1. We have plotted market liquidity on the hori-
zontal axis and debt ratio on the vertical axis. As we only consider firms which are prone to runs,
we are interested in the behavior of the trigger for liquidity-debt combinations (l, δ) which satisfy
31As we work with bounds for the slope, a blind spot arises for behavior of the trigger when debt ratio
lies in interval [δu(l), δd(l)]. In this case, the lower bound for the slope is negative while the upper bound is
positive. The blind spot [δu(l), δd(l)] becomes smaller (the range of the interval goes to zero) as k decreases
for the bounds converge towards one another. Under collateralized borrowing, the blind spot vanishes and
for every asset liquidity we obtain a unique, interior stability minimizing debt ratio as well as two locally
stability maximizing debt ratios at the boundaries (see later discussion).
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δr > l. The curves δd(l) and δu(l) play a crucial role. For every liquidity l ∈ [0, 1], the curve
δu(l) lies below or at the curve δd(l). When fixing a specific asset liquidity on the horizontal axis,
we need to look at the vertical cross-section along the δ-dimension. The curves δu(l) and δd(l)
yield the bounds where monotonicity of stability in debt halts (δu(l)) or starts (δd(l)) at liquidity
value l: When at liquidity l the curve δu(l) exceeds value one, then liquidity is high and stability
is monotone in debt. If liquidity is sufficiently low l = l1, the line l1 intersects both curves δu(l)
and δd(l). Denote by δu(l1) and δd(l1) the corresponding values of debt at the intersection. Then,
stability deteriorates in debt for debt values in (l1/r, δu(l1)) and stability improves in debt for
debt values in (δd(l1), 1). The probability of a run at liquidity l1 reaches its global maximum (and
stability minimum) at some debt ratio in [δu(l1), δd(l1)]. The functions δu(l) and δd(l) monoton-
ically increase in liquidity32 and converge to zero as liquidity goes to zero (see Lemma 1.7.3 in
Appendix). The lower the asset’s market liquidity the greater the range of debt ratios (δd(l), 1)
for which stability improves in short-term debt and hence deteriorates in equity. Also, the lower
market liquidity, the smaller the debt ratios contained in interval [δu(l), δd(l)]. The debt ratio
which yields minimum stability is not necessarily monotone in liquidity. But since both interval
bounds δu(l), δd(l) increase in liquidity, the minimizing debt ratio lies below a bound which de-
creases as liquidity dries up. Vice versa, the equity ratio yielding minimum stability lies above
a bound which increases as liquidity decreases. Hence, especially for illiquid assets, the intuition
that less short-term financing leads to a lower risk of a liquidity squeeze through runs turns out
wrong since short-term debt can discipline depositors to coordinate.
Our analysis of a severe decline in liquidity is motivated by empirical evidence; Gorton and
Metrick (2009, 2012) document haircuts for structured products used as collateral in repo trans-
actions of 50-100% which corresponds to a sharp plummet in funding and hence market liquidity
(Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009) in the course of the financial crises 2007-2008.
1.3.3 Policy Implications
To determine the effect of capital regulation on stability,33 we pick a different, higher liquidity
value l2. To this purpose, assume firm’s current debt ratio is δ
′ and asset risk based capital
regulation34 requires that debt ratio may not exceed δr < δ
′. When we decrease short-term debt
ratio from δ′ to δr, the change of stability depends on the level of market liquidity of the asset,
see Figure 1.6.
When liquidity l2 is sufficiently high, the curves δu(l) and δd(l) do not take admissible values
32Debt ratios can only take values in [0, 1]. For larger liquidity values, the functions δu(l) and δd(l) take
values above one and are hence not attainable by any debt ratio. For such liquidity values the bounds for
monotonicity δu(l) and δd(l) cease to exist and stability is monotone in debt.
33Note that once we allow for long-term debt financing, the following discussion may take the form of
regulating the amount of short-term debt financing (see later subsection).
34Risk-based capital regulation in this paper corresponds to a specific asset return probability function
p(θ) and return H.
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Figure 1.6: Effect of capital regulation on stability depending on asset liquidity
at l2: Both debt ratios δ
′ and δr lie below the δu(l) curve at l2, a decrease in debt ratio thus
improves stability, θ∗(δr) < θ∗(δ′) by Theorem 1.3.1 and Lemma 2.3.1. If instead liquidity is low
at l1 and debt ratios δ
′ and δr lie above value δd(l1), the decrease in short-term debt will cause a
stability loss since coordination would deteriorate, θ∗(δr) > θ∗(δ′). By Lemma 2.3.1, the ex ante
probability of a run increases when reducing debt ratio from δ′ to δr.
Lemma 1.3.2. Assume signals are precise. If liquidity is high, capital regulation can reduce the
probability of runs. When liquidity is low, capital regulation can increase the probability of runs.
Note that Lemma 1.3.2 states, if liquidity is low, capital regulation might change the distribution
of debt to be withdrawn on short notice in a way, such that an exceedance of asset’s market liq-
uidity becomes more likely although the overall amount of short-term debt financing is decreased:
In our example in Figure (1.6), we have δr < δ
′. But the probability of a run under debt structure
δr is higher than under debt structure δ
′:
P(θ < θb(δ′)) = θ∗(δ′) < θ∗(δr) = P(θ < θb(δr)) (1.18)
The results demonstrate that capital regulation and regulation of short-term debt financing can
have adverse effects on run behavior of agents and hence stability. Capital regulation needs take
into account the liquidity profile of firm assets. Further, capital and liquidity regulation should
not be separated.
During economic boom times asset liquidity is higher and capital regulation may have a positive
effect on coordination behavior and thus stability ex ante. During financial crises however,
liquidity dries up. Capital regulation may complicate coordination and thus increase illiquidity
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risk for ex ante the probability that claimed short-term debt exceeds available liquidity increases
although the overall exposure of the firm to short-term debt investors is decreased.
1.3.4 Liquidity Mismatch
Another implication of our result concerns liquidity regulation. To this purpose define the liquidity
ratio as the ratio of liquidity available through sale of the asset to potential short term debt claims
ξ =
l
δr
∈ [0, 1] (1.19)
Liquidity ratio measures liquidity mismatch between assets and short-term liabilities. The smaller
the liquidity ratio, the larger the liquidity mismatch between assets and liabilities. Liquidity mis-
match is generally perceived as a source of liquidity risk (Brunnermeier et al., 2014, 2011; Bai
et al., 2014; Basel III, 2013). We will next demonstrate that liquidity mismatch does not nec-
essarily aggravate coordination and hence increase probability of runs. When withdrawals are
endogenous, liquidity mismatch is no good indicator for liquidity risk driven by miscoordination
on runs.
If liquidity mismatch impaired coordination, liquidity ratio would be an indicator for liquidity
risk, the smaller liquidity ratio the larger liquidity risk. Theorem (1.3.1) however demonstrate
that stability is non-monotone in liquidity ratio: Liquidity ratio as defined in (1.19) decreases
in debt ratio δ when keeping liquidity fix. Fix a low liquidity value l1 ≤ l˜B(1) and consider the
ranges of debt ratios (l1/r, δu(l1)) and (δd(l1), 1). For fixed liquidity value l1, as debt ratio δ
increases within the interval (δd(l1), 1), liquidity ratio decreases by (1.19) while simultaneously
stability improves by Theorem (1.3.1). As debt ratio δ increases within the interval (l1/r, δu(l1)),
liquidity ratio still decreases but stability deteriorates by Theorem (1.3.1). A different way of
seeing this result is depicted in the Online Appendix.
Lemma 1.3.3. Stability is non-monotone in liquidity ratio (liquidity mismatch).
This result is in contrast to Morris and Shin (2009) and Rochet and Vives (2004) where stability
is monotone increasing in liquidity ratio. 35
1.4 Optimal Capital Structure
We next analyze utility debt investors infer from contract (r, k) as a function of firm debt ratio
and market liquidity of the asset. As signals become precise, we obtain
35Rochet and Vives (2004) have adapted a different notion of liquidity ratio in their model which comes
closer to the original definition of Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) as defined in the Basel 3 framework
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The LCR is defined as the ratio of high quality liquid
assets (HQLA) over total expected net cash outflow in a stress scenario over 30 days.
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Proposition 1.4.1 (Optimality for Debt investors). Fix contract (r, k).
When liquidity is high, debt investor’s utility from the contract decreases monotone in firm debt
ratio. When liquidity is moderate or low, utility decreases in debt ratio for lower values of debt
ratio δ ∈ (l/r, δu). If however liquidity is very low, and debt ratio large, δ > δd(l), utility increases
in debt for all δ ∈ (δd(l), 1).
Corollary 1.4.1. If asset liquidity is high, debt investors’ utility from the contract reaches the
global maximum when the firm is financed through sufficient equity such that panic runs are
excluded δ = l/r. Utility reaches the global minimum if the firm is financed through debt only.
If asset liquidity is sufficiently low, debt investors utility from the contract is locally maximized
when the firm is financed through debt only.
Intuitively, debt ratio influences debt investors’ utility inferred from the contract in two ways.
An increase in debt ratio always has a direct, negative impact on immediate utility (assuming
the trigger would stay constant) from both withdrawing and rolling over since it goes hand in
hand with a decrease in equity ratio and thus a decrease in protective cushion.
A change in debt ratio has a further indirect influence on utility by a manipulation of the trigger
and hence a change in stability. Since stability can either improve or deteriorate in debt ratio,
the impact of changes in debt ratio on overall utility from the contract is in general not uniquely
pinned down.
If stability is impaired by an increase in debt the overall impact on utility is clearly negative. By
Theorem (1.3.1), that is the case if liquidity is high or when liquidity is moderate or low and debt
ratio sufficiently low. If however stability improves in debt ratio, by Theorem (1.3.1) that is the
case when liquidity is low and debt ratio is high, debt investors trade off stability gains against
immediate utility losses. When liquidity is sufficiently low and debt is increased, the increase in
stability outweighs the decrease in direct utility.36
1.5 Extensions
1.5.1 Robustness: Collateralized Borrowing
When allowing the firm to raise cash in the money market by pledging the asset as collateral in a
repurchase agreement (repo), partial liquidation of assets can be prevented. A repo transaction
involves two parties, the firm (the borrower) and a lender. The firm borrows cash from the lender
and agrees to repay the amount plus an interest payment (at repo rate) in period 2. In addition,
the firm posts a fraction of the asset as collateral which goes into physical possession of the lender
but is returned when the amount borrowed is paid back. If the firm cannot repay, she defaults
on the repo and the lender in the repurchase agreement may sell the collateral at market price.
36By Proposition (1.7.1) the assumption that stability increases in debt ratio for small liquidity is
consistent when debt ratio is sufficiently large, i.e. we do not talk about a zero measure set.
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The collateral hence reduces the risk of the transaction to the lender. What is the difference to
the case where the firm has to sell the asset in the market to raise cash (partial liquidation)?
If the firm can repay in period 2 and gains back the fraction of asset posted as collateral, the
asset’s accrued interest goes to the firm, including the interest which accrued on the collateralized
fraction. Under partial liquidation, the interest that accrues on the sold part of the asset goes to
the new owner. The payoff structure changes.
The exogenous amount of cash that can be raised when pledging one unit of the asset as collateral
is called funding liquidity and replaces the notion of market liquidity, the amount of cash that can
be raised by selling the asset at market price.37 Note in particular that funding liquidity is not the
market value of the collateral (asset) but the fraction of the ’true’ value participants in the money
market are willing to pay to accept the asset as collateral (overcollateralization). For the analy-
sis we assume a repo rate of zero but results can be extended to accommodate a general repo rate.
We can show that the non-monotonicity results are robust in this different setting. As a result
of the changed payoffs, the blind spot (area between curves δu(l) and δd(l)) vanishes and the
probability of runs is either monotone for large liquidity or is hump-shaped in debt for lower
liquidity values, i.e. is maximized at a unique interior debt ratio. Note that in the following
chapter, the setting just described is analyzed as a special case (a = 0, b = 1).
1.5.2 Long-term debt
So far the financing structure of the firm is composed of short-term debt and equity. We can
extend the structure by adding long-term debt. To keep the balance sheet normalized at 1, let δ
again the fraction of short-term debt, let τ(1 − δ), τ ∈ [0, 1] the fraction of long-term debt and
(1− τ)(1− δ) the fraction of equity. Long-term debt investors invest in period 0 and are paid in
period 2 prior to equity investors. At the interim period 1, they have no claims.
First, assume that long-term debt investors are less senior than short-term debt investors and
are hence paid in period 2 only after short-term debt investors were fully paid. Then long-term
debt is like equity to short-term debt investors. Thus, replacing equity with long-term debt
has no impact on coordination of short-term debt investors. The non-monotonicity results for
short-term debt derived in previous sections hold and have implications for liquidity regulation.
The interpretation however changes. In the previous section, when talking about debt we always
referred to short-term debt. This was unambiguous since short-term debt was the only form of
debt and the remaining financing source was equity. The statements on equity from previous
sections now hold for the combined sum of equity and long-term debt 1− δ.
If long-term debt is treated equally senior as short-term debt in period 2, long-term debt is no
37See Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)
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longer like equity to short-term investors. Coordination between short-term investors is altered
when replacing equity with long-term debt. The immediate payoff (assuming the trigger stayed
constant) from withdrawing early stays constant since long-term investors have no claim on
payment at the interim period. The payoff from rolling over however decreases since gross return
on the asset now has to be sufficiently high to cover remaining short-term investors and more
long-term investors. As long-term debt replaces equity, withdrawing becomes more appealing
relative to rolling over and the trigger (probability of runs) increases.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper studies stability of financial firms which conduct maturity and liquidity transformation
by investing long-term in risky and illiquid assets and financing through equity and liquid short-
term debt. We analyze the question, how the probability of runs on such firms depends on capital
structure and market liquidity of assets. While this question has been analyzed before (Morris
and Shin, 2009; Rochet and Vives, 2004; Vives, 2014)38 we allow for an incentive structure more
generic for settings where uninsured debt investors draw on a common pool of finite liquidity.
Since assets are illiquid, cash available through liquidating all assets on short notice is insufficient
to cover withdrawals by potentially all short-term debt investors. If the number of withdrawing
investors exceeds a critical threshold, the full deposit cannot be paid back. In this case, the firm
follows a sequential service constraint. Investors are served one after another until all cash is
distributed and some investors who try to withdraw cannot be served. We hence explicitly model
partial, endogenous repay in the incidence of a run, see Goldstein and Pauzner (2005). The
probability distribution of short-term debt to be withdrawn tomorrow depends on firm capital
structure and asset liquidity today. Relative incentives of choosing actions change in capital
structure in a way we, to the best of our knowledge, have not observed in the literature before:
As main contribution of the paper, we find that the probability of runs is non-monotone in debt
when liquidity dries up. In particular, the run probability is not monotone decreasing in equity
but can in fact increase in equity when liquidity is sufficiently low. More debt financing can
discipline debt investors to coordinate and may lead to lower probability of runs. Vice versa,
decreasing the exposure towards short-term debt investors today may alter the distribution of
debt to be withdrawn tomorrow in a way that runs become more likely ex ante. Liquidity
risk is increased although liquidity mismatch is lowered. These results stand in contrast to the
monotonicity results of previous papers on coordination behavior of debt investors under changes
in capital structure and asset liquidity (Rochet and Vives, 2004; Vives, 2014; Ko¨nig et al., 2014;
Morris and Shin, 2009)
The non-monotonicity results have consequences for evaluating regulation of capital and liquidity
mismatch under Basel 3. By raising quality and quantity of the regulatory capital base, the Basel
38Morris and Shin (2009) analyze collateralized borrowing, Rochet and Vives (2004); Vives (2014) model
delegated decision making by fund managers. In both cases actions are global strategic complements and
comparative statics are monotone.
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Committee intends to raise the ”resilience of the banking sector ” and states that ”strong capital
requirements are a necessary condition for banking sector stability” (Committee et al., 2010;
Basel III, 2013). Our results show, while capital regulation can improve stability when market
liquidity is high, the identical policy rule can harm stability when liquidity dries up for the
implementation of the rule may deteriorate the coordination problem among short-term debt
investors.39 Our results imply that capital regulation of firms financed by uninsured debt should
be tailored to particular scenarios for market liquidity or regulation should distinguish between
firms according to their target asset liquidity.
Our results hold under the assumption that the firm needs to partially liquidate assets to raise
cash but are robust to assuming that the firm has access to the money market and may borrow
by pledging the asset as collateral to avoid partial liquidation. The set-up here thus fits classic
commercial banks but also maturity transforming shadow banks such as structured investment
vehicles (SIVs) and asset-backed commercial paper conduits (ABCPs), see Gorton et al. (2010);
Adrian and Ashcraft (2012).
From a theory perspective, we depart from a model structure exhibiting global strategic comple-
mentarity between actions (Rochet and Vives, 2004; Vives, 2014; Ko¨nig et al., 2014; Morris and
Shin, 2009) and instead work with one-sided strategic complementarity as modeled in Goldstein
and Pauzner (2005) and Karp et al. (2007). One-sided strategic complementarity is the the key
driver for non-monotonicity in global games, as we will see in the following chapter.
As for the limitations of the model, we assume market liquidity of the asset is common knowledge
among or perfectly anticipated by debt investors prior to making their decisions. We however do
not account for correlation between market liquidity and the random state of the economy.
In the model, the firm commits to investing in a particular asset independently of the state re-
alization, which excludes moral hazard by firm managers. We abstract from observable, state
dependent investment choices since this would give rise to an endogenous public signal and hence
equilibrium multiplicity.
While we discuss optimality of capital structure from a debt investor’s point of view when the
firm is in perfect competition for deposits, optimal capital structure which maximizes ex ante
return on equity remains an interesting question to analyze.
We take contracts as exogenously given since the scope of the paper is on analyzing the impact of
capital structure and liquidity on coordination and optimal capital structure from debt investors
perspective. Since the non-monotonicity results hold for every contract, they also hold for the
optimal contract. Optimal contracts for a fully debt financed firm are analyzed in Goldstein and
Pauzner (2005).
39Our results are developed in a model lacking deposit insurance. Member countries of the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision have partial deposit insurance in place. Our analysis on capital
regulation remains interesting since deposit insurance in the face of a global financial crises might not be
perfectly credible. Iyer and Puri (2008) find that deposit insurance is only partially effective in preventing
bank runs.
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1.7 Appendix
We have implicitly defined h∗ such that for n = h∗ a debt investor who rolls over receives her
full coupon just with probability one given that investment is successful. That is, (1−δnr/l)Hδ(1−n)kr = 1,
thus
h∗ =
H − δkr
δr(H/l − k) (1.20)
Hence, for all n ≤ h∗ we have min(1, (1−δnr/l)Hδ(1−n)kr ) = 1 and debt investors who roll over receive the
full payoff u(kr) for sure if investment is successful. For n ≥ h∗, min(1, (1−δnr/l)Hδ(1−n)kr ) = (1−δnr/l)Hδ(1−n)kr
and debt investors who roll over receive a payoff only with a probability (1−δnr/l)Hδ(1−n)kr < 1 while
equity holders receive zero.
For δr > l the term (1−δnr/l)Hδ(1−n)kr is strictly decreasing in n. Moreover, h
∗ < l/(δr) < 1, as δr > l.
We have h∗ > 0 for by assumption H > kr > δkr and δr > l, thus H > kl.
1.7.1 Appendix A: Existence and Uniqueness
Proof. [Theorem 2.3.1]
The existence and uniqueness proof of a trigger equilibrium and the proof that a non-threshold
equilibrium cannot exist is as in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) with λ = 0. Uniqueness of a
threshold equilibrium alternatively holds due to Lemma 2.3 in Morris and Shin (2001) by the
single-crossing property of the payoff difference function v from equation (2.9) in the aggregate
action n (Figure (2.1) and the monotone likelihood ratio property for the uniform distribution of
noise since the function v is strictly decreasing in n whenever v is positive.
We give a short intuition here, why a unique trigger equilibrium exists: Given that all other
investors play a trigger strategy around signal θ∗, a trigger equilibrium exists if a single investor
also finds it optimal to withdraw for signals θi < θ
∗ and to roll over for signals θi > θ∗. That is,
we demand (a) D(θi, n(·, θ∗)) < 0 for θi < θ∗ and (b) D(θi, n(·, θ∗)) > 0 for θi > θ∗. Continuity
of the integral D(θi, n(·, θ∗)) in signal θi holds by Lemma A1 (i) in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005)
and ensures indifference in θi = θ
∗, D(θi = θ∗, n(·, θ∗)) = 0 if (a) and (b) hold. Existence of
a signal which satisfies D(θi = θ
∗, n(·, θ∗)) = 0 follows by the existence of dominance regions
and continuity of D(θi = θ
∗, n(·, θ∗)) in θ∗ by Lemma A1 (ii) in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005):
If the state realizes high enough in the upper dominance region and ε is small, the investor
observes a very high signal such that rolling over is optimal D(θi, n) > 0 independently of n,
similarly, if the state realizes low enough in the lower dominance region, the investor observes
a very low signal such that withdrawing is dominant D(θi, n) < 0. Uniqueness of a signal
satisfying D(θi = θ
∗, n(·, θ∗)) = 0 holds since by Lemma A1 (iii) in Goldstein and Pauzner
(2005), D(θi = θ
∗, n(·, θ∗)) strictly increases in θ∗ as long as signal θ∗ lies below θ¯ + ε since the
probability function p(·) strictly increases in the state for states below the bound to the upper
dominance region. Uniqueness follows since for signals above θ¯ + ε the definition of the upper
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dominance region yields D(θi, n) > 0. Therefore, a unique candidate for a threshold equilibrium
exists. To show that this candidate also satisfies (a) and (b), Goldstein and Pauzner (2005)
decompose the intervals [θi − ε, θi + ε] and [θ∗ − ε, θ∗ + ε], use D(θi = θ∗, n(·, θ∗)) = 0 and the
single crossing property of v(θ, n(θ, θ∗)) in θ, see (A8) and (A9) in their proof to Theorem 1 B.
The proof why a non-threshold equilibrium cannot exist is less intuitive, and fully given in
Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) proof of Theorem 1 C.
1.7.2 Appendix B: Main Theorem
Proof. [Theorem 1.3.1] Since the unique equilibrium of the game is a trigger equilibrium, the
trigger is pinned down by the payoff indifference equation. Upon observing the trigger θi = θ
∗
an investors needs to be indifferent between rolling over or withdrawing. The PIE is given by
0 = D(θi = θ
∗, n(·, θ∗)) = 1
2ε
∫ θ∗+ε
θ∗−ε
v(θ, n(θ, θ∗)) dθ (1.21)
or equivalently by equation (1.13)
0 = u (kr)
∫ h∗
0
p(θ(n, θ∗)) dn− u(r) l
δr
(1 + ln(δr/l)) (1.22)
+
∫ l/δr
h∗
p(θ(n, θ∗))
(1− nrδ/l)H
δ(1− n)kr u(kr) dn
where
θ(n, θ∗) = θ∗ + ε (1− 2n) (1.23)
is the inverse of n(θ, θ∗) for θ ∈ [θ∗ − ε, θ∗ + ε]. We define the function
fˆ(θ∗, δ) ≡ u (kr)
∫ h∗
0
p(θ(n, θ∗)) dn− l
δr
u(r) (1 + ln(δr/l))
+
∫ l/δr
h∗
p(θ(n, θ∗))
(1− nrδ/l)H
δ(1− n)kr u(kr) dn
(1.24)
The zeros of fˆ constitute equilibrium triggers of the game for different parameter constellations.
To determine the behavior of the trigger due to parameter changes it is sufficient to look at the
set of zeros of fˆ . We have
∂
∂θ∗
fˆ(θ∗, δ) = u (kr)
∫ h∗(δ)
0
p′(θ(n, θ∗))
∂
∂θ∗
θ(n, θ∗) dn (1.25)
+
∫ l/δr
h∗(δ)
p′(θ(n, θ∗))
∂
∂θ∗
θ(n, θ∗)
(1− nrδ/l)H
δ(1− n)kr u(kr) dn
= u (kr)
∫ h∗(δ)
0
p′(θ(n, θ∗)) dn+
∫ l/δr
h∗(δ)
p′(θ(n, θ∗))
(1− nrδ/l)H
δ(1− n)kr u(kr) dn > 0
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since ∂∂θ∗ θ(n, θ
∗) = 1 and where h∗ is given in (1.20). At the limit ε → 0, we have θ(n, θ∗) →
θ∗. Since p(·) is continuous and defined on a compact interval, p′(·) is bounded. In addition,
n(θ, θ∗) ≤ 1, hence with Lebesgue’s Dominated Convergence Theorem
lim
ε→0
∂
∂θ∗
fˆ(θ∗, δ)→ p′(θ∗)u (kr)
(
h∗ +
H
δkr
∫ l/δr
h∗(δ)
1− nrδ/l
1− n dn
)
=
p′(θ∗)
p(θ∗)
l
δr
u(r)
(
1 + ln
(
δr
l
))
(1.26)
where we have used trigger equation (1.35). Note that limε→0 ∂∂θ∗ fˆ(θ
∗, δ) = 0 if θ∗ = θ as by
definition of the function p(·), p′(θ) = 0.
Comparative Statics of Trigger in delta
∂fˆ
∂δ
= u(r)
l
δ2r
ln(
δr
l
) +
H
δ2
p(θ∗)
u(kr)
kr
ln
(
H − kl
H
)
(1.27)
since
∫ l/(δr)
h∗
(
− 11−n
)
dn = ln
(
1−l/(δr)
1−h∗
)
= ln
(
H−kl
H
)
< 0.
With (2.24) and the Implicit Function Theorem, it follows
∂θ∗
∂δ
= −
∂fˆ
∂δ
∂fˆ
∂θ∗
= − u(r)
l
δ2r
ln( δrl ) +
H
δ2
p(θ∗) u(kr)kr ln
(
H−kl
H
)
u (kr)
∫ h∗(δ)
0 p
′(θ) dn+
∫ l/δr
h∗(δ) p
′(θ) (1−nrδ/l)Hδ(1−n)kr u(kr) dn
(1.28)
The denominator of (1.28) is positive while the numerator can change sign. For the numerator is
non-monotone in δ, to analyze the slope ∂θ
∗
∂δ we work with boundaries of the numerator instead.
If at the limit ε → 0 θ∗ 6= θ, the denominator in (1.28) converges to a constant unequal to zero
and using (2.25) we can write
lim
ε→0
∂θ∗
∂δ
= −
∂fˆ
∂δ
∂fˆ
∂θ∗
= −u(r)
l
δ2r
ln( δrl ) +
H
δ2
p(θ∗) u(kr)kr ln
(
H−kl
H
)
p′(θ∗)
p(θ∗)
l
δru(r)
(
1 + ln
(
δr
l
)) (1.29)
Upper boundary: By (1.27) and using p(θ)u(kr) > u(r) for θ > θ
d
dδ
fˆ(θ∗, δ) = u(r)
l
δ2r
ln(
δr
l
) +
H
δ2
p(θ∗)
u(kr)
kr
ln
(
H − kl
H
)
< u(r)
l
δ2r
ln(
δr
l
) +
H
δ2
u(r)
kr
ln
(
H − kl
H
)
=
1
δ2r
u(r) ln
[(
δr
l
)l (
1− l
E
)E]
(1.30)
where E ≡ H/k > 1. Thus, ddδ fˆ(θ∗, δ) < 0 if
(
δr
l
)l (
1− lE
)E
< 1.
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Lower boundary:
d
dδ
fˆ(θ∗, δ) = u(r)
l
δ2r
ln(
δr
l
) +
H
δ2
p(θ∗)
u(kr)
kr
ln
(
H − kl
H
)
> u(r)
l
δ2r
ln(
δr
l
) +
H
δ2
u(r)
r
ln
(
H − kl
H
)
=
u(r)
rδ2
ln
((
δr
l
)l (
1− l
(H/k)
)H)
(1.31)
for p ≤ 1 and u(kr)kr < u(r)r by concavity, k > 1 and u(0) = 0. Thus, ddδ fˆ(θ∗, δ) > 0 if(
δr
l
)l (
1− l(H/k)
)H
> 1. We therefore conclude, that
d
dδ
fˆ(θ∗, δ) ∈
[
u(r)
rδ2
ln(B(δ, l)),
u(r)
rδ2
ln(A(δ, l))
]
(1.32)
where we define
A(δ, l) =
(
δr
l
)l (
1− l
E
)E
(1.33)
B(δ, l) =
(
δr
l
)l (
1− l
(H/k)
)H
(1.34)
The functions A and B are both strictly increasing in δ for every fixed liquidity because 1− lE > 0
and 1− l(H/k) > 0.
The following Lemmata analyze monotonicity behavior of the bounds of ∂∂δ fˆ(δ, θ
∗) in liquidity l
for every fixed δ ∈ (0, 1]. In our analysis, we treat δ as the fixed variable and let liquidity vary in
the admissible parameter space (0,min(1, δr)).
Lemma 1.7.1. For every δ ∈ (0, 1] there exists a unique l∗A(δ) ∈ (0,min(1, δr)) such that the
term A(δ, l) :=
(
δr
l
)l (
1− lE
)E
is strictly increasing for l ∈ (0, l∗A(δ)) and strictly decreasing for
l ∈ (l∗A(δ),min(1, δr)). l∗A(δ) strictly increases in δ. For every δ, A(δ, l)→ 1 as l→ 0 and hence,
there exists a unique l˜A(δ) ∈ (l∗A(δ), 1] ∩ (l∗A(δ), δr) such that A(δ, l) > 1 for all l ∈ (0, l˜A(δ)) and
A(δ, l) < 1 for all l ∈ (l˜A(δ), 1] ∩ (l˜A(δ), δr). l˜A(δ) weakly increases in δ.
Proof. [Lemma 1.7.1] In online Appendix
Lemma 1.7.2. For every δ ∈ (0, 1] there exists a unique l∗B(δ) ∈ (0,min(δr, 1)) such that the
term B(δ, l) =
(
δr
l
)l (
1− l(H/k)
)H
is strictly increasing for l ∈ (0, l∗B) and strictly decreasing for
l ∈ (l∗B,min(δr, 1)). l∗B(δ) strictly increases in δ. For every δ we have B(δ, l) → 1 as l → 0 and
there hence exists a unique l˜B(δ) ∈ (l∗B, 1] ∩ (l∗B, δr) such that B(δ, l) > 1 for all l ∈ (0, l˜B) and
B(δ, l) < 1 for all l ∈ (l˜B, 1]∩ (l˜B, δr). l˜B(δ) is weakly increasing in δ. It holds l∗B(δ) < l∗A(δ) and
l˜B(δ) ≤ l˜A(δ).
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Proof. [Lemma 1.7.2] In online Appendix
Proposition 1.7.1 (Comparative Statics in Equilibrium). For given contract (r, k) there exist
two contract dependent thresholds l˜B(1), l˜A(1) ∈ [0, 1], l˜B(1) ≤ l˜A(1) for liquidity such that
i) If l ∈ [0, l˜B(1)), there exist two boundaries δd, δu ∈ (l/r, 1), δu < δd such that the trigger
θ∗ strictly increases in debt ratio for debt ratio δ ∈ (l/r, δu), strictly decreases for debt ratio
δ ∈ (δd, 1) and takes its global maximum at some [δu, δd].
ii) If l ∈ [l˜B(1), l˜A(1)], there exists a boundary δu ∈ (l/r, 1) such that for δ ∈ (l/r, δu) the
trigger is strictly increasing in debt ratio and the global maximum of the trigger is reached at
some δ ∈ (δu, 1).
iii) If l ∈ (l˜A(1), 1], the trigger is strictly increasing in debt ratio δ for all δ ∈ (l/r, 1). Hence,
the trigger takes its supremum at δ = 1 and its infimum at δ = lr .
Proof. (Proposition 1.7.1) Fix contract (r, k). By (2.24), ∂fˆ∂θ∗ > 0 for all δ. Hence, by the Implicit
Function Theorem the slope of the trigger ∂θ
∗
∂δ = −
∂fˆ
∂δ
∂fˆ
∂θ∗
equals zero if and only if ddδ fˆ(θ
∗, δ) equals
zero. As this expression is not easy to handle, we instead work with its boundaries. The upper
boundary of ddδ fˆ(θ
∗, δ) equals zero if and only if A(δ, l) =
(
δr
l
)l (
1− lE
)E
= 1.
Case 1: Let l ∈ (l˜A(1), 1] (assume liquidity is high). Then, by Lemma 1.7.1, A(δ = 1, l) =(
r
l
)l (
1− lE
)E
< 1. For every fix l the function A(δ, l) is strictly increasing in δ for admissible
values in (l/r, 1). Hence, for all δ ∈ (l/r, 1) we have A(δ, l) < 1. As A determines the upper
bound of the slope, it follows ddδ fˆ(θ
∗, δ) < 0 and ∂θ
∗
∂δ > 0. Thus, the trigger gets minimized and
firm stability maximized in δ = l/r. By monotonicity, firm stability deteriorates as δ increases.
Case 2: Assume liquidity is small, that is fix l ∈ (0, l˜B(1)). By Lemma 1.7.2, l˜B(δ) ≤ l˜A(δ) and
thus B(δ = 1, l) > 1 and A(δ = 1, l) > 1.
For any l, the function A is continuous and strictly increasing in δ for all admissible values in
(l/r, 1). At δ → l/r we obtain A(δ = l/r, l) = (1− lE )E < 1. Using continuity and strict
monotonicity of A in δ, by the Intermediate Value Theorem for fixed l there exists a unique
δu(l) ∈ (l/r, 1) such that in δ = δu we have A(δu, l) =
(
δur
l
)l (
1− lE
)E
= 1. Moreover, for
δ < δu(l) it holds A(δ, l) =
(
δr
l
)l (
1− lE
)E
< 1, ddδ fˆ(θ
∗, δ) < 0 and ∂θ
∗
∂δ > 0 as we are considering
the upper bound.
Using the same argument on the function B, for l there exists a unique δd(l) ∈ (l/r, 1) with
B(δd, l) =
(
δdr
l
)l (
1− lE
)H
= 1. Further, when δ > δd(l) we have B(δ, l) > 1. As B determines
the lower bound of the slope we can follow ddδ fˆ(θ
∗, δ) > 0 and ∂θ
∗
∂δ < 0 for δ > δd(l).
Due to B(δ, l) < A(δ, l) for all δ ∈ (0, 1), when δd exists so does δu and we have δd(l) > δu(l) for
all l ∈ Id. Therefore, for fixed l ∈ Id the global maximum of the trigger in δ and hence the debt
ratio minimizing stability lies in interval [δu(l), δd(l)] ⊂ (l/r, 1).
Case 3: Let liquidity be moderate, fix l ∈ (l˜B(1), l˜A(1)). Then, by Lemma 1.7.1 and 1.7.2,
δu(l) ∈ (l/r, 1) exists but no δd. We can infer ddδ fˆ(θ∗, δ) < 0 and ∂θ
∗
∂δ > 0 for δ ∈ (l/r, δu). Thus
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the trigger gets maximized at some δ ≥ δu(l).
To finish the proof of Theorem 1.3.1, by Lemma 2.3.1, at the limit the trigger equals ex ante risk
of runs. By Lemma (1.7.3), δu and δd are strictly increasing in l if they exist. Apply Proposition
1.7.1.
Lemma 1.7.3. Given that δu(l) and δd(l) exist, they are strictly increasing in liquidity. At the
limit l→ 0, the functions take limits δu(l)→ 0, δd(l)→ 0.
Proof. [Lemma 1.7.3] In online Appendix
Lemma 1.7.4. The trigger strictly increases in liquidity if and only if
u(r)
1
δr
ln(
δr
l
)−
∫ l/δr
h∗
p(θ(n, θ∗))u(kr)
(
Hn
l2k(1− n)
)
dn > 0
.
Proof. (Lemma 1.7.4) Online Appendix
1.7.3 Appendix C: Triggers explicit
Lemma 1.7.5. As noise vanishes, the trigger satisfies
lim
ε→0
p(θ∗) =
l
δr u(r) (1 + ln(δr/l))
u(kr)
(
h∗ +
∫ l/(δr)
h∗
(1−nrδ/l)H
δ(1−n)kr dn
) (1.35)
=
l
δr u(r) (1 + ln(δr/l))
u(kr)
(
1− Hδrk ( δrl − 1) ln
(
H
H−kl
)) (1.36)
Proof. (Lemma (1.7.5)) Online Appendix
1.7.4 Appendix D: Optimality - Debt Investors
Lemma 1.7.6 (Optimality for debt investors). Fix contract (r, k) and liquidity l. As noise
vanishes, if the firm’s stability decreases in debt ratio then also debt investor’s utility from the
contract decreases in debt ratio. If however firm stability increases in debt ratio and the asset’s
liquidity is sufficiently small, l < lˆ, lˆ ∈ Id , investor’s utility from the contract can increase in
debt ratio.
Proof. (Lemma 1.7.6) Online Appendix
Proof. (Proposition 1.4.1) By Lemma (1.7.6 ) and Theorem (1.3.1), when liquidity is high, stabil-
ity decreases in debt ratio for all values of debt ratio in δ ∈ (l/r, 1). When liquidity is moderate
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or low, stability decreases in debt ratio for values of debt ratio in δ ∈ (l/r, δu). When liquidity
is sufficiently low, i.e. l ∈ (0, lˆ), where lˆ ∈ (0, l˜B(1)) is low, stability improves in debt ratio and
investor’s utility increases in debt ratio.
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1.7.5 Proofs Lemmata
Proof. (Lemma 1.7.1) Fix contract (r, k) and let δ ∈ (0, 1]. By assumption we only consider firm
structures that are prone to runs and hence satisfy l ∈ (0,min(1, δr)).
∂
∂l
A(δ, l) :=
∂
∂l
[(
δr
l
)l (
1− l
E
)E]
=
(
δr
l
)l (
1− l
E
)E−1 [
(ln(
δr
l
)− 1)(1− l
E
)− 1
]
(1.37)
The constant
(
δr
l
)l (
1− lE
)E−1
is positive by definition of E = H/k, because H > kr > kl.
Hence, A strictly increases in l if the square bracket in (1.37) is positive. That is the case if and
only if
ln
(
δr
l
)
> 1 +
E
E − l (1.38)
The left hand side is positive, continuous and strictly decreasing in l. The right hand side
is continuous, bounded and increasing in l. For l → 0 the left hand side tends to infinity
while the right hand side approaches value 2 < ∞. Parameter l is bounded from above by
min(1, δr). Let min(1, δr) = 1 and l→ 1. Then the left hand side undercuts the right hand side,
ln (δr) < δr−1 ≤ r−1 < 1 < 1 + EE−1 . Let min(1, δr) = δr and l→ δr. Again, the left hand side
undercuts the right hand side, ln (1) = 0 < 1 + EE−δr . These inequalities hold for E − δr > 0 as
H > kr > δkr and r ≤ 2 is like the coupon payment of a zero coupon bond (principal + interest)
and interest rates are below 100 percent in most economically meaningful situations. Thus, in
either case the right hand side exceeds the left hand side at the upper boundary of l. Thus,
by strict monotonicity, continuity and the Intermediate Value Theorem for every fixed δ ∈ (0, 1]
there exists a unique l∗A(δ, r, k) ∈ (0,min(δr, 1)) for which both sides are equal,
ln
(
δr
l∗A(δ)
)
− 1− E
E − l∗A(δ)
= 0
We have ln
(
δr
l
)
> 1 + EE−l and
∂
∂lA > 0 for l ∈ (0, l∗A(δ)) while ln
(
δr
l
)
< 1 + EE−l and
∂
∂lA < 0
for l ∈ (l∗A(δ),min(1, δr)).
l∗A(δ) increases in δ for the left hand side in (1.38) decreases in l, increases in δ but the right hand
side increases in l and is independent of δ.
Next, observe that for all δ ∈ (0, 1] the function A(δ, l) converges to 1 as l → 0: We have(
1− lE
)E → 1 as l→ 0, l ln(δr/l)→ 0 and thus by continuity of the exponential function ( δrl )l →
1. As A(δ, l) is strictly increasing for l < l∗A and decreasing for l ∈ (l∗A, 1] with liml→0A(δ, l) = 1,
there exists a unique l˜A(δ) ∈ (l∗A, 1] such that A(δ, l) > 1 for all l ∈ (0, l˜A), A(δ, l) < 1 for
l ∈ (l˜A, 1].
In case min(δr, 1) = δr, we always have l˜A ∈ (l∗A,min(1, δr)) (interior) by the structure of
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A(δ, l) :=
(
δr
l
)l (
1− lE
)E
: the factor
(
1− lE
)
is positive and strictly smaller one for every l ≤
δr < 1. Thus, at l = δr we already have A(δ, l = δr) < 1. Therefore, l˜A has to lie below δr. In
case min(δr, 1) = 1 we set l˜A = 1 if A(δ, l) > 1 for all l ∈ (0, 1]. In either case, l˜A < δr.
l˜A(δ) is weakly increasing in δ since A(δ, l) is positive and increasing in δ for every l. Concrete,
assume l˜A is interior: Then, A(δ, l˜A(δ)) = 1. A is strictly increasing in δ, and l˜A(δ) > l
∗
A. Hence,
A decreases in l at l˜A(δ) for every δ. By the Implicit Function Theorem A(δ, l˜A(δ)) = 1 to keep
the function A at value 1, l˜A(δ) increases in δ . If l˜A = 1, then A(δ, l) ≥ 1 for all l ∈ (0, 1]. Then
l˜A is constant (at value one) in δ as A increases in δ because A(δ, l) ≥ 1 already for all l ∈ (0, 1]
under the smaller δ.
Proof. (Lemma 1.7.2)
∂
∂l
B(δ, l) :=
∂
∂l
[(
δr
l
)l (
1− l
(H/k)
)H]
=
(
δr
l
)l (
1− l
(H/k)
)H−1 [
(ln(
δr
l
)− 1)(1− l
(H/k)
)− k
]
again for l ∈ (0,min(1, δr) and H > k the constant ( δrl )l (1− l(H/k))H−1 is positive. So B is
strictly increasing in l if the bracket is positive. That is the case if and only if
ln
(
δr
l
)
> 1 + k
E
E − l
The remaining proof of the first part of the Lemma is as in Lemma (1.7.1). Next we show, for
every δ we have l∗B(δ) < l
∗
A(δ): For k > 1, 1 +
E
E−l < 1 + k
E
E−l holds for all l and ln(δr/l) is
strictly decreasing in l.
For every δ we have l˜B ≤ l˜A: For every δ ∈ (0, 1) and l ∈ (0,min(δr, 1)) we have B(δ, l) <
A(δ, l) as k > 1 and 1 − l/E < 1. Fix δ, and assume l˜B ∈ (0,min(δr, 1)) (interior). Then
1 = B(δ, l˜B(δ)) < A(δ, l˜B(δ)). By Lemma (1.7.1) above, A(δ, l) > 1 for all l ∈ (0, l˜A). Thus,
l˜B ∈ (0, l˜A). If l˜B = 1, then 1 ≤ B(δ, l) < A(δ, l) for all l ∈ (0,min(δr, 1)), thus l˜A = 1.
Proof. (Lemma 1.7.3) Let lˆ ∈ (0, l˜B(1)), then by Proposition (1.7.1) δu(lˆ) and δd(lˆ) exist and
are interior in (lˆ/r, 1). That is A(δu(lˆ), lˆ) = 1, B(δd(lˆ), lˆ) = 1. The function A(δ, l) is strictly
increasing in δ for any δ ∈ (l/r, 1) so in particular in δ = δu(lˆ). We want to show, that A(δu(lˆ), l)
strictly decreases in l at l = lˆ. By Lemma (1.7.1), that is exactly the case if lˆ > l∗A(δu(lˆ)). By
the same Lemma, we know A(δu(lˆ), l) > 1 for all l ∈ (0, l∗A(δu(lˆ))]. But A(δd(lˆ)), lˆ) = 1, hence
lˆ > l∗A(δu(lˆ)). Using the Implicit Function Theorem, for A strictly increases in δ at δ = δu(lˆ) and
decreases in l at l = lˆ, δu(lˆ) strictly increases in lˆ. By the same argument, δd(lˆ) strictly increases
in lˆ.
As lˆ→ l˜B(1) there are two cases: If l˜B(1) < 1, we know B(1, l˜B(1)) = 1 by continuity and Lemma
(1.7.2). Hence, δd(lˆ)→ 1 as lˆ→ l˜B(1). If l˜B(1) = 1, B(1, l˜B(1)) ≥ 1, therefore δd(l˜B(1)) ≤ 1. By
Lemma (1.7.2), l˜B ≤ l˜A, therefore A(1, l˜B(1)) > 1 and δu(l˜B(1)) < 1.
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For lˆ < l˜B we can explicitly calculate δu as a function of lˆ: A(δu(lˆ)), lˆ) =
(
δur
l
)l (
1− lE
)E
= 1.
And hence, δu(lˆ) =
lˆ
r
(
1− lˆE
)−E
lˆ . By definition of the exponential function we have
(
1− lˆE
)E
lˆ →
exp(− 1E )E = 1e as lˆ→ 0 and hence δu → 0. Analogously, δd → 0 as lˆ→ 0.
Proof. (Lemma 1.3.3) Another way of seeing the non-monotonicity of stability in liquidity ratio
is by looking at the derivative of the implicit function lf (δ) which for every debt ratio yields the
value of liquidity such that the trigger and hence stability would stay constant. Using the payoff
indifference equation (2.23), by the Implicit Function Theorem its derivative is given by
∂lf (δ)
∂δ
= −
∂fˆ
∂δ
∂fˆ
∂l
=
1
δr ln(δr/l)u(r) · lδ −
∫ l/(δr)
h∗ p(θ)
u(kr)
kr
H
1−n
(
1
δ2
)
dn
1
δr ln(δr/l)u(r)−
∫ l/(δr)
h∗ p(θ)
u(kr)
kr
H
1−n
(
nr
l2
)
dn
(1.39)
If stability improved monotonically in liquidity ratio, for fixed short-term coupon r the function
lf (δ) would need to be strictly increasing in debt ratio δ since the liquidity ratio decreases in debt
ratio. That is the case if and only if numerator and denominator in (1.39) have the same sign.
This is however not necessarily true although numerator and denominator look fairly similar:
The integration in (1.39) considers only values n < l/(δr) or equivalently nr/l2 < 1/(δl). As a
consequence, the following inequality holds
∫ l/(δr)
h∗
p(θ)
u(kr)
kr
H
1− n
1
δl
dn >
∫ l/(δr)
h∗
p(θ)
u(kr)
kr
H
1− n
nr
l2
dn (1.40)
which allows an analysis of the numerator and denominator in (1.39). By the proof of Proposition
1.7.1 and the comparative statics result in (1.29), stability strictly decreases in debt if and only if
the numerator in (1.39) is negative. Similarly, the denominator is negative if and only if stability
is increasing in liquidity, see Lemma (1.7.4). Therefore by (1.39), if stability improves in liquidity
then stability also decreases in debt ratio, numerator and denominator in (1.39) are negative, and
stability monotonically increases in liquidity ratio for the slope of the function lf (δ) is positive.
If instead stability improves in debt ratio, stability also decreases in liquidity, both numerator
and denominator are positive, and again stability improves in liquidity ratio.
The corresponding reverse directions do not hold. For every contract (r, k) there exist parameters
(l, δ) such that stability decreases in debt and liquidity simultaneously. For such parameters the
function lf (δ) has negative slope and stability decreases in liquidity ratio. By (1.39), this is exactly
the case if the numerator in (1.39) is negative but the denominator is positive or equivalently if
40
u(r)
δr
ln(
δr
l
) ∈
(∫ l/(δr)
h∗
u(kr)
kr
p(θ)H
1− n
nr
l2
dn,
∫ l/(δr)
h∗
u(kr)
kr
p(θ)H
1− n
1
δl
dn
)
(1.41)
By Proposition 1.7.1, for low liquidity l ∈ Id all maxima of the trigger in debt ratio are interior in
the interval (δu(l), δd(l)). By continuity of the derivative ∂θ
∗/∂δ, the slope equals zero at every
maximum point δ∗ or equivalently,∫ l/(δ∗r)
h∗
p(θ)
u(kr)
kr
H
1− n
(
1
δ∗l
)
dn =
u(r)
δ∗r
ln(δ∗r/l) (1.42)
For δ∗ is a maximum point, the derivative ∂θ∗/∂δ needs to be strictly positive on a small open
set (δ∗, δ∗) below the maximum point or equivalently∫ l/(δr)
h∗
p(θ)
u(kr)
kr
H
1− n
(
1
δl
)
dn >
u(r)
δr
ln(δr/l) (1.43)
By (1.40) and continuity there exists an open subset (δl, δ
∗) ⊂ (δ∗, δ∗) such that (1.41) holds.
Proof. (Lemma 1.7.4) By the Implicit Function Theorem ∂θ
∗
∂l = −
∂fˆ
∂l
∂fˆ
∂θ∗
and ∂fˆ∂θ∗ > 0 by equation
(2.24) while
d
dl
fˆ(θ∗, l) = −u(r) 1
δr
ln(
δr
l
) +
∫ l/δr
h∗
p(θ(n, θ∗))u(kr)
(
Hn
l2k(1− n)
)
dn (1.44)
Proof. (Lemma 1.7.5) The trigger is implicitly defined by PIE (1.22) or equivalently
l
δr
u(r)(1− ln(l/(δr))) =
∫ l/(δr)
h∗
p(θ(n, θ∗))
(1− nrδ/l)H
δ(1− n)kr u(kr) dn
+
∫ h∗
0
p(θ(n, θ∗)) u(kr) dn
(1.45)
Taking limits, for ε→ 0 since n(θ) ≤ 1, p(θ) ≤ 1 we have by Lebesgue’s Dominated Convergence
Theorem
∫ l/(δr)
h∗
p(θ(n, θ∗))
(1− nrδ/l)H
δ(1− n)kr dn→ p(θ
∗)
∫ l/(δr)
h∗
(1− nrδ/l)H
δ(1− n)kr dn (1.46)
and
∫ h∗
0 p(θ(n, θ
∗)) u(kr) dn → h∗ p(θ∗) u(kr). By definition of the dominance regions and the
noisy signal, away from the limit the trigger lies in the interval [θ − ε, θ + ε]. As signals become
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precise, we have θ∗ ≤ θ and
lim
ε→0
p(θ∗) =
l
δr u(r) (1 + ln(δr/l))
u(kr)
(
h∗ +
∫ l/(δr)
h∗
(1−nrδ/l)H
δ(1−n)kr dn
) (1.47)
Using the definition of h∗ and (1−nrδ/l)(1−n) = 1 + (δr/l − 1)(1 − 11−n) one may simplify this this
expression to the formula given in the Lemma.
Proof. (Lemma 1.7.6) Let δr > l. By Lemma 2.3.1, stability is directly related to the size of
the trigger. Let θb the state below which the firm defaults in period 1, i.e. n(θb) = l/δr. Let θ˜
the state at which debt investors who roll over receive their full payment kr for sure, n(θ˜) = h∗.
We have 0 < θ∗ − ε ≤ θb ≤ θ˜ ≤ θ∗ + ε ≤ θ < 1, therefore ex ante utility away from the limit is
given as
E[u(DD)] =
∫ θb
0
u(r)
l
δr
dθ
+
∫ θ˜
θb
n(θ, θ∗) u(r) + (1− n(θ, θ∗)) p(θ) (1− δn(θ, θ
∗)r/l)H
δ(1− n(θ, θ∗))kr u(kr)dθ
+
∫ θ∗+ε
θ˜
n(θ, θ∗) u(r) + (1− n(θ, θ∗)) p(θ) u(kr)dθ
+
∫ θ
θ∗+ε
p(θ) u(kr) dθ +
∫ 1
θ
u(kr) dθ
(1.48)
Trigger θ∗ depends on δ, further θb = θ∗− 2ε
(
l
δr − 12
)
and θ˜ = θ∗− 2ε (h∗(δ)− 12) where h∗(δ) =
H−krδ
δr(H/l−k) . The bound to the upper dominance region θ is constant in δ. With n(θ˜, θ
∗) = h∗ and
Leibniz rule for parameter integrals,
∂
∂δ
E[u(DD)]
= −
∫ θb
0
u(r)
l
δ2r
dθ +
∂n(θ, θ∗)
∂θ∗
· ∂ θ
∗
∂δ
∫ θ∗+ε
θ˜
(u(r)− p(θ) u(kr))dθ (1.49)
+
∂n(θ, θ∗)
∂θ∗
· ∂ θ
∗
∂δ
∫ θ˜
θb
(
u(r)− p(θ) (1− δnr/l)H
δ(1− n(θ, θ∗))kr u(kr)
)
dθ (1.50)
+
H
δkr
∫ θ˜
θb
p(θ) u(kr) ·
(
(1− δrl ) dn(θ
∗)
dθ∗
∂θ∗
∂δ
1− n(θ, θ∗) −
1
δ
)
dθ (1.51)
Here, we could draw the derivative ∂θ
∗
∂δ out of the integral since the equilibrium θ
∗ does not
depend on the state realization θ. Also, the derivative ∂n(θ,θ
∗)
∂θ∗ is independent of θ. Using trigger
42
condition (1.22), or equivalently
0 =
∫ θb
θ∗−ε
−u(r) l
δrn(θ)
dθ +
∫ θ˜
θb
p(θ)
(1− δnr/l)H
δ(1− n(θ, θ∗))kr u(kr)− u(r) dθ
+
∫ θ∗+ε
θ˜
p(θ) u(kr)− u(r) dθ (1.52)
equation (1.49) simplifies to
∂
∂δ
E[u(DD)] = −
∫ θb
0
u(r)
l
δ2r
dθ − ∂n(θ, θ
∗)
∂θ∗
· ∂θ
∗
∂δ
(∫ θb
θ∗−ε
u(r)
l
δrn(θ)
dθ
)
+
H
δkr
∫ θ˜
θb
p(θ) u(kr) ·
(
(1− δrl ) dn(θ
∗)
dθ∗
∂θ∗
∂δ
1− n(θ, θ∗) −
1
δ
)
dθ
(1.53)
Plugging in ∂∂θ∗n(θ, θ
∗) = 12ε for θ ∈ [θ∗ − ε, θ∗ + ε] and changing variables of integration to n, if
the limit limε→0 ∂θ
∗
∂δ exists, that is by equation (1.29) if limε→0 θ
∗ 6= θ¯, with n(θ) ≤ 1, p(θ) ≤ 1
by Lebesgue’s Dominated Convergence Theorem the derivative of expected utility converges to
lim
ε→0
∂
∂δ
E[u(DD)] = −θ∗ · u(r) l
δ2r
− ∂θ
∗
∂δ
l
δr
ln(δr/l)u(r) (1.54)
−
(
δr
l
− 1
)
H
δkr
p(θ∗) u(kr)
∂θ∗
∂δ
∫ l/(δr)
h∗
1
1− n dn
Clearly, if ∂θ
∗
∂δ > 0 then due to δr > l the limits of all three terms are negative and limε→0
∂
∂δE[u(DD)] <
0.
The limit limε→0 ∂θ
∗
∂δ does not exist if the trigger converges to the the bound of the upper dom-
inance region limε→0 θ∗ = θ¯ and thus p′(θ∗) = 0. By continuity of all terms in equation (1.53)
in ε for ε > 0, when ∂θ
∗(ε)
∂δ > 0 the derivative
∂
∂δE[u(DD)] however is defined and negative for
nonzero but sufficiently small noise ε.
If limit limε→0 ∂θ
∗
∂δ exists and
∂θ∗
∂δ < 0 instead, we rewrite equation (1.54) using
−
∫ l/(δr)
h∗
1
1− n dn = ln
(
1− l/(δr)
1− h∗
)
= − ln
(
H
H − kl
)
and the explicit formula for p(θ∗) at the limit ε → 0 given in equation (1.36). Concretely, we
replace the term −H(δr/l−1)δkr ln
(
H
H−kl
)
p(θ∗)u(kr) and obtain
lim
ε→0
∂
∂δ
E[u(DD)] = −θ∗ · u(r) l
δ2r
+
∂θ∗
∂δ
(
l
δr
u(r)− p(θ∗)u(kr)
)
(1.55)
We have lδru(r) − p(θ∗)u(kr) < 0 for δr > l and u(r) < p(θ∗)u(kr). With ∂θ
∗
∂δ < 0, the second
term in (1.55) is positive and can be estimated from below to obtain a boundary independent of
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θ∗. We have
l
δr
u(r)− p(θ∗)u(kr) < l
δr
u(r)− u(r) < 0 (1.56)
for l/(δr) < 1. Thus,
lim
ε→0
∂
∂δ
E[u(DD)] > −θ∗ · u(r) l
δ2r
+
∂θ∗
∂δ
u(r)
(
l
δr
− 1
)
(1.57)
For l→ 0 the first term in (1.57) goes to zero since θ∗ ∈ [θ, θ] ⊂ [0, 1] is uniformly bounded. The
second term40 goes to −u(r) (liml→0 ∂θ∗∂δ ) .
It remains to show, that the limit liml→0 ∂θ
∗
∂δ is unequal to zero. This is true, if the limit of the
upper bound for ∂θ
∗
∂δ derived in the comparative statics part of the Appendix is strictly smaller
and bounded away from zero. For fix l and ∂θ
∗
∂δ < 0, that is
∂fˆ
∂δ > 0, we use the lower bound of
∂fˆ
∂δ to derive an upper bound for
∂θ∗
∂δ . Using (1.32), (2.25) and since by assumption limε→0 θ
∗ 6= θ¯
for ε→ 0
∂θ∗
∂δ
< −
u(r)
δ2r
ln
[(
δr
l
)l (
1− lH/k
)H]
p′(θ∗)
p(θ∗)
l
δru(r)
(
1 + ln
(
δr
l
)) = − 1δ ln
[(
δr
l
)l (
1− lH/k
)H]
p′(θ∗)
p(θ∗) l
(
1 + ln
(
δr
l
)) (1.58)
= −
l
δ ln
(
δr
l
)
+ Hδ ln
(
1− lH/k
)
p′(θ∗)
p(θ∗) l
(
1 + ln
(
δr
l
)) (1.59)
= −1
δ
p(θ∗)
p′(θ∗)
 1(
1 + 1
ln( δrl )
) + H ln
(
1− lH/k
)
l
(
1 + ln
(
δr
l
))
 (1.60)
The bracket in (1.60) converges to one as l→ 0:
1(
1 + 1
ln( δrl )
) → 1 as l→ 0 (1.61)
Further, ln
(
1− lH/k
)
→ 0 and l (1 + ln ( δrl ))→ 0. Therefore, by Hoˆpital’s rule
lim
l→0
H ln
(
1− lH/k
)
l
(
1 + ln
(
δr
l
)) = lim
l→0
∂
∂lH ln
(
1− lH/k
)
∂
∂l l
(
1 + ln
(
δr
l
)) = lim
l→0
− k
1− l
H/k
ln(δr/l)
= 0 (1.62)
By assumptions on the lower dominance region and for p(·) is continuous and strictly increasing
with θ∗ ∈ [θ, θ] for ε → 0 we have liml→0 p(θ∗) ≥ p(θ) > 0 and liml→0 p(θ∗) ≤ p(θ) = 1. There-
fore, liml→0 p(θ∗) = const > 0.
40In particular, by Proposition (1.7.1) the assumption ∂θ
∗
∂δ < 0 for l → 0 is consistent when debt ratio
is sufficiently large, i.e. we do not talk about a zero measure set.
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Last, p′(·) is uniformly bounded as θ ∈ [0, 1] lies in a compact interval and p′(·) is continuous.
Precisely, we have p′(θ) ≤ c for all θ ∈ [0, θ) and p′(θ) = 0 for θ ∈ [θ, 1] by assumption on the
upper dominance region. For p′ is continuous and positive, liml→0 p′(θ∗) ∈ (0, c] and the fraction
1
p′(θ∗) converges to a constant as by assumption limε→0 θ
∗ 6= θ¯. Therefore, the upper bound of ∂θ∗∂δ
converges to a negative constant. The limit of ∂θ
∗
∂δ is thus bounded away from zero as l approaches
zero. We therefore obtain the existence of an lˆ such that for all l < lˆ we have ∂∂δE[u(DD)] > 0.
For lˆ needs to be such that ∂θ
∗
∂δ < 0, that is stability needs to improve in debt ratio, we can infer
lˆ ∈ (0, l˜B(1)) by Theorem (1.3.1).
If limε→0 θ∗ = θ¯, 1p′(θ∗) diverges to infinity as ε→ 0. The upper bound in (1.60) thus also diverges
to minus infinity and ∂θ
∗
∂δ cannot converge to zero. For noise sufficiently small but nonzero and l
sufficiently small, the derivative of expected utility is thus strictly positive.
45
46
Chapter 2
The Impact of Recovery Value on
Coordination in Securitized Banking
2.1 Motivation
When a run on a financial firm takes place, national bankruptcy laws and interventions by central
banks (lender of last resort) impact recovery values1 of debt investments. I analyze how recovery
values after bankruptcy influence coordination behavior of uninsured debt investors and stability
of financial intermediators (firms) against debt runs. In particular, the paper analyzes how the
composition of recovery values changes coordination when recovery value consists of a run-size
dependent, endogenous part controlled by the lender of last resort and a fixed component to
model national differences in bankruptcy costs.
The set-up discussed is interesting in the light of Basel 3 capital and liquidity regulation since the
member countries of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision have agreed upon following
the same regulatory framework on bank capital adequacy and market liquidity risk while corre-
sponding bankruptcy costs differ nationally:2
Country specific bankruptcy costs impact debt recovery rates given default of the firm through
various channels such as allocating different sets of control rights to creditors, demanding differ-
ent time periods the firm remains in bankruptcy and varying court-declared expenses (trustees,
accountants, attorneys), see Acharya et al. (2003). Chapter 11 of the U.S. bankruptcy code
leaves control over firm’s assets to some degree with management during debt renegotiations.
1Throughout the paper, I use the term ’recovery value’ as the average value a debt investor can recover
after a run, that is taking into account interventions of a lender of last resort during a run and bankruptcy
costs after a successful run.
2In 2008, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the International Association
of Deposit Insurers (IADI) developed the ’Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems’ (
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and International Association of Deposit Insurers , 2009) as a
voluntary framework. Iyer and Puri (2008) however find that deposit insurance is only partially effective
in preventing bank runs.
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The Swedish bankruptcy law in contrast foresees a public auction where the firm is liquidated
either piecewise or survives as a going concern. Management and shareholders immediately lose
their control rights. Thorburn (2000) estimates recovery rates of Swedish firms as proportion of
debt’s face value3 at a median of 25% for piecewise liquidation and 38% if the firm is auctioned in
bankruptcy as going concerns. For the US, Franks and Torous (1994) report a median recovery
rate of 51% for firms reorganizing under Chapter 11, based largely on face values. Analyzing
US firms, Bris et al. (2006) show that creditors in Chapter 11 reorganizations fare significantly
better than those in Chapter 7 liquidations. They find mean recovery rates4 of 1% for unsecured
creditors of firms under Chapter 7 liquidations and 52% for unsecured creditors of firms under
Chapter 11.
Bankruptcy proceedings, the way bankrupt firms are liquidated or restructured, and legal costs
are fixed costs that diminish recovery values. Interventions by central banks on the other hand
depend on the severity of runs and increase the average value a debt investor may recover. Since
in real world the scale of a run is ex ante random and endogenous, in the presence of a lender
of last resort recovery values to debt investors are random and endogenous too. Differences in
debt recovery rates vice versa lead to an adaption of behavior by creditors ex ante. In an empiri-
cal study, Davydenko and Franks (2008) find that differences in creditors’ rights across countries
cause banks to adapt their lending practices at loan origination to companies in France, Germany
and the UK. Still, they find that recovery rates in default remain distinct across countries, due
to different levels of creditor protection.
Motivated by the study of Davydenko and Franks (2008), this article aims at answering the ques-
tion how debt investors (creditors) ex ante adapt their behavior to (not) roll over debt, taking into
account endogenous, random recovery values which depend on national differences in bankruptcy
fixed costs and generosity of national central banks when intervening as lender of last resort.
In the model, a financial firm5 finances an investment in a risky, illiquid asset through equity and
short-term debt. The firm promises fixed interest payments to debt investors and the residual
value of investment to equity investors. At an interim period, debt investors observe noisy, private
information about the asset’s return and then decide whether to stay invested in the firm (roll
over debt) or to withdraw their investment. Since debt investors make their roll over decisions at
the interim period, the measure of total short-term withdrawals is random in the initial period.
To finance withdrawals, the firm turns to the money market and pledges a proportion of the asset
to a third party in form of a repurchase agreement (repo). If funds available through pledging
the asset (funding liquidity) undercut the overall amount of potential short-term debt claims the
firm might face, the firm is prone to a liquidity squeeze (run): When the number of debt investors
demanding their deposit exceeds a critical threshold, the firm cannot serve all debt investors and
3Note that face values overstate market values.
4Here, recovery rate is measured as fraction of initial claim which is distributed by the court in the
case closure.
5Examples for such financial firms are asset backed commercial paper conduits, banks or structured
investment vehicles.
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goes into default. Given a default, not liquidity of the asset is available for distribution among
debt investors but a bankruptcy cost applies. After costs are withdrawn, the recovery value of
the asset remains for distribution to debt investors. Before choosing actions, debt investors take
into account the possibility of a run. The potential of a run gives rise to a coordination prob-
lem between debt investors. Debt investors base their roll over decision on inferences about the
random asset return (insolvency risk), and also on the expected number of other debt investors
rolling over (liquidity risk). The endogenous measure of agents rolling over influences whether
a run occurs or not and the size of recovery value if a run occurs. As a result, a debt investor
might decide not to roll over, not because the expected asset return is too low but because she
expects a too large number of other investors to not roll over. A panic run or self-fulfilling run
occurs if too many investors fear other investors will not roll over, withdraw, and cause the run.
A recovery value function determines the payoff of a debt investor given bankruptcy of the firm.
I model recovery value as an affine function which linearly depends on the scale of the run plus
a constant part (intercept). The intercept symbols a fixed fraction of asset liquidity which is
recovered after the firm declares bankruptcy. Acharya et al. (2003) provide empirical evidence
that a better liquidity position of industry peers of the defaulted firm implies higher recovery
at emergence from bankruptcy. The size dependent part (”slope parameter”) takes into account
that recovery value might be affected by the scale of the run. A negative slope parameter means
that larger runs are more costly and detrimental to recovery value. In this paper, the size of the
run directly depends on and is inversely related to the random state of the economy. Acharya
et al. (2003) find that recovery in a distressed state of the industry is lower than the recovery
in a healthy state of the industry by 10 to 20 cents on a dollar which suggests that scale of run
negatively affects recoveries. On the other hand, government interventions (bail-out) and actions
taken by the lender of last resort (central bank) such as Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA),
granted to prevent a financial panic and contagion to other financial firms, increasess debt values
during a run and hence average recovery values (pro rata shares) if the run is successful, see
(Rochet et al., 2008).
As main contribution of the paper, I find that both composition and size of recovery values after
bankruptcy have a large impact on stability of financial firms. Allover, I demonstrate that high
recovery values are never desirable from a stability or regulator perspective and only sometimes
desirable from a consumer perspective. Increases in recovery value through either increases in
slope parameter controlled by a lender of last resort or increases in intercept determined through
national bankruptcy proceedings both increase the probability of runs. Generosity of a lender
of last resort or more cost efficient bankruptcy proceedings harm financial stability since the
anticipation of greater recovery values increases incentives to withdraw.
Concerning the composition of recovery values, the probability of runs and ex ante welfare to debt
investors from contracts are monotone in liquidity mismatch if recovery values have no intercept.
In this case, I recover the results of Morris and Shin (2009) and Rochet and Vives (2004). With
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intercepts, probability of runs become hump-shaped in liquidity ratio. There exists a unique,
maximizing liquidity ratio which monotonically decreases in intercept and slope parameter of
recovery value.
Exploiting the non-monotonicity results, I demonstrate, that in two countries where intercepts
of recovery value differ due to differences in national bankruptcy proceedings, drops in funding
liquidity6 can have ambiguous effects on firm stability. While the drop in funding liquidity may
harm firm stability in one country, it may increase stability of a firm with identical capital struc-
ture in the other country. Regarding two further countries, where recovery values are purely
determined through interventions of a lender of last resort (zero intercept), I show that countries
with a more generous lender of last resort need to impose tighter liquidity and capital regulation
to guarantee the same level of stability as a country with less generous lender of last resort. These
result suggests that capital and liquidity regulation should take into account national differences
in bankruptcy costs and potential interventions by a lender of last resort.
Last, I analyze welfare debt investors infer from contracts under different recovery values. Higher
recovery values increase both payoffs conditional on a run but also probabilities of a run. There-
fore, greater recovery values in general do not lead to higher welfare to debt investors unless
liquidity ratio is sufficiently high.
As for the theory contribution, this paper analyzes the cause of the non-monotonicity of proba-
bilities of runs on financial institutions in liquidity coverage as first discovered in Schilling (2015).
The intercept of recovery value is responsible for the appearance of the interior maximizer of
probability of runs. As long as the intercept of recovery value is positive, conditional on a run
the game structure exhibits one-sided strategic substitutability between actions. In addition, the
size of the intercept of recovery value controls the extent of one-sided strategic substitutability
between actions and hence the size of the maximizer. As main theory contribution of the paper,
I show that the extent of strategic substitutability in the model, parametrized by the intercept of
recovery value, has an essential impact on the probability of runs and utility debt investors infer
from the contract. As the intercept of recovery value goes to zero, the game structure changes,
the one-sided strategic substitutability between actions vanishes, actions become global strategic
complements and the probability of runs becomes monotone in debt and liquidity mismatch. We
hence recover the results from Morris and Shin (2009) and Rochet and Vives (2004). One-sided
strategic substitutability between actions drives non- monotonicity.
Related Literature
This paper adds to the literature on stability of maturity transforming financial intermediators
against runs by short-term debt investors in the presence of self-fulfilling beliefs. Diamond and
6Drops in funding liquidity, the amount of cash that can be borrowed when posting the asset as
collateral, were documented in the course of the financial crises, see (Gorton and Metrick, 2012, 2009;
Dang et al., 2013).
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Dybvig (1983) analyze coordination behavior of depositors who share consumption risk by enter-
ing in deposit contracts with a bank. Risk-sharing among depositors yields proneness to panic
runs. Postlewaite and Vives (1987) analyze demand-deposit contracts and deduce parameter
constellations under which a unique equilibrium evolves with a strictly positive probability of a
’run’. Bryant (1980), Chari and Jagannathan (1988) and Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) model
information-based runs by introducing risk of asset returns and interim information. Empirical
evidence exists for both types of runs: Evidence for depositors withdrawing when perceived asset
risk is too high is provided by Goldberg and Hudgins (1996, 2002). Foley-Fisher et al. (2015)
investigate the run on U.S. life insurers during the summer of 2007 and find evidence for self-
fulfilling expectations.
To obtain a unique equilibrium, this paper employs technique from global games theory (Carlsson
and Van Damme, 1993; Morris and Shin, 1998, 2001). The models closest to ours are Goldstein
and Pauzner (2005) and Schilling (2015). Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) embed the Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) model in a global game. They show that risk-sharing through deposit contracts
is ex ante optimal although it increases the probability of runs. In their setting the bank is
fully financed by debt and invests in an asset which is liquid at the interim period. Their paper
is the first to show equilibrium existence and uniqueness under partial, endogenous repayment
given default of the bank. I strongly draw on their proof to show existence and uniqueness
in our setting. Schilling (2015) extends Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) to analyze the impact
of capital structure and asset liquidity on coordination and financial stability. She finds that
under partial, endogenous repayment, the probability of runs is in general non-monotone in
short-term debt if asset liquidity is sufficiently small. This paper extends Schilling (2015) by
introducing (endogenous) recovery values to discuss the impact of varying national bankruptcy
costs and interventions of a lender of last resort on coordination and financial stability. Further
this paper looks at financial stability under the interaction between recovery values and liquidity
mismatch. As a byproduct, this paper studies emergence and behavior of the non-monotonicity
of probability of runs as discovered in Schilling (2015). This paper shows, the non-monotonicity
alters in recovery value and may vanish completely if recovery values have no intercept. To the
best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that studies coordination behavior of debt investors
under varying, random and endogenous recovery values. A further difference to Goldstein and
Pauzner (2005) and Schilling (2015) is that here, debt investors are risk-neutral. By this, the
interpretation that in case of a run agents queue in front of the financial institution to obtain back
their fixed funds with certain probability (sequential service constraint) is equivalent to obtaining
a pro rata share for sure which simplifies the analysis.
Morris and Shin (2009); Rochet and Vives (2004); Vives (2014); Ko¨nig et al. (2014) study the im-
pact of capital structure and asset liquidity on coordination behavior of debt investors in a global
game in the context of collateralized funding or delegated decision making. While in these pa-
pers recovery values after default are fixed to one, I allow for variations and endogenous recovery
values and analyze its impact on miscoordination. Rochet and Vives (2004) derive policy recom-
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mendations by studying solvency and illiquidity risk of firms. Morris and Shin (2009) partition
credit risk in illiquidity and insolvency risk. Vives (2014) relates information structure, balance
sheet, and market stress parameters to the degree of strategic complementarity of investors ac-
tions and fragility. Ko¨nig et al. (2014) analyze optimal capital structure and portfolio choice.
While Morris and Shin (2009), Rochet and Vives (2004); Vives (2014) and Ko¨nig et al. (2014)
allow the asset liquidation value to depend on the random state, in our model the liquidation
value is exogenous and deterministic. In Rochet and Vives (2004); Vives (2014) and Ko¨nig et al.
(2014) debt investors delegate decisions to fund managers while in our model investors decide
directly.
From a theory perspective, this paper studies the impact on monotonicity when transitioning
from a game with global strategic complementarity between actions (Bulow et al., 1985; Morris
and Shin, 2009; Rochet and Vives, 2004; Vives, 2014; Ko¨nig et al., 2014) to a game exhibiting
one-sided strategic complementarity between actions (Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005; Karp et al.,
2007; Schilling, 2015).
Further related set-ups are Eisenbach (2013) and Szkup (2015) who study roll-over decisions by
short-term debt investors in dynamic settings. A different class of dynamic coordination models
analyzes strategic uncertainty induced by a time-varying fundamental rather than private noisy
signals. He and Xiong (2012) study how asset price volatility, debt maturity and credit lines affect
the risk of debt runs in intertemporal coordination problems between creditors of different debt
maturities. In a related model, Tourre (2015) studies the impact of portfolio liquidity composition
on run behavior of creditors.
2.2 The Model
There are three periods of time 0, 1, 2 an one good (money). There is no discounting between
periods. There is a financial intermediary, denoted by ’the firm’, and two types of agents: a
continuum of short-term debt investors [0, δ], of measure δ ∈ (0, 1), and a single equity investor.
Both types of agents live for two periods. In period 0, debt investors are symmetric and born
each endowed with one unit of the good. Debt investors are risk-neutral and can consume in
either period. The equity investor is risk-neutral and can only consume in period 2. At time zero
she is endowed with measure 1− δ units of the good. Hence, at time zero there is an aggregate
endowment of measure 1 units of the good. Debt investors and equity investors finance the firm’s
investment in a risky asset. Agents are born either as equity or debt investor, agents may not
split their endowments to finance the firm in both ways.7
Investment and Collateralized Borrowing There exists a storage technology and an
illiquid, risky asset in the economy, T . Storage yields the initial investment for sure in every
7This assumption is for tractability reasons.
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period. The risky asset costs one unit of money at the initial period. For every unit invested, it
pays a return H only in period 2 with likelihood p > 0 and pays zero with probability 1− p.
In period 1, the asset pays no return but can be used to raise cash: The firm can pledge fractions
of the asset as collateral to borrow from a third party in the money market. This is done in form
of a repurchase agreement (repo):
A repo transaction has two parties, the firm (the borrower) and a lender. The lender lends cash
to the borrower, the borrower pays interest (repo rate) on the borrowed amount. To reduce the
risk of the transaction to the lender, the borrower posts a collateral which goes into physical
possession of the lender. Borrower and lender agree on that the collateral is returned to the
borrower at a prespecified date if the borrowed amount and interest are paid back. If the collat-
eral accrues interest during maturity of the repo, and the borrower repays, accrued interest goes
to the borrower. If the borrower cannot repay, she defaults on the repo and the lender in the
repurchase agreement may sell the collateral at market price.8
Let fraction ψ ∈ (0, 1] the exogenous amount of cash that can be raised (funding liquidity) when
pledging one unit of the asset as collateral.9 Set the repo rate to zero.10 If the firm can repay
the counterparty of the repo in period 2, she collects interest on the entire investment including
the pledged fraction of the asset. Note that this leads to a major distinction in pay-off structure
compared to the case where the firm has no access to the money market and has to sell parts of
the asset to raise cash.11
The asset’s probability of return p = p(θ) is random and determined by the random state θ ∈ [0, 1]
(see information structure below). The asset’s return function p(θ) is continuously differentiable
in θ, strictly increasing for θ ≤ θ and constant p(θ) = 1 on [θ, 1]. θ denotes the boundary to the
upper dominance region, introduced below.
Debt investors have no access to asset T , only to storage. Debt investors gain indirect access to
T through investing in the firm. The expected asset return exceeds the return from storage
E[p(θ)]H > 1 (2.1)
The firm The firm is the representative financial intermediator of the economy. I normalize
the firm’s balance sheet size to one. Denote by δ ∈ (0, 1) the endogenous fraction of firm’s funds
financed by uninsured short-term debt. The remaining fraction 1 − δ is financed with equity.
This simplified capital structure is without loss of generality when allowing for long-term debt
investors who invest in period zero, have a claim on payments in period 2 and are less senior
8See Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)
9Note, ψ is not the ’true’ asset value of the collateral in period 1 but the fraction of the ’true’ value
participants in the money market are willing to pay to accept the asset as collateral (overcollateralization).
Fraction 1− ψ is called the haircut and corresponds to a safety margin to the lender.
10The model can easily be adapted to allow for a strictly positive repo rate, this however out of scope
of the paper.
11Sold parts of the asset do not accrue interest to the previous owner even if the asset is bought back.
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than short-term debt investors.12 By normalization of funds, call δ the firm’s capital structure
or debt ratio. Collected funds of one unit are invests in the risky asset T .13 The firm is in perfect
competition for short-term debt with other firms and maximizes utility to debt investors.
Debt contract I now describe the contracts between debt investors and the firm. By entering
in a debt contract with the firm, debt investors can attain higher returns on their investment
than through investing in storage. Every debt contract is characterized by two coupon payments,
the period 1 coupon r > 1 and period 2 coupon rk < H, k > 1. Henceforth, write (r, k) for the
contract. If a debt investor invests in contract (r, k), she hands her endowment to the firm in
period 0. The contract is liquid from the view of debt investors: In period 1, a debt investor
chooses her action and spontaneously decides whether to pull out (’withdraw ’) her investment
and earn coupon r or to roll over (wait) and earn coupon rk a period later. As a consequence, in
period 0 the number of debt investors who are going to withdraw in the following period is not
known to the firm. If a debt investor decides to withdraw, we will also say that she ’runs’ on the
firm. Debt investors cannot demand a fraction of their investment.14 The parameter k ∈ (1, H/r)
can be seen as an implicit forward interest payment which the firm pays to investors for leaving
funds invested for another period.15
The contract (r, k) and asset return probability function p(·) are such that the expected payoff
from rolling over exceeds payoff from withdrawing
E[p(θ)]kr > r (2.2)
Otherwise, running on the firm was a dominant action. By r > 1 this constraint implies that
expected period 2 payoff from the contract exceeds utility from storage,
E[p(θ)]kr > 1 (2.3)
the contract satisfies ex ante individual rationality.
Endogenous Liquidation At period 1, the maximum measure of withdrawals a firm with
debt ratio δ faces is δr. By seniority of debt, the firm is committed to make the coupon payments
12The capital structure of the firm can be extended to incorporate long-term debt. In this case, the
model needs to specify whether long-term debt investors are equally senior or less senior than short-term
debt investors in period 2. If they are less senior than short-term investors, that is all short-term investors
need to be paid first before long-term investors may be paid, the coordination game remains unchanged
since in that case long-term debt is like equity to short-term debt investors. If long-term debt investors
are equally senior or even more senior than short-term debt investors in period 2, the coordination game
will change compared to the case where long-term funds are financed through equity only since short-term
investors compete with long-term investors for repayments.
13I assume that the firm commits to investing in the asset no matter how the state realizes. By this
assumption, I exclude signaling in a Global Game and circumvent multiplicity of equilibria.
14This assumption is for tractability reasons.
15The assumption k > 1 is necessary, otherwise we had r > kr and withdrawing early was a dominant
action.
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under the premise of solvency.
Let n ∈ [0, 1] denote the endogenous, ex ante random equilibrium proportion of debt investors
who decide to withdraw in period 1 (aggregate action). Given the contract (r, k) and the measure
of short-term debt funds δ ∈ (0, 1) collected by the firm, in period 1 the firm needs to pay out
measure δrn in cash to withdrawing investors. The firm finances withdrawals by pledging the
fraction nδr/ψ of the asset in the money market as collateral as part of a repo.
A run on the firm occurs, if in period 1 the measure of short-term funds claimed back by
withdrawing investors exceeds the amount that can be borrowed using the asset as collateral.
That is if n ∈ [0, 1] realizes such that
nδr > ψ (2.4)
If funding liquidity ψ is sufficiently high for a given capital structure δ and contract (r, k), the
occurrence of a run can be excluded ex ante. Since the proportion of investors who run on the
firm cannot exceed one, runs are excluded if δr ≤ ψ. We call such a firm run-proof. If instead a
run cannot be excluded ex ante, if δr > ψ, the firm is run-prone.
To shorten notation, define liquidity ratio as
ξ =
ψ
δr
(2.5)
By assumptions, we have δ ∈ (ψ/r, 1], ψ ∈ (0, 1] and ξ ∈ (0, 1) for a run-prone firm and a run
occurs for n > ξ.
Bankruptcy costs and Recovery Value In the incidence of a run, n ∈ (ξ, 1], the firm
cannot borrow enough money to satisfy all debt claims. Thus, she cannot honor her debt,
defaults and goes bankrupt. In this case, a bankruptcy cost for unwinding or reorganizing the
firm applies. I model bankruptcy cost as a multiplier of funding liquidity ψ.16 After bankruptcy
costs are withdrawn, the remaining value is available for distribution to debt investors. Denote
by
γa,b(n, ξ) =
a
ξ
n+ b, b ≥ 0, a ∈ R, 0 < a+ b ≤ 1
H
< 1 (2.6)
the recovery value function, where constants a, b and ξ are exogenous and common knowl-
edge to investors but recovery value γ(n, ξ) is endogenous and ex ante random since the aggregate
action n is random and endogenous. Function γ(n, ξ) should be seen as first order Taylor ap-
proximation in n of a more complex recovery value function in point zero.
16In real world, modeling bankruptcy cost as a multiplier of market liquidity (the amount of cash that
can be realized through selling the asset) is more adequate. This can however easily be integrated in
the model by assuming that market liquidity is a multiple of funding liquidity, see (Brunnermeier and
Pedersen, 2009)
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In case of a run, proceeds γ(n, ξ)ψ are available for distribution to remaining investors where17
γ(n, ξ)ψ < 1, n ∈ [ξ, 1] (2.7)
The constant b (intercept) denotes the part of recovery value which can be realized independently
of the size of the run n while a/ξ (slope) controls how much the scale of the run affects recovery
value. To address a directly, we will call a the slope parameter . A negative a indicates that larger
runs reduce the value to be recovered after bankruptcy compared to smaller runs. A positive a
instead indicates that recovery value increases in size of the run.
Note that recovery value γ might exceed one18, thus liquidity available given bankruptcy γψ
might exceed funding liquidity of the asset ψ if a is sufficiently large.
For a and b small, recovery value γ undercuts one so that 1 − γ has the interpretation of a
bankruptcy cost which corresponds to the percentage of funding liquidity that is lost to debt
investors due to bankruptcy proceedings and the event of a run. If recovery value exceeds one,
bankruptcy cost 1− γ is negative and has the interpretation of a subsidy to debt investors. The
constraint a + b > 0 guarantees that even for negative a and arbitrary liquidity ratio ξ recov-
ery value is strictly positive γ(n, ξ) > 0 for all values of n which imply the occurrence of a run
n ∈ (ξ, 1].19
For the case of a zero intercept b = 0, the recovery value function γ(n, ξ) = aξn, a > 0 is linear.
In the case with nonzero intercept b > 0, the function γ(n, ξ) = aξn+ b is affine. The distinction
between these two cases will become important later.
Payoffs In the incidence of a run the firm cannot pay the full coupon to withdrawing debt
investors but pays pro rata shares. Investors have a claim on r, nδ is the measure of investors
who withdraw and γψ is available for distribution after applying the bankruptcy cost. Thus, in
case of a run every withdrawing investor receives the share
γψ
δn
=
γξ
n
r (2.8)
17In case of a run 1 ≥ n ≥ ξ = ψ/(δr), a ∈ R, b ≥ 0, a + b > 0 the inequality γ(n, ξ)ψ = anδr + bψ ≤
(a+ b)nδr ≤ (a+ b)r < r/H < 1 holds since δ ∈ (0, 1] and r < rk < H.
18Within the euro area, Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) can be granted to ’solvent financial
institutions’ which face ’temporary liquidity problems’ if refinancing via the interbank market or the facility
of the European Central Bank breaks down (European Central Bank). The emergency loan is provided by
the according national central bank in exchange for assets as collateral to ”prevent or mitigate potential
systemic effects as a result of contagion through other financial institutions or market infrastructures”.
ELA operations can be restricted by the Governing Council of the European Central Bank. Examples
for banks which received emergency loans (ELA) are the German bank Hypo Real Estate in 2008/2009,
Greek banks in 2015 and Cypriot Banks in 2013. The collateral banks post when using ELA may be of
lower average quality than is accepted by the ECB facility. If the liquidity assistance granted for collateral
by the national central bank exceeds the factual funding liquidity of the asset (determined by markets) we
have γ > 1.
19The constraint a+ b ≤ 1H < 1 guarantees that recovery values in case of runs depend on asset payoffs
and cannot become too large, see the paragraph on payoffs below.
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by definition of ξ.20 Note that the pro rata share is independent of short-term coupon r. By
a+ b < 1, the pro rata share in case of a run undercuts one, γ(n, ξ) ξn = a+ b
ξ
n < a+ b < 1 since
in case of a run n ∈ (ξ, 1]. Hence, withdrawing agents can never recover the full coupon r. Debt
investors who roll over receive zero in case of a run.21
The firm stays liquid in period 1 if she can borrow a sufficiently large amount in the money
market to honour her debt, i.e. if n ≤ ξ. In that case, all withdrawing investors receive r and
the game proceeds to period 2. In period 2, the return of the asset realizes as either H with
probability p(θ) or zero with probability 1 − p(θ).22 In case of zero, remaining debt investors
receive zero and the firm defaults on the repo, i.e. the counterparty of the repo is not paid back
and may sell the collateral at market price. Conditional on success, the firm earns gross return
H and can repay all remaining debt investors and the counterparty of the repo.23
Payoffs Debt Investors I assign the following payoffs to agents:
Event/ Action Withdraw Wait/roll-over
no run,
n ∈ [0, ξ] r
{
kr , p(θ)
0 , 1− p(θ)
run,
n ∈ (ξ, 1] γa,b(n, ξ)
ξ
nr 0
Note that we require parameters a and b to be such that γ(n, ξ) > 0 for n ∈ (ξ, 1], otherwise the
game has a dominant strategy to roll over and the coordination game vanishes.24
Debt investor’s utility difference between withdrawing in period 2 versus withdrawing early in
period 1 is given by
v(θ, n) =
{
p(θ) kr − r if n ≤ ξ (no run)
−γ(n,ξ)ξn r if n > ξ (run)
(2.9)
Note that for given contract (r, k), payoffs to debt investors are determined by funding liquidity
and short-term debt only through ξ, a ratio of funding liquidity and short-term debt.
20Compare to Schilling (2015) where agents have to queue but are risk-averse.
21Hence, I assume that conditionally on a run bankruptcy law prefers withdrawing investors over those
who extend the maturity of their debt by rolling over. Conditionally on a run, if we treated withdrawing
investors and investors who roll over equally the coordination problem vanishes. This is the case since
conditionally on no run rolling over is always optimal by condition (2.2).
22For instance, a loan is paid back including interest H or the borrower defaults completely.
23This is, since the firm’s net return is H−δ rn−δ(1−n)kr > 0 where she repays δrn to the counterparty
of the repo to obtain back possession of the pledged fraction of the asset and repays δ(1−n)kr to remaining
debt investors. We have H − δ rn− δ(1− n)kr > 0 since H > δkr.
24Avoiding dominant strategies in particular means, a > 0 if b = 0. I assume that the intercept b is
greater or equal to zero.
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Figure 2.1: Payoff difference function v(θ, n) from equation (2.9) plotted for fixed θ as
function of the endogenous proportion of withdrawing debt investors n.
Information Structure Here, I follow Goldstein and Pauzner (2005). In period zero, the
unobservable state θ ∼ U [0, 1] realizes and determines the return probability p(θ) of the asset.
Debt investors share a common prior about state θ in period 0. In period 1, debt investors observe
private, noisy and asymmetric signals about the state and hence the asset return probability
θi = θ + εi, i ∈ [0, δ]
where εi are iid random noise terms, independent of θ and distributed according to U [−ε,+ε].
From the signal structure we see, signals convey information not only about the random asset
return probability p(θ) but also about other investors’ signals.
I assume, there exist states which yield dominant actions (dominance regions).25 There are states
θ and θ such that if θ < θ, withdrawing is a dominant action whereas if θ > θ rolling over is the
dominant action to debt investors. I refer to [0, θ] as the lower dominance region and call [θ, 1]
the upper dominance region. The bound θ depends on the specific contract (r, k) and is given as
the realization of θ such that26
r = p(θ) kr (2.10)
The assumption of existence of the lower dominance region implies that function p(·) takes values
below r/kr = 1/k > 0. For very high states θ ≥ θ, I impose that the asset earns return H
already in period 1 with certainty27, that is with p(θ) = 1. By assumption H > kr > r, the
coordination problem vanishes for state realizations in the upper dominance region. To ensure
25Dominance regions are crucial to obtain an equilibrium selection (Morris and Shin, 2001).
26Payoff kr is the maximum payoff debt investors who roll over can obtain. By design of the contract,
if θ realizes below θ, even in the absence of a run the expected payoff to rolling over is smaller than r for
every n ∈ [0, 1], while conditional on a run investors who roll over receive zero.
27This assumption can be justified by assuming that the firm is an investment expert.
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that debt investors may receive signals from which they can infer that the state has realized in
either of the dominance regions, I assume that noise ε is sufficiently small such that θ(r, k) > 2ε
and θ < 1− 2ε hold. In particular, the bounds to the dominance regions are independent of debt
ratio and asset liquidity.
Note that the dominance regions are independent of funding liquidity ξ and debt δ and hence
independent of liquidity ratio ξ.
Timing In period 0, the state θ and payoff probability p(θ) realize unobservably. Debt and
equity investors invest. In period 1, debt investors observe noisy, private signals and subsequently
choose actions. The aggregate action n (proportion of withdrawing debt investors) realizes which
determines whether the firm defaults due to a run or whether it stays liquid in period 1. In case
of a run, all debt investors receive payoffs according to chosen actions and the game ends. If
the firm stays liquid, the game proceeds to period 2 after paying debt investors who decide to
withdraw. In period 2, the success of the risky investment is determined. In case of success, the
counterparty of the repo and remaining debt investors are repaid, the extra proceeds go to equity
investors. Note that agents choose actions only in period 1.
t0 t1 t2
θi private signals realize, 
actions are chosen
Run/ No run   
θ,p(θ) realize, 
investment
asset return
realizes
2.3 Equilibrium
In order to justify the imposition of the information structure described in the outline of the
model, I briefly discuss equilibrium behavior in the absence of private, noisy and asymmetric
signals.
2.3.1 The Common Knowledge Game
Without signals, all debt investors share a common prior about state θ in period zero and receive
no further information about the state in period 1. By assumption (2.2), the ex ante expected
utility from rolling over exceeds the utility from withdrawing. The presence of the coordination
problem in period 1 gives rise to a Diamond and Dybvig (1983) type situation. There are two
pure equilibria: In the ’good’ equilibrium all debt investors roll over and there is no run. Due
to assumption (2.3) welfare in this equilibrium is higher than in the outcome where all debt
investors store their endowment. In the bad equilibrium all investors panic and withdraw early
which causes a run. In the run equilibrium, due to (2.7) we have γψ ≤ 1, that is aggregate welfare
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is lower than in the outcome where all debt investors store their endowment. There is no means
to determine the ex ante probability for selection of the Pareto-efficient no-run equilibrium within
the model. To achieve an equilibrium selection and definite comparative statics on stability, I
impose the information structure given in the outline of the model.
2.3.2 The Coordination Game
Assume a firm with debt ratio δ offers contract (r, k), faces asset liquidity ψ and recovery value
function γa,b. Let θi an investor’s private signal. A mixed strategy for investor i is a measurable
function si : [0 − ε, 1 + ε] → [0, 1] which assigns a probability that the investor withdraws
early (runs) as a function of her signal θi. A strategy profile is denoted by {si}i∈[0,δ]. A fixed
strategy profile generates a random variable n˜(θ) ∈ [0, 1] which represents the aggregate action,
the proportion of investors who withdraw early, if the unobservable state realizes as θ. The
equilibrium concept I use is Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 2.3.1 (Existence and Uniqueness). The coordination game played by debt investors
has a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium is in trigger strategies.
Denote by θ∗ = θ∗(r, k, ξ(δ, ψ), γ,H, p(·)) ∈ [θ − ε, θ + ε] the equilibrium trigger signal. In the
trigger equilibrium, if an investor observes a signal θi < θ
∗ she withdraws, if she observes a
signal θi > θ
∗ she rolls over debt. In case θi = θ∗ she is indifferent. For the equilibrium is a
symmetric trigger equilibrium played by a continuum of debt investors, the endogenous measure
of investors who withdraw is a deterministic function of the state. The payoff structure to debt
investors (2.9) and hence trigger θ∗ depend on debt and funding liquidity only through liquidity
ratio since also the dominance regions (2.10) are independent of debt and funding liquidity.28 Let
n(θ, θ∗) indicate the endogenous equilibrium proportion of investors demanding early withdrawal
in period 1 when the true state is θ and the trigger is θ∗. The function n(θ, θ∗) is given by the
proportion29 of investors who observe a signal below the trigger θ∗ when the true state is θ. By
the uniform distribution of the error term, we have
n(θ, θ∗) =

1
2 +
θ∗−θ
2ε if θ ∈ [θ∗ − ε, θ∗ + ε]
1 if θ ≤ θ∗ − ε
0 if θ ≥ θ∗ + ε.
(2.11)
Note that changes in parameters a and b of recovery value change the trigger θ∗ and by this
function n(θ, θ∗). In addition, changes in parameters a and b change recovery value directly but
also indirectly through the change in n(θ, θ∗).
In figure (2.2), I have plotted the proportion of investors withdrawing as a function of the state
28Introducing the liquidity ratio leads to a parameter reduction since it substitutes debt ratio and
funding liquidity in the model.
29As the continuum of debt investors has measure δ, the proportion of investors observing signals below
the trigger differs from its measure by factor δ.
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for fixed trigger θ∗. Given state θ, investors observe signals in the range [θ− ε, θ+ ε]. For a state
below θ∗ − ε, all investors obtain signals smaller than the trigger and hence withdraw, n = 1.
Vice versa, for a state above θ∗+ ε, all investors observe signals larger than the trigger and hence
roll over, n = 0.
lower dominance
region
range of states for potential 
miscoordination
upper dominance
region
Figure 2.2: Proportion of debt investors who withdraw as a function of the state
Having established equilibrium uniqueness, the equilibrium trigger signal is pinned down using
the expected payoff difference between actions when all investors use the same trigger θ∗,
D(θi, θ
∗) =
1
2ε
∫ θi+ε
θi−ε
v(θ, n(θ, θ∗)) dθ (2.12)
When observing a signal θi < θ
∗, the expected payoff difference D(θi, θ∗) is negative and the
investor withdraws. When instead she observes θi > θ
∗, the payoff difference D(θi, θ∗) is positive
and she rolls over. When observing a signal equal to the equilibrium trigger a debt investor’s
posterior beliefs on the state and the proportion of withdrawing investors n need to be such
that in expectation utility from withdrawing equals utility from rolling over. The trigger is thus
implicitly defined by the payoff indifference equality (PIE)
D(θ∗, θ∗) = 0 (2.13)
Graphically, as signals become precise the trigger is located between the dominance regions [θ, θ]
in a way such that the area under the curve in figure (2.1) equals zero. Conditional on the
observation of the trigger signal θi = θ
∗, an investor’s belief about the proportion of withdrawing
agents n is uniform over [0, 1] (Laplacian Belief).30 Consequently, with slight abuse of notation
I can write the PIE using (2.9) and (2.11) as
30We obtain P(n < z|θi = θ∗) = P
(
1
2 +
εi
2ε < z
)
= z for z ∈ [0, 1] by (2.11).
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0 = −ξr
∫ 1
ξ
γ(n, ξ)
n
dn+
∫ ξ
0
p(θ(n, θ∗)) kr − r dn (2.14)
where θ(n, θ∗) = θ∗ + ε (1− 2n) is the inverse of n(θ, θ∗) for θ ∈ [θ∗ − ε, θ∗ + ε]. In period 1, a
run takes place if the measure of funds claimed by withdrawing debt investors nδr exceeds the
measure of funds the firm can raise by pledging the asset as collateral ψ, or equivalently if n
realizes such that n > ξ. The payoff difference between rolling over and withdrawing conditional
on a run is thus negative (integrand of first integral in (2.14)). If instead endogenous withdrawals
realize low, n ≤ ξ, the firm can borrow enough cash in the money market to satisfy all interim
debt claims and hence stays liquid. Further, if the asset pays in the second period, all debt
claims of investors who rolled over can be satisfied, the counterparty of the repo can be repaid
and equity value becomes strictly positive.31 Thus, conditional on no run, the payoff difference
is given by the integrand of the second integral in (2.14).
2.3.3 Probability of Runs
Before stating the main results, I briefly explain why the equilibrium trigger signal θ∗ and the ex
ante probability of runs coincide when signals become arbitrarily precise.
If the state realizes such that in the interim period claimed withdrawals just equal available
liquidity, the firm is on the edge of becoming unable to repay debt investors in period 1. I call
this state the critical state θb implicitly defined by
n(θb, θ
∗) = ψ/(δr) = ξ (2.15)
Since n is a weakly decreasing function of state θ, the larger the critical state θb, the smaller the
proportion of investors necessary to cause a successful run. Vice versa, if liquidity ratio ξ is large,
the firm can bear a larger proportion of investors deciding to withdraw without being subject to
a run, hence the critical state must become smaller as ξ increases (see figure 2.2). By equation
(2.11) and (2.16), the critical state depends on noise and trigger, and is given as
θb = θ
∗ + ε
(
1− 2 ψ
δr
)
= θ∗ + ε (1− 2 ξ) (2.16)
As depicted in figure (2.2), for state realizations smaller than the critical state a run occurs because
the value of claimed funds exceeds funding liquidity of the asset. By the uniform distribution of
states the probability of a run equals
P(run occurs) = P(θ ≤ θb) = θb (2.17)
31I exclude that the firm may replace withdrawn deposits with other funds to simplify the analysis.
62
In the sequel, we say that signals become precise or noise vanishes, if the support of the idiosyn-
cratic, random shock collapses to a single point, ε → 0. As signals become precise, the critical
state converges to the trigger, θb → θ∗ as ε → 0, thus as noise vanishes the trigger directly
represents the firm’s liquidity risk (ex ante probability of runs).
Lemma 2.3.1. As noise vanishes, the trigger θ∗ coincides with the ex ante probability of a run
θb.
*
RUNS
NO RUNS
PANIC RUNS
Figure 2.3: The size of the trigger determines the range of states for which panic runs
occur
Note that by (2.16) at the limit any partial derivative of the run probability equals the partial
derivative of the trigger θ∗.
As a consequence of Lemma 2.3.1, at the limit state realizations above the trigger lead to successful
coordination while realizations below the trigger lead to runs. The greater the trigger, the greater
the ex ante risk of a run. The bound to the lower dominance region θ is independent of capital
structure, liquidity ratio or recovery value. Next, I analyze how the trigger θ∗ changes for varying
constellations of those three parameters. This is interesting since the range of state realizations
between the lower dominance region and the trigger yield panic or self-fulfilling runs, which
cannot be attributed to asset return risk.
2.3.4 Recovery Value after Bankruptcy
In Schilling (2015) we have seen that probabilities of runs are non-monotone in liquidity ratio
under partial repay if recovery value is fixed at b = 1, a = 0. In this section I analyze, how proba-
bilities of runs change in recovery value and how probabilities behave in liquidity ratio depending
on composition of recovery value as introduced in equation (2.6).
Liquidity ratio ξ, by equation (2.5), measures the liquidity gap (mismatch) between firm assets
and short-term liabilities. If liquidity ratio is low, the amount of debt that could be claimed
on short notice by withdrawing investors is much higher than the amount of cash the firm can
raise through pledging assets. Hence, the smaller the liquidity ratio, the greater the liquidity
mismatch, that is the wider the gap between liquidity available by pledging the asset and po-
tential short-term liquidity withdrawals by debt investors. Conversely, if liquidity ratio is one,
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the amount of short-term debt that could be claimed equals the asset’s funding liquidity and the
possibility of a run due to a liquidity squeeze vanishes. In that case the firm is ’run-proof’, and
the outcome is trivial, investors always roll over unless they observe signals in the lower domi-
nance region. To keep the analysis interesting, in the remaining paper the firm is run-prone, ξ < 1.
Monotonicity versus Non-Monotonicity
Proposition 2.3.2 (Probability of runs in recovery value). Fix contract (r, k) and let noise
vanish.
i) If the recovery value function is linear γ(n, ξ) = nξ a > 0, b = 0, a > 0, then as noise vanishes
the probability of a run is monotone decreasing in liquidity ratio ξ.
ii) If the recovery value function is affine γ(n, ξ) = nξ a+ b with b > 0, the probability of a run is
a hump-shaped function of liquidity ratio: the probability of a run takes its unique maximum at
interior liquidity ratio ξ∗(a, b, r, k, (H, p(·))) ∈ (0, 1), strictly increases in liquidity ratio on (0, ξ∗)
and strictly decreases on (ξ∗, 1).
Proof. Appendix
Note in particular, that in the affine case the maximizer ξ∗ does not depend on debt ratio or
funding liquidity. Debt ratio and funding liquidity impact liquidity ratio but not the maximizing
liquidity ratio.
Corollary 2.3.1. Let noise vanish. If the recovery value function is linear, stability improves
monotonically in liquidity ratio and deteriorates in liquidity mismatch. The probability of a run
is minimized in ξ = 1 and has its supremum in ξ = 0.
*
Figure 2.4: For b > 0, the trigger and hence probability of runs is a hump-shaped function
of liquidity ratio ξ and takes its unique interior maximum in ξ∗
Both liquidity ratio and bankruptcy costs impact coordination. Unless the intercept of recovery
value b is zero, by Proposition (2.3.2) there exists a unique, interior, run probability- maximizing
liquidity ratio ξ∗. Thus in this case, the intuition that a higher liquidity ratio (lower liquidity
mismatch) in general leads to more stability turns out wrong. If liquidity ratio lies below ξ∗, the
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trigger and hence run probability increase as liquidity mismatch becomes smaller (liquidity ratio
increases) since coordination among debt investors is worsened. Only for liquidity ratios above
maximizer ξ∗ (case b > 0) or in the case where the intercept of recovery value is zero b = 0, the
intuition that smaller liquidity mismatch (larger liquidity ratio) leads to lower run probability
holds.
Result ii) in Proposition (2.3.2) was developed in Schilling (2015) for the special case of zero
bankruptcy costs a = 0, b = 1. I briefly give two examples to improve the understanding of the
non-monotonicity result and then proceed to explaining why the case of general recovery values is
interesting from a theory perspective but also from an applied perspective when thinking about
supranational capital and liquidity regulation under varying national bankruptcy law and hence
costs.
For a given asset (H, p(·)), I call stability θ∗ attainable at contract (r, k) if there exists a liquidity
ratio ξ ∈ (0, 1) which achieves stability θ∗, θ∗ = θ∗(r, k, (H, p(·)), γa,b, ξ).
Since ξ is a ratio, every equilibrium θ∗ can be attained by infinitely many combinations of debt
and funding liquidity. In particular, two assets with same risk profile (H, p(·)) but different
funding liquidity can achieve the exact same stability level if debt ratios are sufficiently adjusted:
Example 2.3.4.1 (Indeterminacy of stability in funding liquidity). At contract (r, k) and asset
(H, p(·)) denote the pairs of debt and funding liquidity by (ψ1, δ1) = (0.8, 0.72) and (ψ2, δ2) =
(0.2, 0.18) and assume δ1r > ψ1, δ2r > ψ2 (e.g. r ≥ 1.12) such that the firm is prone to runs
under each pair. Then both pairs yield the same equilibrium and hence stability since
ξ1 =
0.8
0.72r
=
0.2
0.18r
= ξ2 (2.18)
and hence θ∗(ξ1) = θ∗(ξ2).
By Proposition 2.3.2, for affine recovery value functions γa,b with b > 0 the function θ
∗(ξ) is not
one-to-one. Therefore, every equilibrium θ∗(ξ) and its corresponding stability level is not uniquely
attainable with respect to liquidity ratio. For given attainable θ∗ there can exist liquidity ratios
ξ1 6= ξ2 with θ∗(ξ2) = θ∗(ξ1).
Similarly, at contract (r, k) and asset (H, p(·)), by Proposition 2.3.2, a decrease in debt ratio alone
does not allow a qualified statement about the change of stability if the recovery value function
is affine. How the trigger θ∗ reacts to changes in debt ratio depends on funding liquidity and
whether the change causes liquidity ratio to move towards or away from the trigger maximizing
liquidity ratio:
Example 2.3.4.2 (Indeterminacy of stability: Drops in funding liquidity). Fix contract (r, k) =
(1.03, 1.15) and recovery value function γ(n, ξ), b > 0. Assume, the trigger θ∗(ξ) is uniquely
maximized at ξ∗(γ) = 0.4 and consider two distinct debt ratios δ1 = 0.6 and δ2 = 0.3.
i) Assume funding liquidity of the asset is ψ = 0.25. In this setting the firm is prone to runs
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under both debt ratios δ1, δ2 >
ψ
r = 0.24. Changing debt ratio from δ1 to δ2 causes a change in
liquidity ratio from 0.250.6×1.03 = 0.41 to
0.25
0.3×1.03 = 0.81. Since both values exceed the maximizer ξ
∗
and the change in debt causes liquidity ratio to increase and move away from the maximizer, by
Proposition 2.3.2 the trigger (probability of a run) falls and stability increases.
ii) Now assume instead funding liquidity is ψ = 0.1. Maximizer ξ∗ is not affected by this change.
Again both debt ratios satisfy the new condition δ1, δ2 >
ψ
r = 0.1. Changing debt ratios from δ1
to δ2 causes a change in liquidity ratio from
0.1
0.6×1.03 = 0.16 to
0.1
0.3×1.03 = 0.32. This time both
liquidity ratios undercut the maximizer. Hence, the change in debt ratio has led to an increase in
the trigger and thus a decrease in stability.32
These stylized examples demonstrate that debt ratio or funding liquidity alone are not sufficient
to make a statement about firm stability. Only the combination of debt and funding liquidity
uniquely pins down equilibrium behavior of debt investors.
The impact of recovery value on stability
I next analyze the interaction of non-monotonicity and recovery values after bankruptcy.
Proposition 2.3.3. At the limit, for every liquidity ratio ξ ∈ (0, 1) the probability of runs θ∗
increases in both parameters of recovery value, slope parameter a and intercept b
By the Proposition, more cost efficient bankruptcy proceedings lead to ex ante higher run prob-
abilities and lower stability independently of capital structure or asset funding liquidity.
As a consequence of the Proposition, increases in parameters a or b in fact lead to pointwise
increases in recovery value function γ(n(θ, θ∗), ξ) for every state θ and every liquidity ratio ξ if
a is nonnegative: An increase in a or b increases recovery value γ directly in a first order effect.
In addition, an increase in a or b increases the trigger und thus weakly increases the aggregate
action n(θ, θ∗) pointwise for every state θ which again increases γ in a second order effect for
every θ. Thus, if a and b are positive, increases of these parameters translate to increases in bank
run probability and recovery value. In addition, increases in bank run probability translate to
increases in recovery value if a is positive.
If a is negative, an increase in b not necessarily leads to an increase in recovery value γ. This is
since increasing b on the one hand increases γ directly but also leads to a decrease in γ through
an increases of the trigger θ∗ and hence function n(θ, θ∗) in every point (state) θ.
Corollary 2.3.2. Let a ≥ 0 and let noise vanish. An increase in recovery value through either
an increase in intercept b or slope parameter a monotonically increases the ex ante probability of
runs.
In particular, the more generous a lender of last resort intervenes, the larger a, the larger the
probability of runs since debt investors anticipate larger recovery values which increases incentives
32The size of maximizer ξ∗(γ) = 0.4 is an out of equilibrium assumption.
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to run. Similarly, the more efficient national bankruptcy proceedings, i.e. the smaller bankruptcy
fixed costs, the larger b and the greater the probability of runs.
Next, we are interested in how maximizer ξ∗(a, b) changes as the recovery value function varies
in slope parameter a and intercept b.
Proposition 2.3.4 (Non-monotonicity varies in recovery value). Fix contract (r, k). Assume the
recovery value function is affine. At the limit, the liquidity ratio ξ∗(a, b) which maximizes the
probability of a run strictly decreases in both recovery value determining parameters a and b.
Proof. Appendix
Figure 2.5: For every b > 0, the trigger θ∗ is maximized at interior liquidity ratio ξ∗b .
As b declines, the maximizer increases. For b → 0, the maximizer converges to the right
boundary and the trigger becomes a monotone increasing function in ξ. By Proposition
(2.3.3), for every given liquidity ratio ξ the trigger increases pointwise in parameter b of
recovery value.
Let us now look at how different bankruptcy laws in countries affect how changes in funding
liquidity impact stability:
Example 2.3.4.3 (Stability under distinct bankruptcy laws). A financial firm offers contract
(r, k) = (1.05, 1.02), invests in asset (H, p(·)) and has capital structure δ = 0.6. There are two
countries, where in country A due to different bankruptcy laws recovery value γA is smaller than
recovery value γB in country B, 0 < γA < γB with slope parameters aA = aB but intercepts
bB > bA > 0, that is in country B the fixed fraction of recovery value is larger.
i) Assume the financial firm is based in country A , asset funding liquidity is ψ1 = 0.2 and the
maximizing liquidity ratio is ξ∗(γA) = 0.4. The liquidity ratio of the firm is ξ1 = 0.21.05×0.6 = 0.32
which is below ξ∗(bA), see Figure 2.6. Now assume funding liquidity drops to ψ2 = 0.1. The new
liquidity ratio becomes ξ2 =
0.1
1.05×0.6 = 0.16 and has thus moved away from ξ
∗. By Proposition
2.3.2 the firm has become more stable, the bank run probability is decreased.
ii) Now assume, the firm moves to country B where due to different bankruptcy law recovery value
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is increased. By Proposition 2.3.4 the maximizer in country B has to be smaller at ξ∗(γB) = 0.1
than in country A. Before the drop of funding liquidity, the firms’ liquidity ratio ξ1 = 0.32 lies
above the new maximizer ξ∗(γB). After the drop of funding liquidity the firm’s liquidity ratio
ξ2 = 0.16 is still above but has decreases towards maximizer ξ
∗(bB). The bank run probability has
increased.33
Figure 2.6: The change in stability depends on whether the change in liquidity ratio ξ
leads to a move towards or away from the maximizer ξ∗. In country A, the drop in funding
liquidity causes liquidity ratio to move away from maximizer ξ∗A while in country B the
same drop in liquidity induces a move towards the maximizer in country B, ξ∗B.
A similar example can be constructed using changes in debt instead of changes in funding liquid-
ity. Country specific bankruptcy costs affect the size of maximizer ξ∗ by Proposition 2.3.4. For
fixed funding liquidity, changes in debt influence the size of liquidity ratio. To determine how
stability changes in debt the direction of movement and position of liquidity ratio relative to the
maximizer are both decisive. Hence, for the same change of debt and hence liquidity ratio it can
be that liquidity ratio moves away from the maximizer in country A but towards the maximizer
in country B.
The last example in particular demonstrates that capital and liquidity regulation should take into
account differences in fixed costs associated with national bankruptcy proceedings. Regulation
that is stability enhancing in one country may have a destabilizing effect in another country with
different bankruptcy laws. The next example concerns differences in costs that depend on the
scale of the run such as interventions by a lender of last resort. The example demonstrates that
countries in which a lender of last resort acts more generously should impose tighter liquidity
and capital regulation on financial firms.
Example 2.3.4.4. Imagine two countries G and I where the corresponding national central bank
acts as lender of last resort in case of a run. Assume the central bank in country G intervenes
33The size of maximizers ξ∗(γA) = 0.4 and ξ∗(γB) = 0.1 are out of equilibrium assumptions.
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more generously during a run than country I, slope parameters satisfy aG > aI > 0 with intercept
bG = bI = 0. Assume both countries agree on liquidity regulation, that is balance sheets of
financial firms in both countries must be composed in a way that liquidity ratio is larger or
equal than ξ. By Propositions 2.3.2 and 2.3.3, at every liquidity ratio ξ the recovery value and
probability of runs is higher in country G compared to country I. In particular at the lower bound
on liquidity ratio imposed by regulation ξ, stability level in country G undercuts stability level in
country I. Hence, to guarantee the same minimum level of stability in country G as in country
I, liquidity regulation in country G needs to be tighter at some liquidity ratio ξ
G
, see Figure
2.7. Assuming that funding liquidity for the specific asset in both countries coincides, the lower
bounds ξ > ξ
G
> ξ
I
for liquidity ratio by equation (2.5) transfer directly to upper bounds for
capital structure δ < δG < δI . To guarantee the same minimum level of stability in country G as
in country I, capital regulation in country G needs to be tighter.
Figure 2.7: Since recovery value after runs is higher in country G compared to country
I, country G needs to impose tighter liquidity regulation ξ
G
> ξ to guarantee the same
minimum level of stability as in country I, θ∗ ≤ θ∗I (ξ) = θ∗G(ξG).
Capital Structure and Recovery Value
I now connect the results on recovery value with the firm’s capital structure. Note that for given
contract (r, k) and funding liquidity ψ the value of liquidity ratio ξ = ψδr is pinned down by
capital structure δ. As a corollary of Propositions 2.3.2 and 2.3.4, I obtain a result already seen
in Schilling (2015) for the special case of no bankruptcy costs b = 1, a = 0.
Corollary 2.3.3 (Probability of runs and debt). Fix contract (r, k), parameters of recovery value
(a, b), funding liquidity ψ and let noise vanish.
i) If recovery value function is linear γ(n, ξ(δ)) = nξ(δ)a with b = 0, a > 0, the probability of a run
monotonically increases in debt.
ii) If recovery value function is affine γ(n, ξ(δ)) = nξ(δ)a + b, b > 0, the probability of a run
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increases in debt for smaller debt values δ ∈ (ψr , δ∗(a, b)), decreases in debt for large debt values
δ ∈ (δ∗(a, b), 1) and is maximized at interior debt ratio
δ∗(a, b) =
ψ
ξ∗(a, b)r
∈
(
ψ
r
, 1
)
The probability of a run is locally minimized at debt ratios δ = 1 (full debt financing) and δ = ψr
(no proneness to runs).
Applying the result on comparative statics of the maximizer ξ∗(a, b) in recovery value, by Propo-
sition 2.3.4, I obtain
Proposition 2.3.5. Fix (r, k, a, b, ψ) and let noise vanish. If recovery value is affine γ(n, ξ(δ)) =
n
ξ(δ)a+ b, b > 0, the debt ratio which maximizes the probability of a run δ∗(a, b) increases in both
recovery value determining constants a and b.
Figure 2.8: For b > 0, the trigger and hence probability of runs is a hump-shaped function
of debt ratio δ and takes its unique interior maximum in δ∗. Note that by Proposition
2.3.3, for every given debt ratio δ the trigger monotonically increases in parameter b of
recovery value. Thus, the curve θ∗b1(δ) for instance lies above curve θ
∗
b2
(δ).
Combining Proposition 2.3.5 with Proposition 2.3.3, we see very nicely that for slope parameter
a ≥ 0 an increase in intercept of recovery value function in a first effect increases the probability
of runs at every liquidity ratio and hence for given funding liquidity at every debt ratio δ. In a
second effect, the increase in intercept shifts the maximizing debt ratio δ∗ upwards.
If the intercept is zero, the probability of runs is monotone. However, increases in slope parameter
also increase the probability of runs at every debt ratio as seen in Figure 2.7.
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2.3.5 Intuition
By Proposition 2.3.2, a strictly positive intercept of recovery value b > 0 is responsible for the
occurrence of a non-monotonicity in the probability of a run. This result is due to a change in the
game structure when recovery value has zero intercept b = 0 compared to a game where recovery
value has intercept b > 0:
Both games for b > 0 and b = 0 have in common that conditional on no run n ≤ ξ the incentive to
withdraw versus roll over is constant in the proportion of other agents who withdraw (aggregate
action n), see equation (2.9) and figure (2.1). The game structures differ when conditioning on
the occurrence of a run. For b > 0, conditional on a run occurring, the payoff difference from
withdrawing versus rolling over depends on and strictly decreases in the aggregate action n,
(γξ/n) r = (a + b ξn) r. This holds since the payoff from rolling over is fixed at zero if a run has
happened. For a recovery value function with b = 0, the payoff difference from withdrawing from
the firm versus rolling over conditional on a run is constant i.e. independent of the aggregate
action n: Conditional on a run, a withdrawing agent receives (γξ/n) r = a r.
Figure 2.9: Payoff difference function v(θ, n) from equation (2.9) plotted for varying values
of b. For the special case b = 0, function v becomes a step function and is particularly con-
stant in n for n ≥ ξ which gives rise to a game structure with global strategic complements
in actions.
The intercept b of recovery value controls how fast the incentive to withdraw decreases relative to
rolling over since it influences the slope of the payoff difference function v(θ, n) in n as well as the
values of v in n = ξ and n = 1. The smaller b, the more clinched and flatter the curve v for n > ξ
and the slower the change of relative incentives, see Figure 2.9. Further, by Proposition 2.3.4,
the smaller b, the larger maximizer ξ∗ and hence the larger the range of liquidity values (0, ξ∗)
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for which the probability of runs increases in liquidity ratio and decreases in liquidity mismatch.
As b goes to zero, the curve v for n > ξ approaches the constant −ar and the change of v in n
goes to zero.
From a theory perspective, the game with recovery value b > 0 is such that there is one-sided
strategic substitutability between actions (see Goldstein and Pauzner (2005); Karp et al. (2007);
Schilling (2015)) conditional on a run. Further, there is (weak) one-sided strategic complemen-
tarity between actions conditional on no run independently of the size of b. In Figure 2.1, we
see for b > 0, conditional on a run i.e. for n > ξ the payoff difference function v(n) jumps from
positive constant p(θ)kr − r > 0 to the negative value −(a+ b)r and becomes upward sloping in
n.
The intercept of recovery value b controls the extent of strategic substitutability between actions
through the slope of v and by this controls the non-monotonicity. As the intercept of recovery
value b goes to zero, strategic substitutability between actions vanishes since the payoff difference
becomes constant in n while strategic complementarity between actions conditional on no run
remains. Actions become global strategic complements. As b → 0 the maximizer ξ∗ vanishes
and the probability of a run becomes monotone decreasing in liquidity ratio. Thus, for b → 0 I
recover the results by Morris and Shin (2009) and Rochet and Vives (2004) which were obtained
in games exhibiting global strategic complementarity between actions. 34
Schilling (2015) suggests that partial repay of deposits to debt investors in case of a run and
the corresponding one-sided strategic substitutability in actions is responsible for the arise of
the non-monotonicity of the probability of runs in debt. In this paper I show, monotonicity can
be achieved under partial repay as long as the recovery value function is such that one-sided
strategic substitutability in actions vanishes and actions are global strategic complements. We
obtain monotonicity under partial repay as soon as recovery value solely depends (linearly) on
size of the run and has no intercept.
In an economic context these results imply, as soon as we believe that recovery values after runs
are to some extent determined by a constant independent of the size of the run (intercept b > 0),
we have to deal with non-monotonic probabilities of runs not only in liquidity ratio but also in
debt.
2.3.6 Welfare
In this subsection I analyze, how parameters of recovery value impact debt investors ex ante
utility (consumer welfare) inferred from a contract (r, k).
Proposition 2.3.6 (Welfare in Recovery Value). Let noise vanish. For every contract (r, k) and
every slope a ≥ 0 there exists a bound for liquidity ratio ξ
b
such that debt investors’ utility from
34Note that b = 0 requires a > 0 since for fixed ξ I demand recovery value γ to be strictly positive for
all n ∈ [ξ, 1].
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the contract strictly increases in recovery value intercept b when liquidity ratio exceeds the bound
ξ ≥ ξ
b
.
For every contract (r, k) and every intercept b ≥ 0 there exists a bound for liquidity ratio ξ
a
such
that debt investors’ utility from the contract strictly increases in recovery value slope parameter
a when liquidity ratio exceeds the bound ξ ≥ ξ
a
.
In general, greater recovery values do not necessarily improve debt investors’ welfare from con-
tracts. Intuitively, this is since recovery values larger in intercept b or slope parameter a make the
event of a run more likely, see Proposition 2.3.3. Conditional on a run, however, greater recovery
values benefit investors. When determining how recovery values impact welfare, investors trade
off higher probability of no run under low recovery values versus higher payoffs conditional on
a run under higher recovery values. As the analysis shows, the effect is unambiguous only if
liquidity ratios are sufficiently high since in this case the probability of a run becomes close to
constant in recovery values.
2.4 Conclusion
This paper is to the best of my knowledge the first to analyze the impact of size and composition
of endogenous recovery values after bankruptcy on stability of financial firms against runs by
debt investors. When financial firms invest in illiquid, long-term assets and finance by liquid,
uninsured debt, the potential of a liquidity squeeze arises: When tomorrow too many investors
prematurely demand back their deposits the firm needs to transform illiquid assets to cash quickly.
If the number of withdrawing agents is too large, due to asset illiquidity the firm cannot satisfy
all claims and goes into default (run). If the firm defaults, agents who did not claim their deposit
receive zero. Knowing this in advance, uninsured debt investors face a coordination problem.
Invoking the theory of global games, I derive a unique equilibrium of the game which allows us
to study ex ante probability of runs as a function of the primitives such as capital structure,
liquidity mismatch and composition of recovery value.
After a run, the firm goes into bankruptcy for liquidation or reorganization. This process is
in general associated with costs. Therefore, not asset liquidity but the recovered value after
bankruptcy is distributed back to debt investors. I model recovery value as an affine function
of the endogenous, random size of the run (slope) plus a size independent constant (intercept).
While the intercept is associated with fixed costs caused by the bankruptcy proceedings, the slope
can be interpreted as an intervention by a lender of last resort in the course of a run on the firm.
As main contribution of the paper, I show that high recovery values achieved by cost efficient
bankruptcy proceedings or generous government interventions are never desirable from a stability
perspective and only sometimes desirable from a consumer perspective. I show, the probability
of runs increases in both, slope and intercept of recovery value. Thus, larger recovery values are
detrimental to firm stability since it increases incentives to run on the firm. The composition
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of recovery values effects run probabilities differently. The presence of the intercept makes run
probabilities hump-shaped in debt and liquidity ratio, where the non-monotonicity alters in the
intercept. With zero intercept, run probabilities are monotone as in Morris and Shin (2009) and
Rochet and Vives (2004). Also, greater recovery values in general do not lead to higher wel-
fare to debt investors unless liquidity ratio is sufficiently high, since recovery values increase run
probabilities. As a consequence of the non-monotonicity, drops in funding liquidity or changes in
capital structure can both decrease or increase the run probability depending on national differ-
ences in recovery value after bankruptcy. Countries with a more generously intervening lender
of last resort need to impose tighter capital and liquidity regulation to guarantee same stability
levels as countries where a lender of last resort intervenes more restrained. These findings are
interesting since agreements on supranational capital and liquidity regulation (Basel 3) do not
take into account differences in national bankruptcy proceedings and costs.
The most crucial constraint of this paper is, that funding liquidity ψ is assumed to be exogenous
and common knowledge. In real world, liquidity varies according to macroeconomic parameters
and asymmetric information. Further, slope and intercept of recovery value are assumed to be
common knowledge. Knowledge of the intercept can be justified since several empirical stud-
ies provide estimates on recovery values such as Thorburn (2000), Franks and Torous (1994),
Acharya et al. (2003) and Bris et al. (2006). Information about ELA, in connection to the slope,
is more difficult to obtain.35 I model recovery values as affine function of the size of the run.
This choice can be seen as first order Taylor approximation of a more complex recovery value
function.
35Bank of Cyprus and Laiki Bank obtained a combined volume of around 11 bn euro in 2013, see
Attalides et al. (2015). To obtain the slope parameter, knowledge of the volume of withdrawn funds in the
course of the runs on both banks and liquidity of assets posted as collateral to obtain ELA is necessary.
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2.5 Appendix
Appendix A: Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
Proof. [Proposition 2.3.1] The existence and uniqueness proof of a trigger equilibrium and the
proof that a non-threshold equilibrium cannot exist is as in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) with
λ = 0 and u(·) = id. Uniqueness of a threshold equilibrium alternatively holds due to Lemma 2.3
in Morris and Shin (2001) by the following properties: i) The payoff difference function v from
equation (2.9) satisfies single-crossing in the aggregate action n (figure (2.1), ii) the monotone
likelihood ratio property holds for the uniform distribution of noise, iii) state monotonicity holds,
the function v(θ, n) is monotone in θ, iv) there is limit dominance, either action can be dominant
if the state realizes sufficiently high or low, v) the expected payoff difference is continuous in the
signal θi and vi) it can be shown that there exists a unique signal at which the expected payoff
difference is zero.
I give a short intuition here, why a unique trigger equilibrium exists for the general recovery value
function γ(n, ξ) with b ≥ 0: Given that all other investors play a trigger strategy around signal
θ∗, a trigger equilibrium exists if a single investor also finds it optimal to withdraw for signals
θi < θ
∗ and to roll over for signals θi > θ∗. That is, we demand (a) D(θi, θ∗) < 0 for θi < θ∗ and
(b) D(θi, θ
∗) > 0 for θi > θ∗. Continuity of the integral D(θi, θ∗) in signal θi holds by Lemma A1
(i) in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) and ensures indifference in θi = θ
∗, D(θ∗, θ∗) = 0 if (a) and
(b) hold. Existence of a signal which satisfies D(θ∗, θ∗) = 0 follows by the existence of dominance
regions and continuity of D(θ∗, θ∗) in θ∗ by Lemma A1 (ii) in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005): If the
state realizes high enough in the upper dominance region and ε is small, the investor observes a
very high signal such that rolling over is optimal D(θi, n) > 0 independently of n, similarly, if the
state realizes low enough in the lower dominance region, the investor observes a very low signal
such that withdrawing is dominant D(θi, n) < 0. Uniqueness of a signal satisfying D(θ
∗, θ∗) = 0
holds since by Lemma A1 (iii) in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), D(θ∗, θ∗) strictly increases in θ∗
as long as signal θ∗ lies below θ¯ + ε since the probability function p(·) strictly increases in the
state for states below the bound to the upper dominance region. Uniqueness follows since for
signals above θ¯+ε the definition of the upper dominance region yields D(θi, θ
∗) > 0. Therefore, a
unique candidate for a threshold equilibrium exists. To show that this candidate also satisfies (a)
and (b), Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) decompose the intervals [θi− ε, θi + ε] and [θ∗− ε, θ∗+ ε],
use D(θ∗, θ∗) = 0 and the single crossing property of v(θ, n(θ, θ∗)) in θ, see (A8) and (A9) in
their proof to Theorem 1 B.
The proof why a non-threshold equilibrium cannot exist is less intuitive, and fully given in
Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) proof of Theorem 1 C. We can apply Theorem 1 C since the
necessary characteristics of the functions for the proof to hold remain valid: due to γ(n, ξ) > 0
for all n ∈ (ξ, 1], the payoff difference function v(θ, n) satisfies single-crossing and is monotone
in n when it is nonnegative for every b ≥ 0. Further, v remains strictly negative for all n > ξ.
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A difference to the model in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) is that here the function v jumps in
n = ξ from p(θ)rk− r to −(a+ b)r. This however does not impact continuity of the integral over
v.
Appendix B: Comparative Statics
Proof. [Proposition 2.3.2] Let n(θ, θ∗) the measure of agents demanding early withdrawal in
period 1 when all agents use trigger θ∗ and the state of the world is θ. The payoff indifference
equality which implicitly determines the trigger θ∗(r, δ) as a function of the firm’s primitives
(r, k, δ, ψ, γa,b) away from the limit is given by D(θ
∗, θ∗) = 0. By the proof of Theorem 1 and
changing variables from θ to n using (2.11) I obtain
D(θ∗, θ∗) =
1
2ε
∫ θ∗+ε
θ∗−ε
v(θ, n(θ, θ∗)) dθ =
∫ 1
0
v(θ(n, θ∗), n) dn (2.19)
where
θ(n, θ∗) = θ∗ + ε (1− 2n) (2.20)
is the inverse of n(θ, θ∗) for θ ∈ [θ∗ − ε, θ∗ + ε]. Hence,
0 = D(θ∗, θ∗) =
∫ 1
0
v(θ(n, θ∗), n) dn (2.21)
Plugging in for the function v from (2.9) I obtain the payoff indifference equation
0 = −ξr
∫ 1
ξ
γ(n, ξ)
n
dn+
∫ ξ
0
(p(θ(n, θ∗)) kr − r) dn (2.22)
Set
fˆ(θ∗, ξ) = −ξr
∫ 1
ξ
γ(n, ξ)
n
dn+
∫ ξ
0
p(θ(n, θ∗)) kr − r dn (2.23)
We have
∂
∂θ∗
fˆ(θ∗, ξ) = kr
∫ ξ
0
p′(θ(n, θ∗))
∂
∂θ∗
θ(n, θ∗) dn
= kr
∫ ξ
0
p′(θ(n, θ∗)) dn > 0 (2.24)
since ∂∂θ∗ θ(n, θ
∗) = 1. For ε → 0 we have θ(n, θ∗) → θ∗. Since p(·) is continuous and defined on
a compact interval, p′(·) is bounded. Thus, with Lebesgue’s Dominated Convergence Theorem,
∂
∂θ∗
fˆ(θ∗, ξ)→ ξ p′(θ∗) kr (2.25)
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Comparative Statics of Trigger in liquidity ratio
To obtain ∂θ
∗
∂ξ , I use the Implicit Function Theorem and need to calculate
∂fˆ
∂ξ . Then,
∂θ∗
∂ξ
= −
∂fˆ
∂ξ
∂fˆ
∂θ∗
(2.26)
For γ(n, ξ) > 0 for all n ∈ [0, 1], ξ ∈ (0, 1) using Leibniz’ rule
∂
∂ξ
fˆ(θ∗, ξ) = −r
1− γ(ξ, ξ) + ∫ 1
ξ
γ(n, ξ) + ξ
(
∂
∂ξγ(n, ξ)
)
n
dn
 (2.27)
+ p(θ(ξ, θ∗)) kr (2.28)
As ε → 0, we have θ(n, θ∗) → θ∗ and thus p(θ(ξ, θ∗)) → p(θ∗) independently of ξ. Further,
p(θ∗)kr ≥ r by definition of the lower dominance region and since θ∗ ≥ θ for ε → 0. Hence, a
sufficient condition for limε→0 ∂∂ξ fˆ(θ
∗, ξ) > 0 for all ξ ∈ (0, 1) is
∫ 1
ξ
γ(n, ξ) + ξ
(
∂
∂ξγ(n, ξ)
)
n
dn < γ(ξ, ξ) for all ξ ∈ (0, 1) (2.29)
Since limξ→1 |γ(n, ξ)| ≤ |a|n + b ≤ |a| + b < ∞, a ∈ R, b > 0 and limξ→1 | ∂∂ξγ(n, ξ)| = n|a| ≤
|a| <∞ and n ∈ [ξ, 1], the integrand on the left hand side of (2.29) is bounded. Hence, using the
Intermediate Value Theorem for integrals, we see that for ξ → 1
lim
ξ→1
∫ 1
ξ
γ(n, ξ) + ξ
(
∂
∂ξγ(n, ξ)
)
n
dn = 0 < lim
ξ→1
γ(ξ, ξ) (2.30)
since γ(n, ξ) is strictly positive for all n ∈ [ξ, 1]. Hence, for ξ → 1, ε → 0 we have ∂fˆ∂ξ > 0 and
therefore ∂θ
∗
∂ξ < 0 for all strictly positive, continuously differentiable recovery value functions
γ(n, ξ) since ∂fˆ∂θ∗ > 0 for all ξ by (2.24).
Plugging in for the function γ(n, ξ) = nξ a+ b I obtain
∂
∂ξ
fˆ(θ∗, ξ) = −r
(
1− (a+ b) + b
∫ 1
ξ
1
n
dn
)
+ p(θ(ξ, θ∗)) kr
= −r (1− (a+ b)− b ln(ξ)) + p(θ(ξ, θ∗)) kr (2.31)
77
and taking the limit noise to zero
lim
ε→0
∂
∂ξ
fˆ(θ∗, ξ) = −r (1− (a+ b)− b ln(ξ)) + p(θ∗) kr (2.32)
The sufficient condition for limε→0 ∂∂ξ fˆ(θ
∗, ξ) > 0 for all ξ ∈ (0, 1) becomes
−b ln(ξ) < a+ b for all ξ ∈ (0, 1) (2.33)
As the intercept of recovery value b goes to 0, the sufficient condition becomes
0 < a (2.34)
Hence, for γ(n, ξ) = nξ a, a > 0 we have limε→0
∂
∂ξ fˆ(θ
∗, ξ) > 0 for all ξ ∈ (0, 1) and thus ∂θ∗∂ξ < 0.
For any arbitrary small b > 0, there exists a ξ∗(b, a) such that in (2.32) ∂∂ξ fˆ(θ
∗, ξ) < 0 and ∂θ
∗
∂ξ > 0
for ξ ∈ (0, ξ∗(b, a)) since ln(ξ) goes to minus infinity as ξ → 0. In addition, for b > 0 the function
∂
∂ξ fˆ(θ
∗, ξ) is strictly increasing and continuous in ξ. Thus, by (2.29) and the Intermediate Value
Theorem ∂∂ξ fˆ(θ
∗, ξ) satisfies single-crossing in ξ which implies that for every b > 0, ξ∗(b, a) is the
unique maximizer of the function θ∗(ξ).
Proof. [Lemma 2.3.3] I show that the probability of runs strictly increases in recovery value
parameters a and b: Plugging γ(n, ξ) into (2.23), we have
fˆ(θ∗, a, b) = −r (ξ + (1− ξ)a− ξb ln(ξ)) + kr
∫ ξ
0
p(θ(n, θ∗)) dn (2.35)
And thus for ξ ∈ (0, 1)
∂fˆ(θ∗, a, b)
∂a
= −(1− ξ) r < 0 (2.36)
∂fˆ(θ∗, a, b)
∂b
= ξ ln(ξ) r < 0 (2.37)
Thus, with (2.25) and the Implicit Function Theorem we have for ξ ∈ (0, 1)
lim
ε→0
∂θ∗
∂b
= − r ln(ξ)
krp′(θ∗)
= − ln(ξ)
k p′(θ∗)
> 0 (2.38)
lim
ε→0
∂θ∗
∂a
=
r(1− ξ)
ξkr p′(θ∗)
=
(1− ξ)
ξk p′(θ∗)
> 0 (2.39)
Proof. [Proposition 2.3.4] Let γ(n, ξ) = nξ a + b > 0 with b > 0. We know by the single crossing
property of function limε→0 ∂∂ξ fˆ(θ
∗, ξ) in ξ for b > 0, shown in proof of Proposition 2.3.2, that at
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the limit ε→ 0 for given b > 0, a ∈ R, 0 < a+ b < 1/H < 1 the maximizer ξ∗(b, a) of the trigger
θ∗ exists, is unique and is implicitly defined as the zero of equation (2.32):
lim
ε→0
∂
∂ξ
fˆ(θ∗, ξ) = −r (1− (a+ b)− b ln(ξ)) + p(θ∗) kr = 0
Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to equation (2.31) (away from the limit) and taking the
limit ε→ 0 gives us the behavior of the maximizer ξ∗ in parameters a, b: We have
∂ξ∗
∂b
= −
∂
∂b
∂fˆ
∂ξ
∂
∂ξ
∂fˆ
∂ξ
∣∣∣
ξ=ξ∗
,
∂ξ∗
∂a
= −
∂
∂a
∂fˆ
∂ξ
∂
∂ξ
∂fˆ
∂ξ
∣∣∣
ξ=ξ∗
Here, away from the limit using (2.31) I obtain with (2.20)
∂
∂ξ
∂fˆ
∂ξ
∣∣∣
ξ=ξ∗
=
rb
ξ∗
+ kr p′(θ(n, θ∗))
(
∂θ(n, θ∗)
∂n
∣∣∣
n=ξ∗
+
∂θ(n, θ∗)
∂θ∗
∂θ∗
∂ξ
∣∣∣
ξ=ξ∗
)
=
rb
ξ∗
+ kr p′(θ(n, θ∗))
(
−2ε+ ∂θ
∗
∂ξ
∣∣∣
ξ=ξ∗
)
Since ξ∗ exists and maximizes θ∗ when ε→ 0, we have ∂θ∗∂ξ∗ = 0 and thus taking the limit
lim
ε→0
∂
∂ξ
∂fˆ
∂ξ
∣∣∣
ξ=ξ∗
=
rb
ξ∗
Further, with (2.38) and (2.39) at the limit
lim
ε→0
∂
∂b
∂fˆ
∂ξ
∣∣∣
ξ=ξ∗
= r (1 + ln(ξ∗)) + kr p′(θ∗) lim
ε→0
∂θ∗
∂b
= r (1 + ln(ξ∗)) + kr p′(θ∗)
(
− ln(ξ
∗)
kp′(θ∗)
)
= r
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lim
ε→0
∂
∂a
∂fˆ
∂ξ
∣∣∣
ξ=ξ∗
= r + kr p′(θ∗) lim
ε→0
∂θ∗
∂a
= r + kr p′(θ∗)
(1− ξ∗)
ξ∗k p′(θ∗)
= r
(
1 +
1− ξ∗
ξ∗
)
=
r
ξ∗
Finally,
lim
ε→0
∂ξ∗
∂b
= −
limε→0 ∂∂b
∂fˆ
∂ξ
limε→0 ∂∂ξ∗
∂fˆ
∂ξ
= − r
rb/ξ∗
= −ξ
∗
b
< 0
lim
ε→0
∂ξ∗
∂a
= −
limε→0 ∂∂a
∂fˆ
∂ξ
limε→0 ∂∂ξ∗
∂fˆ
∂ξ
= −
1
ξ∗ r
rb/ξ∗
= −1
b
< 0
Proof. [Proposition 2.3.3] By equation (2.22), the trigger depends on debt ratio δ and funding
liquidity ψ only through liquidity ratio. By its definition (2.5), for every recovery value function
γ(n, ξ) = nξ a+ b with a, b such that γ(n, ξ) > 0 liquidity ratio ξ =
ψ
δr strictly increases in funding
liquidity ψ and decreases in debt.
Fix a, b and (r, k, ψ). If b = 0, by Proposition 2.3.2 the trigger monotonically decreases in liquid-
ity ratio ξ an thus for given ψ monotonically increases in debt δ.
If b > 0, the trigger maximizing liquidity ratio ξ∗(a, b) ∈ (0, 1) is uniquely pinned down as a
function of a, b, r, k. We have ξ(δ) < ξ∗(a, b) if and only if
δ >
ψ
rξ∗(a, b)
(2.40)
Thus, as δ increases within [ ψrξ∗(a,b) , 1), ξ(δ) =
ψ
δr decreases and moves away from ξ
∗(a, b). Since
ξ∗(a, b) uniquely maximizes the probability of a run, the probability of a run has to decrease in
δ. Equivalently, we have ξ(δ) > ξ∗(a, b) if and only if
δ <
ψ
rξ∗(a, b)
(2.41)
As δ increases within (ψl ,
ψ
rξ∗(a,b)), ξ(δ) decreases and approaches ξ
∗(a, b) from above. Thus, the
probability of a run increases in δ for δ in (ψl ,
ψ
rξ∗(a,b)).
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Appendix C: Welfare
Proof. [Proposition 2.3.6] Debt investors’ ex ante utility from the contract equals
EU(ξ) =
∫ θb(ξ)
0
n(θ, θ∗(ξ))
γ(n(θ, θ∗), ξ)ξ
n(θ, θ∗(ξ))
r + (1− n(θ, θ∗(ξ))) · 0 dθ (2.42)
+
∫ θ∗(ξ)+ε
θb(ξ)
n(θ, θ∗(ξ))r + (1− n(θ, θ∗(ξ)))p(θ) kr dθ (2.43)
+
∫ θ
θ∗(ξ)+ε
p(θ) kr dθ +
∫ 1
θ
kr dθ (2.44)
=
∫ θb(ξ)
0
γ(n(θ, θ∗), ξ) · ξ r dθ (2.45)
+
∫ θ∗(ξ)+ε
θb(ξ)
n(θ, θ∗(ξ))r + (1− n(θ, θ∗(ξ)))p(θ) kr dθ (2.46)
+
∫ θ
θ∗(ξ)+ε
p(θ)kr dθ + (1− θ)kr (2.47)
Using Leibniz rule and γ(n(θ, θ∗), ξ) = aξn(θ, θ
∗) + b, the change in utility due to a change in
slope parameter a is
∂
∂a
EU =
∂
∂a
∫ θb(ξ)
0
(
a
ξ
n(θ, θ∗) + b
)
· ξ r dθ (2.48)
+
∂
∂a
∫ θ∗(ξ)+ε
θb(ξ)
n(θ, θ∗(ξ))r + (1− n(θ, θ∗(ξ)))p(θ) kr dθ (2.49)
=
∫ θb(ξ)
0
∂
∂a
(
a
ξ
n(θ, θ∗) + b
)
· ξ r dθ (2.50)
+
∂θb
∂a
(a+ b) ξr (2.51)
+
∫ θ∗(ξ)+ε
θb(ξ)
∂
∂a
[n(θ, θ∗(ξ))r + (1− n(θ, θ∗(ξ)))p(θ) kr] dθ (2.52)
− ∂θb
∂a
[ξr + (1− n(θb, θ∗))p(θb)kr] (2.53)
=
∫ θb(ξ)
0
(
1
ξ
n(θ, θ∗) +
a
ξ
∂n(θ, θ∗)
∂θ∗
∂θ∗
∂a
)
· ξ r dθ (2.54)
+
∂θb
∂a
(a+ b) ξr − ∂θb
∂a
[ξr + (1− ξ)p(θb)kr] (2.55)
+
∫ θ∗(ξ)+ε
θb(ξ)
∂n(θ, θ∗)
∂θ∗
∂θ∗
∂a
[r − p(θ) kr] dθ (2.56)
since n(θb, θ
∗) = ξ. Next, due to definition of θb, since n(θ∗ − ε, θ∗) = 1, n(θ∗ + ε, θ∗) = 0, and
ξ ∈ (0, 1) θb > θ∗−ε. Also, for all θ ≤ θ∗−ε we have n(θ, θ∗) = 1 and hence ∂n(θ,θ
∗)
∂θ∗ = 0. Further
∂n(θ,θ∗)
∂θ∗ =
1
2ε for θ ∈ [θ∗ − ε, θ∗ + ε] by (2.11). The integral (2.54) therefore simplifies to
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∫ θ∗−ε
0
(
1
ξ
n(θ, θ∗) +
a
ξ
∂n(θ, θ∗)
∂θ∗
∂θ∗
∂a
)
· ξ r dθ (2.57)
+
∫ θb(ξ)
θ∗−ε
(
1
ξ
n(θ, θ∗) +
a
ξ
∂n(θ, θ∗)
∂θ∗
∂θ∗
∂a
)
· ξ r dθ (2.58)
= (θ∗ − ε)r +
∫ θb(ξ)
θ∗−ε
(
1
ξ
n(θ, θ∗) +
a
ξ
1
2ε
∂θ∗
∂a
)
· ξ r dθ (2.59)
Changing variables to n with (2.11), (2.59) becomes
(θ∗ − ε)r +
∫ 1
ξ
(
1
ξ
n 2ε+
a
ξ
∂θ∗
∂a
)
· ξ r dn
−→
ε→0
θ∗r +
∫ 1
ξ
a
∂θ∗
∂a
· r dn
For integral (2.56), changing variables to n and then applying the PIE (2.22) in a second step,
the integral becomes
∂θ∗
∂a
∫ ξ
0
[r − p(θ(n, θ∗)) kr] dn
= −∂θ
∗
∂a
∫ 1
ξ
γ(n, ξ)ξ
n
r dn = −∂θ
∗
∂a
∫ 1
ξ
(a+
b
n
ξ) r dn
where I can draw out ∂θ
∗
∂a since the trigger only depends on the primitives of the game, not the
random state and θ(n, θ∗) is as in (2.20). Altogether, with θb → θ∗ for ε→ 0 and (2.16)
lim
ε→0
∂
∂a
EU = θ∗r − lim
ε→0
∂θ∗
∂a
∫ 1
ξ
b
n
ξ r dn (2.60)
+ lim
ε→0
∂θ∗
∂a
[(a+ b− 1) ξr − (1− ξ)p(θ∗)kr] (2.61)
= θ∗r + lim
ε→0
∂θ∗
∂a
[(a+ b− 1 + b ln(ξ)) ξr − (1− ξ)p(θ∗)kr] (2.62)
We have θ∗r ≥ θr > 0. Since a+ b < 1 and ln(ξ) < 0 for ξ ∈ (0, 1), the bracket is always strictly
negative. By Proposition 2.3.3, limε→0 ∂θ
∗
∂a > 0 for ξ ∈ (0, 1). However, by (2.39) as ξ → 1,
lim
ξ→1
lim
ε→0
∂θ∗
∂a
= lim
ξ→1
(1− ξ)
ξk p′(θ∗)
= 0 (2.63)
where limξ→1 p′(θ∗) is bounded from below, in particular limξ→1 p′(θ∗) ≥ p′(θ) > 0 since p(·) is
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strictly increasing for all θ ∈ [0, 1], p′(·) is continuous and limξ→1 θ∗ > θ > 0. In addition, the
bracket is bounded for ξ → 1 as p(·) is bounded. Therefore,
lim
ξ→1
lim
ε→0
∂
∂a
EU = lim
ξ→1
θ∗r > θr > 0 (2.64)
By continuity of limε→0 ∂∂aEU , there exists ξa such that for all ξ ≥ ξa, we have limε→0 ∂∂aEU ≥ 0.
By an identical argument,
lim
ε→0
∂
∂b
EU = θ∗ξr − lim
ε→0
∂θ∗
∂b
∫ 1
ξ
b
n
ξ r dn (2.65)
+ lim
ε→0
∂θ∗
∂b
[(a+ b− 1) ξr − (1− ξ)p(θ∗)kr] (2.66)
= θ∗ξr + lim
ε→0
∂θ∗
∂b
[(a+ b− 1 + b ln(ξ)) ξr − (1− ξ)p(θ∗)kr] (2.67)
Note that the bracket equals the bracket in (2.62) and is hence negative. By Proposition 2.3.3,
limε→0 ∂θ
∗
∂b > 0 for ξ ∈ (0, 1) but by (2.38) as ξ → 1,
lim
ξ→1
lim
ε→0
∂θ∗
∂b
= lim
ξ→1
− ln(ξ)
k p′(θ∗)
= 0 (2.68)
where still limξ→1 p′(θ∗) is bounded from below, limξ→1 p′(θ∗) ≥ p′(θ) > 0. Therefore,
lim
ξ→1
lim
ε→0
∂
∂b
EU = lim
ξ→1
θ∗ξr = lim
ξ→1
θ∗r > θr > 0 (2.69)
By continuity of limε→0 ∂∂bEU , there exists ξb such that for all ξ ≥ ξb, we have limε→0 ∂∂bEU ≥
0.
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Chapter 3
Redistributional Effects of Health
Insurance in Germany: Private and
Public Insurance, Premia and
Contribution Rates
3.1 Motivation
In a model of obligatory health insurance, we study redistributional effects when public and pri-
vate insurances coexist and compete for profitable customers. In Germany, systemic competition
between public and private insurance is regulated by requiring public insurance to operate cost
covering1 and to finance health expenditures via an only income dependent contribution2 with
a price cap. Private insurance maximizes profits and premia may depend on health risk. Public
insurance is available to every citizen. Sufficiently wealthy customers may opt out of the public
system and insure privately.
The opportunity to opt out of the redistributive, public system was originally granted to en-
hance consumer choice and stimulate competition between insurers (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat
beim BMF, 2004; Jacobs and Schulze, 2004; Fehr et al., 2006). Thomson and Mossialos (2006)
however find that choice of public or private health insurance coverage (systemic competition)
creates incentives for private insurers to select risks (cream skimming3) and leads to risk seg-
mentation, thereby increasing the financial risk borne by public insurers. In Germany, cream
skimming by private insurance is a result of regulation. Solidary public insurance may condition
the contribution rate not on health risk but on income only (Pauly, 1984). As a result, healthy
1That is she balances budget: Public insurance charges a contribution such that health expenses payable
to customers on average equal overall collected contributions.
2The current contribution (”Beitragssatz”) is 14.6% of income in 2015. The contribution is split equally
between employer and employee such that 7.3% of income are payable by the employee.
3Selection of customers who in expectation cause a profit to the insurer.
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and wealthy individuals opt out attracted by low, private health premia. Since private insurance
operates profit maximizing, health premia paid by privately insured customers are lost for the
redistributive public system which affects the health contribution charged by the budget balanc-
ing public insurance. The public contribution rate vice versa impacts the customers’ final choice
for a contract and thus the selection of risk by private insurance.
In a model where customers are characterized by health and income, we study how the German
opt-out option4 and the price cap5 on public health premia affect cream skimming of profitable
customers by private insurances and thus health premia of all customers, publicly and privately
insured.
We further analyze, how improvements in the health income distribution or increases in cor-
relation between health and income affect redistribution streams between customer groups and
health premia when opt-out and price caps exist. Our analysis is motivated by a study by Deaton
and Paxson (1998). Using US data from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) and the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), they provide empirical evidence that for more recently
born cohorts the correlation between income and health is increased. Health shocks may have a
larger impact on future income and social security, vice versa income increasingly affects choice
of lifestyle and according risk factors such as smoking, drinking and obesity.
The question how to optimally organize the market for health insurance provision remains rele-
vant in many countries - not only in Germany. Political parties in Germany discuss changes of
the health insurance system to a system financed by flat premia (’Kopfpauschale’). This system
demands that private and public insurances offer equal health benefits at flat, income and health
independent premiums to every agent, see Worz and Busse (2005). Insurances would compete in
price for customers and customers may choose between insurances unrestrictedly.
When changing the model to a flat premium system, we analyze the customer groups who win
and lose compared to the current German system. Last and most interesting, we analyze optimal
health and income dependent premia under a budget balancing constraint. Further, we analyze
optimal premiums constrained to depend not on health risk but on income only.
To conduct our analysis, we model three types of agents: A population of customers, a public and
a private insurance. Customers are characterized by a two-dimensional random but observable
type for health h and income e. Health and income are assumed to be positively correlated.
Taking the health-income distribution of types as given, the public insurer endogenously sets the
percentage of income she charges as the premium. We assume that the public insurer commits
to operate cost-covering instead of maximizing profits. In contrast, the private insurer sets a
4The income threshold to opt out (”Versicherungspflichtgrenze”) is 56,250 euro in yearly income in
2016.
5The income threshold to determine the maximum public premium (”Beitragsbemessungsgrenze”) is
50,850 euro in yearly income in 2016.
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profit-maximizing premium as a function of the customer’s health and income type, taking the
public premium as given. We assume both insurance contracts offer equivalent maximum health
benefits and hence equally high partial coverage.
A customer decides on her insurance contract after observing her type. Customers hence face no
uncertainty about future net income. The motive to insure is imposed by regulation of obligatory
health insurance. Also, since customer types are observable by insurances, the model features no
asymmetric information and hence no adverse selection problem.
As first main result we demonstrate, under voluntary health insurance no insurance company
offers a contract to any potential customer and the market collapses. This result is not driven by
adverse selection and is hence fundamentally different from the collapse of insurance markets as
described in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). Instead, regulation of public insurances to condition
public insurance premiums on income only and the budget balancing constraint in combination
with continuity and multi-dimensionality of types make it impossible for public insurance to
finance the system. Public insurance contributions are based on income but actual health costs
depend on customers’ health types. Only those agents will insure voluntary whose health costs
to the insurance company will exceed benefits receivable from her insurance. As a consequence,
running a balanced budget becomes impossible to the public insurance.
Under obligatory insurance, we give a constraint under which a unique public insurance contri-
bution exists charged as percentage of income. In addition, we give a closed form solution of the
private premium offered to customers. Existence requires that average income of customers who
must insure with public insurance exceeds health costs caused by the entire customer population.
The constraint thus reflects the difficulty for public insurance to run a balanced budget in the
face of the opt-out opportunity for rich customers. Monopolistic private insurance discriminates
between profitable and unprofitable customers, i.e. customers for whom the health premium
payable exceeds or undercuts expected health costs. She attracts healthy customers by setting
a premium slightly below the public insurance premium and tries to chase away unhealthy cus-
tomers by setting the maximum premium possible (cream skimming). Given this behavior, a
sufficient condition for existence of an equilibrium is that the opt-out threshold is high enough
such that the public insurance insures sufficiently many healthy customers and thereby can oper-
ate cost-covering. In that case, the public insurance contribution is unique and publicly insured
customers pool along the health dimension in the sense that customers with equal income type
but varying health type pay the same premium. The public insurance system is solidary (Hin-
richs, 1995), publicly insured customers with equal health type but varying income pay different
premiums.
Looking at variations of opting out, we demonstrate that increasing the opt-out threshold up to
the level of the contribution cap decreases health premiums for all customers, public and private.
This is since the private insurance can cream skim customers with earnings between these cut-
offs. By equating them, cream skimming is prevented.
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As next main result, we show that systematic improvements of the population’s health and income
distribution in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, not necessarily lead to decreases in
public contribution rates. Contribution may increase due to migration from public to private
insurance since private insurance pockets the gains instead of redistributing them.
Increasing correlation between health and income may lead to an increase in public contribution
rate. This result is again due to the opt-out threshold. Under higher positive correlation, pub-
licly insured, low income customers on average will cause higher health costs while higher income
customers have improved health but opt out. To quantify increases in correlation we use the
notion of supermodular stochastic order (Shaked and Shanthikumar, 2007).
Last, we apply our model to study changes in welfare6 when changing the health system to a flat,
health and income independent premium system. If the opt-out threshold is sufficiently high,
the current German system yields higher welfare than the premium system. This is, since in the
German, income tax resembling system customers with high income pay more than customers
with low income which accounts for the concave utility function. Introducing a simple, budget-
balanced income redistribution scheme (income tax) into the flat premium system however allows
to obtain the same level of welfare as the current German system may achieve.7 This implies that
a change of the current system to a premium system should be accompanied by an appropriate
change in income taxation.
Going one step further, we derive the welfare-maximizing pricing scheme which may depend on
health and income. The optimal pricing scheme requires every customer to pay the health costs
she imposes on the system plus the deviation of her net income from average net income of the
population if there was no insurance. By this, the optimal pricing scheme entails a redistribution
but not in form of an income tax but by deviation from mean.
Analyzing the welfare-maximizing pricing scheme constrained to depend on income only, we show
that the current public redistribution system financed via an income tax fails to be optimal since
it does not take into account the correlation between health and income.
Literature
The classic paper by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) demonstrates that insurance markets can
fail as a consequence of asymmetric information about risk types and adverse selection. In the
context of adverse selection, Neudeck and Podczeck (1996) analyze regulation of health insurance
markets in a Rothschild Stiglitz type model where agents can opt out of social public insurance
and insure privately.
As Neudeck and Podczeck (1996), our paper analyzes competition between public and private
6We study utilitarian welfare, where health enters a customer’s utility function since health costs and
insurance affect her comsumption.
7Note that factually in Germany, income taxation is in addition to income dependent health premiums
while here in our model we do not model income taxation in addition to income dependent premiums. In
Germany, a budget balancing income dependent redistribution scheme is thus already in place.
88
health insurance under regulation and opt out. Our paper differs, since in our model types are
revealed before the choice of insurance is made. The motive for agents to insure is thus not by
uncertainty and desire for risk-sharing but by regulation. In addition, types are publicly observ-
able, information is symmetric which excludes adverse selection. In particular, our results on
market failure under voluntary insurance and cream skimming under obligatory insurance are
not driven by adverse selection but by regulation of the health insurance market.
Our analysis focuses on systemic competition between public and private insurance under regu-
lation. As opposed to Neudeck and Podczeck (1996), our model distinguishes agents not only by
their health risk type but also by an income type. In Neudeck and Podczeck (1996) social public
insurance is financed by a lump-sum tax on endowments, all agents pay the same flat premium.
In our model, agents’ premium payment for the same public insurance coverage may vary since
agents differ in income types and public insurance charges an income dependent contribution.
As a consequence here, not only high risk types are subsidized by low risk types but also healthy
very low income types are subsidized by healthy higher income types. The latter is, since our
model contains the feature that the maximum compensation payment agents may obtain from
their insurance cannot be larger than the health costs they impose on the system. In Neudeck
and Podczeck (1996) all agents may opt out of public insurance, while in our model only agents
with income above the opt-out threshold have this option. Pooling is thus enforced on low income
types by regulation and the obligation to insure.
Our model features cream-skimming by private insurance, but not driven by asymmetric infor-
mation and flat premiums as in Barros (2003) but by regulation as described in Pauly (1984). In
our model, public insurance premiums may only depend on income while private insurance may
condition the premium on a customer’s risk type.
Kemnitz (2013) studies differences in consumer welfare between an income tax financed and a flat
premium financed health insurance system under competition and switching costs. As opposed
to our setting, the model does not allow for opt-out and regulated, systemic competition between
public and private insurance.
Our analysis of optimal social insurance premiums when individuals differ in productivity and
health is related to the work by Blomqvist and Horn (1984), Rochet (1991) and Cremer and
Pestieau (1996). Rochet (1991) and Cremer and Pestieau (1996) study welfare under social, in-
come tax financed insurance and budget balancing in a model synthesizing Mirrlees (1971) and
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). As in our paper, agents have two-dimensional types that affect
consumption. As opposed to our model, agents face uncertainty about falling ill and in Rochet
(1991) private insurance may be chose in addition to public insurance. In our model, all uncer-
tainty is resolved before customers choose contracts, hence when calculating optimal premiums
we also condition on health types.
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Besley (1989), Blomqvist and Johansson (1997) and Petretto (1999) study efficiency of systems
with coexisting public and private insurance under moral hazard when public insurance is com-
pulsory and agents buy additional private insurance to top up services. While in our paper public
and private insurance coexist, insurances compete for customers and are mutually exclusive. Fur-
ther, our model does not feature moral hazard.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give a formal description of the organizational
structure of the health insurance market. Section 3 starts by describing the general insurance
problem and then proceeds with solving the benchmark case with equal benefits. Thereafter,
comparative statics in the primitives and distribution are discussed.
3.2 Model
In the health insurance market a population of customers purchases health insurance contracts
from either of two insurances: a private health insurance and a public health insurance.
3.2.1 Population
The population consists of a unit mass continuum of customers. Every customer is characterized
by her health type h and her income type e; a high value of h corresponds to a good state of health.
Types are distributed according to distribution function F (h, e) with compact and connected
support Hb × Eb = [0, h¯] × [0, e¯]. The distribution has a strictly positive, twice differentiable
density f(h, e). Health and income types are affiliated,8 that is, for all points (h1, e1) and (h2, e2),
the density f satisfies
f(max(h1, h2),max(e1, e2)) · f(min(h1, h2),min(e1, e2)) ≥ f(h1, e1)f(h2, e2) (3.1)
The condition means that large values for health make income more likely to be large than small
and vice versa. Associated with a customer’s health type h are health costs c(h) where c(·) is
a continuous, positive, and strictly decreasing function. Customers’ utility function is strictly
increasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously differentiable in consumption w, where for an
uninsured customer consumption is the difference between income and health costs
w = e− c(h). (3.2)
Customers’ health and income types are observable by all agents in the market. In the course of
the paper we refer to high income types as wealthy and high health types as healthy.
8Affiliation is a strong form of positive correlation and widely used in Auction Theory, see Milgrom
(1982).
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Choice of Insurance
Health insurance is compulsory, every customer must choose a contract. A customer has to insure
with the public insurance if her income is less than the opt-out threshold K1; otherwise, she is
eligible to choose between private and public insurance. Neither insurance is allowed to exclude
customers from their services, both insurances have to offer a contract to every eligible customer
(open enrollment).
Contracts
A health insurance contract is defined by its payment p(h, e) and the maximum monetary reim-
bursement of health costs, benefit level L. As a consequence, health insurance provides only partial
coverage. We assume that both insurances offer the same fixed benefit level L.9 Denote by C(h, e)
the set of contracts available to a type-(h, e) customer. Upon signing a contract, a customer pays
p(h, e) and receives a monetary, health type dependent reimbursement of min(c(h), L), referred to
as health benefit. Applying the minimum function allows us to model overinsurance, i.e., the case
of L > c(h). A customers net benefit from contract C(h, e) is then given as min(c(h), L)− p(h, e).
Formally, type-(h, e)’s decision problem is to choose (L, p(h, e)) such that
(L, p(h, e)) ∈ arg max
(L,p)∈C(h,e)
u(e+ min(L− c(h), 0)− p(h, e)). (3.3)
3.2.2 Public Health Insurance
The public health insurance (PU) charges its customers a fixed percentage α, the contribution
rate, of their income. Above income threshold K2, however, the payment to PU remains constant;
we refer to K2 as the contribution cap. The public payment is therefore
pPU(e) = αmin(K2, e). (3.4)
and does not explicitly depend on a customer’s health type.
PU commits to operate with a balanced budget, i.e., she equates revenues and expenditures.
Formally, PU’s objective is to set α ∈ [0, 1] such that
α E[min(K2, e)|(h, e) ∈ PU(α)] = E[min(L, c(h))|(h, e) ∈ PU(α)] (3.5)
where PU(α) denotes the set of PU’s customers, and the expectation is taken with respect to F (·).
9See a later section for a relaxation of this assumption.
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3.2.3 Private Health Insurance
The private health insurance (PR) charges each customer a payment pPR(h, e) that may depend
on the customer’s health type and income. We call the function pPR(·) PR’s payment scheme.
PR is by assumption obliged to set a payment below αK2, pPR(h, e) ≤ αK2, for all health and
income types. We refer to a payment pPR(h, e) satisfying this requirement as feasible payment
and to pPR(·) as feasible payment scheme. PR aims at maximizing profit, i.e., payments collected
less health benefits to pay. Thus, PR’s objective is to choose pPR(·) such that
pPR(·) ∈ arg max
p(·) feasible
E
[
(p(h, e)−min(L, c(h))) 1PR(α)
]
(3.6)
where PR(α) denotes the set of PR customers.
3.3 Equilibrium
3.3.1 Timing and Equilibrium Concept
We study the health insurance market as a two-period game. In the first period PU and PR
simultaneously devise payments for all customer types; in the second period every customer
chooses from her set of contracts. We solve for pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria:
Definition 3.3.1. For given distribution F (h, e) and benefit level L, a pure-strategy subgame-
perfect equilibrium of the health insurance game is a tuple (α∗, p∗PR(·), (L, p∗(h, e))) such that
(i) α∗ satisfies (3.5) given p∗PR(·) and (L, p∗(h, e)),
(ii) p∗PR(·) solves (3.6) given α∗ and (L, p∗(h, e)),
(iii) (L, p∗(h, e)) solves (3.3), for all α ∈ [0, 1], feasible pPR(·), and (h, e).
In the sequel, we refer to a tripel (α∗, p∗pr, (L, p∗(h, e))) satisfying the conditions of Definition
3.3.1 simply as an equilibrium of the health insurance market.
3.3.2 Voluntary Health Insurance
Before establishing equilibrium existence, we study the health insurance market when insurance
is voluntary. In this case, instead of purchasing contracts from PU or PR, every customer may
choose to be uninsured and bear health costs herself. As is not uncommon in models of insurance,
voluntary insurance leads to a complete unraveling of the health insurance market:
Proposition 3.3.1. Under voluntary insurance, for any positive benefit level there exists no
equilibrium in the health insurance market.
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Note that this result is not due to adverse selection since customer types are observable. Instead,
the combination of budget balancing, multi-dimensional continuous types and regulation that
public insurance must condition her contribution rate on income only (Pauly, 1984) leads to
market collapse. We provide intuition for Proposition 3.3.1 here, all proofs can be found in the
Appendix.
If health insurance is voluntary, a customer is willing to insure only if a contract offers her a
net benefit, that is, if the difference between health benefits and payment is weakly positive.
All customers whose contract set contains only contracts with negative net benefit decide to
remain uninsured. A net benefit for the customer translates one-to-one in a loss in profits for
the insurance. Hence, only customers who inflict a (weak) loss on a health insurance company
choose to be insured. PR can avoid the loss on most parts of the population as it can finetune
its contract to customer’s health and income. PR may only incur a loss if the upper bound on
its payment binds. As a consequence, PR might fail to deter unprofitable customers who are rich
but unhealthy.
PU is less flexible than PR since it only discriminates along the income dimension. As a con-
sequence, for strictly positive benefit level PU cannot avoid a loss on comparatively poor and
unhealthy customers who want to insure. Since such customers’ income is sufficiently low, PR
can deter these from insuring privately. Thus, they insure with PU. Customers who are indiffer-
ent between insuring or not, with zero net benefit, might decide to insure with PU but do not
generate profits either. In addition, since types are continuous, for every contribution rate PU
might set, customers with negative net benefit who would prefer insuring with PU over remaining
uninsured do exist. This causes PU to be unable to run a balanced budget and consequently to
a failure of equilibrium existence.
To sum up, if health insurance is voluntary, customers who are attractive from the insurances’
perspective remain uninsured, leaving insurances with unprofitable customers. This makes health
insurance non-viable. Hence, Proposition 3.3.1 provides a rationale for why health insurance is
obligatory in Germany and more generally in many health insurance markets.
3.3.3 Equilibrium Existence
Retaining obligatory health insurance, we prove existence of equilibrium in the health insur-
ance market. We proceed backward from the second period, first studying customers’ optimal
insurance choice.
Lemma 3.3.1. Given any contribution rate set by PU and any feasible payment scheme of PR,
it is optimal for customers to choose the insurance which offers the contract with the lowest
payment.
This result is immediate since both insurances offer contracts with equivalent benefit level L.
Customers whose income is below the opt-out threshold can only choose PU’s contract. All other
customers have the choice between PU and PR. As the utility function is strictly increasing, every
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customer chooses the contract which offers her the largest net benefit. Since the benefit level is
fixed and equal for PU and PR, it is the contract’s payment that determines the net benefit and,
thereby, its attractiveness for customers.
In the following, we assume that customers choose PR when they are indifferent, i.e., if both
insurances charge the same payment.10
Having determined the population’s optimal insurance choice, we analyze PR’s optimal payment
scheme. We call a customer profitable at a given PU contribution rate, if the payment charged
by PU exceeds health benefits payable to the customer; otherwise, we call the customer unprof-
itable.11
Lemma 3.3.2. Given customer’s optimal contract choice and an arbitrary contribution rate set
by PU, it is optimal for PR to set its payment equal to PU’s payment if a customer is profitable
and to set the highest possible payment if a customer is unprofitable.
For a profitable customer, PR faces the trade-off between attracting the customer and charging a
high payment. If PR’s payment exceeds PU’s payment, the customer turns down PR’s contract
and chooses PU. If PR’s payment is strictly less than PU’s payment, PR can increase profits by
increasing its payment slightly without losing the customer. Hence, it is optimal for PR to set
its payment exactly equal to PU’s payment for all profitable customers.
If a customer is unprofitable and PR sets a payment below PU’s payment, PR incurs a loss since
she attracts the customer. Since PR may not reject customers, PR tries to deter unprofitable
customers by setting its payment as high as possible. Note that PR may not deter all unprofitable
customers because of the upper bound on its payment (feasibility constraint).
In contrast to PU, PR sets a flexible payment and discriminates based on both health and income.
The above argument shows that PR exploits its greater flexibility to cream skim all profitable
customers with sufficiently high income, i.e., with income exceeding the opt-out threshold. In
fact, without an opt-out threshold, PR would cream skim all profitable customers in the pop-
ulation which would make it impossible for PU to run a balanced budget. Hence, the opt-out
threshold is essential for the existence of equilibrium in the health insurance market.
This observation motivates the following assumption which we maintain throughout the paper.
Assumption 1. (Viable health insurance market.) The aggregated income of customers with
income below the opt-out threshold and below the contribution cap exceeds the entire population’s
health benefits:
E[min(L, c(h))] < E[e1{e<min(K1,K2)}].
10See also the remarks following Theorem 3.3.1.
11Note that such a situation may only arise since insurance is obligatory.
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Roughly, Assumption 1 says that the total income of all customer who must insure with PU
covers the health costs of the whole population. It guarantees that the population structure is
such that at least potentially PU can run a balanced budget. There are several reasons why
Assumption 1 may be satisfied; some of those may be under direct control of an exogenous
regulator (benefit level, opt-out threshold, contribution cap) but some of those may not (health
costs). In particular, for a given health income distribution F Assumption 1 holds if the benefit
level is sufficiently low or the opt-out threshold and contribution cap are sufficiently high. With
this assumption in place, we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 3.3.1. Assume that the health insurance market is viable. Then the health insurance
market has an equilibrium and the equilibrium contribution rate α∗ is unique.
The proof of Theorem 3.3.1 relies on the intermediate value theorem. The key step is to establish
continuity of PU’s objective in the contribution rate. See the Appendix for details.
In equilibrium, customers with income below the opt-out threshold choose PU. Above the opt-out
threshold customers who are profitable insure with PR; unprofitable customers insure with PU.
However, all customers, profitable or unprofitable, with income above the contribution cap and
above the opt-out threshold choose PR. See Figure 3.1 for a graphical illustration.
Figure 3.1: Customers’ insurance choice by customer type. The function of renormalized
health benefits, min(c(h),L)
α
, takes values on the e-axis.
Interestingly, independent of their choice of insurance, all PR customers pay the same amount
they would pay if they insured with PU. That is, PR’s payment is coupled to PU’s payment in
equilibrium. Intuitively, its monopolistic power allows PR to charge customers a payment that
makes them indifferent to choosing their outside option which is insuring with PU.12 Attract-
ing profitable customers entails two positive effects for PR: Firstly, there is an immediate gain in
profits. Secondly, if PU loses profitable customers to PR, PU has to increase the contribution rate
leading to a higher payment for all customers. This in turn allows PR to increase payments for
all its customers as their outside option has become less attractive. In fact, note that if profitable
customers with income above the opt-out threshold would collectively choose to insure with PU
12We study the case of competing private insurances in subection 5.3.
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instead of PR, PU could adjust the contribution rate downward leading to a lower payment for
the entire population. Intuitively, PR prevents this by slightly undercutting PU’s payment.
What are the redistributional effects of the health insurance market? Profitable customers with
income below the opt-out threshold subsidize all unprofitable customers with income below the
contribution cap. Furthermore, the relative profitability of these two customer groups determines
the payment for the entire population through their effect on the contribution rate. The surplus
of profitable customers with high income above the opt-out threshold is transformed one-to-one
into a profit for PR and is lost for the population. PR may incur a loss on unprofitable customers
with income above the contribution cap and above the opt-out threshold. However, as a con-
sequence of the organizational structure of the health insurance market, PR obtains an overall
profit: PU runs a balanced budget; relative to PU, PR attracts customers with higher income.
As health and income are positively correlated, a higher income entails also a better health type.
Thus, PR draws upon a more lucrative part of the population and earns positive profits. See the
proof of Theorem 3.3.1 for details.
A couple of technical remarks are in order: Firstly, as can be seen from the proof of Theorem
3.3.1, the assumption that health and income are affiliated is not required for the existence of
equilibrium.
Secondly, note that PU’s contribution rate is only unique given the behavior of PR and customers.
However, customers indifference behavior is not unique. Our specification that customers choose
PR if they are indifferent resolves existence issues for profitable customers with income exceeding
the opt-out threshold: If these customers would choose PU when they are indifferent, PR would
like to set a payment arbitrarily close but not equal to PU’s payment. However, one could imagine
different specifications for unprofitable customers with income above the contribution cap and
above the opt-out threshold. For these specifications an analogous analysis applies.
Relatedly, PR’s optimal payment scheme may not be unique (even on a set with positive measure):
In order to deter unprofitable customers with income between the opt-out threshold and the
contribution cap, PR can set any payment that exceeds PU’s payment. Note, however, that this
does not change customers decisions and thus the equilibrium contribution rate is the same as
under Lemma 3.3.2. Furthermore, our specification is particularly robust against tremble-like
errors in the behavior of customers.
3.3.4 Comparative Statics in Policy Parameters
Having established existence of equilibrium, we analyze how changes in the opt-out threshold,
the contribution cap, and the benefit level affect the equilibrium in the health insurance market.
As these three parameters might be controlled by an exogenous regulator, we refer to them as
“policy” parameters.
Proposition 3.3.2. An increase of the opt-out threshold decreases the contribution rate.
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First, consider the case where both the former and the new opt-out threshold are below the
contribution cap. Recall that PR cream skims the part of the population with income above the
opt-out threshold but below the contribution cap, i.e., profitable customers with income in this
range insure with PR whereas unprofitable customers in this range insure with PU. An increase
in the opt-out threshold limits PR’s possibility to cream skim since some profitable customers
are consequently forced to insure with PU under the new opt-out threshold. No additional un-
profitable customers join PU because they insured with PU already under the former opt-out
threshold. Thus, all new PU customers are profitable, allowing PU to adjust the contribution
rate downward.
Next consider the case where the former and the new opt-out thresholds lie above the contribution
cap. In this case the cream skimming area for PR has vanished. All customers with income below
the the opt-out threshold insure with PU; customers with income above the opt-out threshold
insure with PR. An increase in the opt-out threshold forces additional customers to insure with
PU. In contrast to the first case, some of these customers might be unprofitable. However,
compared to existing PU customers, the new customers have a higher income. As income and
health are correlated, a higher income entails (on average) also a better health type. These two
factors allow PU to decrease the contribution rate.
Surprisingly here, limiting choices of customers benefits them in that it decreases the contribution
rate and thus their payments. As PR’s payment is coupled to PU’s payment, in equilibrium not
only PU customers benefit from the lower contribution rate but all customers do. Intuitively,
with a higher opt-out threshold more profitable customers are forced to insure with PU rather
than being cream skimmed by PR. These profitable customers’ surplus is redistributed to all
other customers in the population (including themselves) rather than translated into a profit for
PR. PR’s profits decrease because PR loses profitable parts of the population to PU and has to
charge a lower payment to attract customers. Observe that from the customers’ perspective it
would be desirable to set the opt-out threshold as high as possible, essentially eliminating PR
from the market.
Proposition 3.3.3.
(i) If the contribution cap is above the opt-out threshold, a decrease of the contribution cap to
a level that is still above the opt-out threshold decreases the contribution rate.
(ii) If the contribution cap is below the opt-out threshold, a decrease of the contribution cap
increases the contribution rate.
Consider first the case where the former and the new contribution cap lie above the opt-out
threshold. In this case, lowering the contribution cap decreases the range of income in which
PR can cream skim customers because PR faces a lower upper bound on its payment (feasibility
constraint). As a result, PR can deter fewer unprofitable customers from its service. Furthermore,
PR does not attract any new profitable customers. Regarding it from PU’s perspective, PU loses
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unprofitable customers while retaining all profitable customers. Also, note that the payments all
remaining PU customers make are not reduced by the change since these customers have income
below the contribution cap. Therefore, PU can adjust the contribution rate downward.
Intuitively, after the decrease in the cap profitable customers with income below the opt-out
threshold subsidize a smaller number of unprofitable customers which allows for a decrease in the
contribution rate. Consequently, all customers pay less, and PR’s profits decrease.
Now consider the case where both the former and the new contribution cap lie below the opt-out
threshold. In this case, customer sets do not change through the decrease of the contribution cap.
PU is however forced to reduce demanded payments for those customers for whom the former
contribution cap was binding. To compensate this loss, PU has to adjust the contribution rate
upward. Thus, customers’ payments increase, and PR’s profits increase.
Proposition 3.3.4. An increase of the benefit level increases the contribution rate.
An increase in the benefit level L affects PU in two ways. Firstly, existing PU customers for
whom the former benefit level was binding13 become less profitable since the income dependent
contribution remains the same. Additionally, if the opt-out threshold is below the contribution
cap, there is an income range where PR cream skims. Some of the customers with income in
this range are profitable under the former benefit level but become unprofitable under the new
benefit level. Under the new benefit level, PR deters these customers who thus join PU. As a
result of these two effects, PU has to adjust the contribution rate upward to cover the increased
health benefits of its customers. The effect on customers’ utility is twofold. On the one hand, all
customers face a higher payment; on the other hand, some customers enjoy more health benefits.
Accordingly, PR can charge a higher payment but also needs to cover higher health benefits.
3.3.5 Structural Population Changes
Changes in a populations health-income distribution may occur over time due to immigration,
advances in technology, better education or rise and fall of national economies. In this section we
study how structural changes in the population’s health and income affect the health insurance
market. To this end, we analyze two different changes in the underlying distribution of health and
income: a systematic improvement of health and income and an increased correlation between
health and income.
Systematic Improvement of Health and Income
First, we investigate the effect of a systematic improvement of the population’s income and health
on the contribution rate and PR’s profit. Technically, we consider a stochastic improvement of
f(h, e) to a distribution with density function f˜(h, e) in the sense of (multivariate) first-order
13These are customers who are underinsured, whose health type causes health costs in equal or larger
extent to the maximum benefit level written down in the contract c(h) ≥ L.
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stochastic dominance.14 Intuitively, as the population’s income and health improve, the popu-
lation should spend a lower percentage of its income on health insurance given that the benefit
level stays constant. Indeed, if the entire population was insured with the budget-balancing PU,
the contribution rate could be adjusted downward. To account for the precise organizational
structure of the insurance market a more thorough analysis is needed.
We start by analyzing how customer sets change as the distribution changes. It is instructive to
divide the population into four subgroups and study the effect of a systematic improvement on
each of these subgroups separately.
Profitability and unprofitability are defined relative to the original distribution and the corre-
sponding contribution rate α∗. Let PU+(α∗) be the set of profitable PU customers and PU−(α∗)
the set of unprofitable PU customers. Analogously, let PR+(α∗) be the set of profitable PR
customers and PR−(α∗) the set of unprofitable PR customers.
Firstly, consider the effect on the subgroup of unprofitable PU customers, PU−(α∗). As health
and income improve, PU’s profits on this subgroup unambiguously increase: customers who
remain in the group even after the improvement are less unprofitable than before; additionally,
some unprofitable customers leave PU−(α∗) to join one of the other subgroups.
Second, consider how PR’s profit is affected on the set of its unprofitable customers, PR−(α∗).
Customers remaining in the group even after the improvement are less unprofitable than before,
and some unprofitable customers join PR+(α∗). This effect increases PR’s profit. On the other
hand, there is an inflow of new unprofitable customers from PU−(α∗). These customers are un-
profitable before and after the change of distribution but had income lower than the contribution
cap before the change and income exceeding the contribution cap after the change. This effect
decreases PR’s profit. Which of the two effects dominates depends on the precise change in health
and income.
Third, we analyze the effect on PR’s profit generated from PR+(α∗): Customers remaining in
the group are more profitable than before. Additionally, there is an inflow of new profitable
customers from all other subgroups. Thus, PR’s profit from this subgroup increases.
Finally, consider PU+(α∗). Again, customers remaining in this group are more profitable than
before. Also, there is an inflow of new profitable customers from PU−(α∗). These two effects
suggest that PU’s profit should increase. There is a countervailing effect though. Profitable PU
customers whose income exceeds the opt-out threshold after the change are attracted by PR,
decreasing PU’s profit on PU+(α∗). Therefore, the overall change in profit depends on the exact
changes in health and income.
In general, we cannot determine the sign of the change in profits on PR−(α∗) and PU+(α∗). We
can however derive an upper bound on a potential loss. In fact, a negative change in profits on
14See the Appendix for a definition and technical details.
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PR−(α∗) never outweighs the increase in profits on PU−(α∗). To see this, observe that the loss
in profit on PR−(α∗) is caused by unprofitable customers switching from PU−(α∗) to PR−(α∗).
Thus, the loss on PR−(α∗) corresponds to a one-to-one gain in profit on PU−(α∗). All other
effects increase profit. Put differently, profit on PR−(α∗) ∪ PU−(α∗) increases. An analogous
argument applies to the change in profit on PU+(α∗).
Our analysis reveals that the systematic improvement of health and income may affect the overall
profit of PU and PR positively or negatively, depending on the precise inflow and outflow in
PU+(α∗) and PR−(α∗). As noted above, the overall effect is however positive. Thus, it cannot
be that both PU’s and PR’s profits decrease. The change in PU’s profit determines whether PU
adjusts the contribution rate upward or downward in response to the systematic improvement.
As PR’s profit is increasing in the contribution rate, this effect may reinforce or counteract the
initial change in PR’s profit. The following proposition summarizes our findings.
Proposition 3.3.5. Consider a systematic improvement of the population’s health and income.
Then exactly one of the following three scenarios arises:
(i) If the loss in PU’s profit on PU+(α∗) outweighs the gain in profit on PU−(α∗), the con-
tribution rate increases and PR’s profit increases.
(ii) If the loss in PR’s profit on PR−(α∗) outweighs the gain in profit on PR+(α∗), the con-
tribution rate decreases and PR’s profit decreases.
(iii) Else the contribution rate decreases and the private insurance may profit or lose.
Proposition 3.3.5 sorts the wide range of possible systematic improvements of health and income
into three categories according to their effect on the contribution rate and PR’s profit. Given
that the class of improvements we consider unambiguously increase health and income for the
entire population, these categories are surprisingly manifold. In particular, there exist cases in
which customers have to pay a higher percentage of their income for health insurance. Intuitively,
this is because an improvement might allow PR to absorb profitable PU customers, urging PU
to increase the contribution rate in order to run a balanced budget.
This observation has important implications. The current organization of the health insurance
market might mitigate policy programs and campaigns targeted to improve the population’s
health in order to decrease the contribution rate.
Increase in Correlation Between Health and Income
Motivated by empirical studies (Deaton and Paxson, 1998) which document an increase in cor-
relation between health and income, we investigate how changes in correlation affect the health
insurance market. For a meaningful comparison of correlations, we consider distributions ranked
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by correlation according to the supermodular order which have identical marginal distributions
of health and income.15
Start with a distribution f and consider a distribution g that is larger than f in the supermodular
order. For the case when the opt-out threshold exceeds the contribution cap, we obtain the
following clear-cut result.
Proposition 3.3.6. If the opt-out threshold exceeds the contribution cap, an increase in correla-
tion between health and income increases the contribution rate.
Note that in Germany, in fact since 2003 the opt-out threshold exceeds the contribution cap
and there is hence ’no cream skimming’. To gain intuition for our result, it is instructive to
decompose the transition from f to g into several sub steps. Consider the two-dimensional space
of health and income types. Start with the health income distribution f . Now fit a rectangle
into the health income space and consider a transformation that shifts probability mass from the
bottom right corner of the rectangle to the bottom left corner and the same probability mass
from the upper left corner to the upper right corner.16 This transformation increases correlation
between health and income while keeping the marginal distributions of health and income fixed.
Intuitively, we can construct g from f by applying several of these transformations to f .
e
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Figure 3.2: Mass shift not affecting the contribution rate
If the correlation-increasing mass transformation is such that all four corners of the rectangle
lie within the set of PR customers (see figure ??), PU is unaffected and the contribution rate
remains the same. Similarly, in case the four corners of the rectangle lie within the set of PU
customers, PU does not need to adjust the contribution rate because the marginal distributions
of health and income conditional on being a PU customer are unchanged.
Lastly, consider the case when the left corners of the rectangle are in the set of PU customers
whereas the right corners of the rectangle lie within the set of PR customers (see figure ??). As a
consequence of this transformation, the income distribution of PU customers is not altered since
income is on the x-axis and marginals are held constant by the transformation. But the health
distribution of PU customers worsens. Therefore, PU has to increase the contribution rate to run
a balanced budget. Taking all three cases together, we see that PU increases the contribution rate
15See the Appendix for a formal definition.
16This probability mass shift corresponds to an ’elementary transformation’ as described and analyzed
in Meyer and Strulovici (2015) to characterize the supermodular stochastic order.
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Figure 3.3: Mass shift affecting the contribution rate
if correlation between health and income increases. From a broader perspective, PU customers
have comparatively low income whereas PR customer have comparatively high income. If the
correlation between health and income increases, PU’s low-income customers have also a worse
health type, forcing PU to increase the contribution rate.
If the opt-out threshold lies below the contribution cap, there exists an income range where
PR cream skims. Graphically, PU and PR customers are not separated any longer by a single
cut-off in the income dimension. Thus, we have to consider additional correlation-increasing
transformations. Consider the transformation where only the upper right corner of the rectangle is
in the set of PR customers; all other corners lie in the set of PU customers. For this transformation
there are two conflicting effects. On the one hand, the income distribution of PU customers
worsens. On the other hand, unprofitable customers leave PU. It depends on the distribution
f which of the two effect dominates, and, consequently, whether PU adjusts the contribution
rate upward or downward. All other transformations entail a decrease in the contribution rate.
Overall, in this case it depends on the specific increase in correlation and on how much weight is
put on which transformation whether PU adjusts the contribution rate upward or downward.
3.4 Applications
We apply our model to address two policy questions. First, we study how customers’ welfare
changes if the health insurance market changes from the current contribution-based system to a
premium-based system. We identify the population subgroups that benefit from such a change
and the population subgroups that suffer. Second, we characterize the theoretically welfare-
optimal payments. Understanding the properties of welfare-optimal payments yields additional
insights into how to adjust the organization of health insurance markets to improve customer
welfare.
3.4.1 Health Premia
In recent years, discussions to change the health insurance market in Germany have centered
around two ideas. First, an abolishment of the difference between private and public insurances.
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Second, a change from an income-dependent contribution-based payment scheme to a premium-
based payment scheme, i.e., a scheme in which payments are flat and do not depend on the
customer’s income or health.
We adjust the model outlined in Section 3.2 to accommodate these two features of a premium-
based health insurance market. Subsequently, we apply our two models to compare the premium-
based to the contribution-based health insurance market. To make the two models comparable,
we alter only the insurance provision sector and leave all other characteristics unchanged such as
the population’s health and income distribution or the customers’ objective.
In the premium-based health insurance market any customer must insure with either of two
identical premium insurances, henceforth PMi, i ∈ {1, 2}.17 Customers can choose freely between
PM1 and PM2, independently of their income and health. PM1 and PM2 offer the same benefit
level and face the same health costs. Each PMi aims at balancing its budget by charging all its
customers premium Ai, i.e.,
E[min(c(h), L)1{PMi(Ai)}] = E[Ai1{PMi(Ai)}], (3.7)
where {PMi(Ai)} denotes the set of PMi’s customers given premium Ai.18 The timing of the
game is unchanged. First, PM1 and PM2 simultaneously set their premium, then customers
choose their preferred insurance. Again, we are interested in subgame-perfect equilibria.
Proposition 3.4.1. There exists an equilibrium in the premium-based health insurance market.
In every equilibrium, all customers pay the premium
A∗ = E[min(c(h), L)]. (3.8)
As before, customers choose the insurance that gives them a higher net benefit. Because the
benefit level written down in the contracts is equal, customers choose the insurance with lower
payment, i.e., the insurance with lower premium. Thus, if PMi’s premium is strictly lower than
PM−i’s premium, all customers choose PMi. As a result of budget balancing and competition for
customers, all PMi demand the same premium and insure on average identical pools of health
risks (identical PMi) or there is only one PM . In either case, the equilibrium premium is equal
to the average health benefit of the population, i.e., (3.8).
How does the change to a premium-based system affect redistribution in the population? Proposi-
tion 3.4.1 reveals that in a premium-based system every customer pays the average health benefit
of the population, independently of her income. This implies that redistribution occurs only
17Analogous results hold if there are more than two premium insurances.
18We model premium insurances in the spirit of the public insurance in the contribution-based system.
Results are virtually unchanged if we assume that premium insurances maximize profits.
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along the health dimension, i.e., customers with a good health type subsidize customers with a
bad health type. In contrast to the contribution-based system, there is no redistribution along
the income dimension. Thus, the premium-based system disentangles the mixture of redistribu-
tion across health and redistribution across income which is inherent to the contribution-based
system. As a consequence, we obtain the following corollary
Corollary 3.4.1. There exists an income threshold such that all customers with income below
the threshold have higher utility in the contribution-based system, and all customers with income
above the threshold have higher utility in the premium-based system.
Ceteris paribus, customers with higher income pay more in the contribution-based system and
customers with lower income pay less in the contribution-based system. As health benefits remain
equal, in the contribution-based system customers with higher income have a lower utility and
customers with lower income have a higher utility.
To maintain the current level of income redistribution the introduction of a premium-based sys-
tem would thus have to be accompanied by an adjustment of income taxation.
We next assess the impact of a change in the insurance system on the population’s welfare. We
adopt the utilitarian welfare criterion, i.e., our welfare function is the sum (integral) of utilities
of all customers in the population. Recall from Proposition 3.3.2 that an increase of the opt-out
threshold decreases the contribution rate and consequently the payment of all customers in the
population. Thus, as the opt-out threshold increases, all customers enjoy a higher utility, i.e.,
welfare increases. Welfare in the contribution-based system reaches its maximum once the opt-
out threshold is so high that the entire population must insure with PU. We refer to this specific
contribution-based system as “contribution-based system without PR”.
Proposition 3.4.2.
(i) For high levels of the opt-out threshold, the contribution-based system has higher welfare
than the premium-based system.
(ii) In the premium-based system, there exists a budget-balanced income redistribution scheme
(income tax) such that welfare is the same as in the contribution-based system without PR.
To understand the result, observe that there are two opposing effects. First, in the contribution-
based system PR makes profits and thereby extracts surplus that is not used to cover the pop-
ulation’s health benefits. In the premium-based system neither insurance makes profits.19 This
effect reduces welfare in the contribution-based system compared to the premium-based system.
Second, concavity of the population’s utility function favors the income-dependent payment of
the contribution-based system compared to the flat payment of the premium-based system be-
cause low-income customers pay relatively less and high-income customers pay relatively more.
19Recall, that this is true even if we assume that both premium insurances are profit-maximizing.
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With a higher opt-out threshold, PR extracts less surplus which attenuates the first effect. Thus,
for a sufficiently high opt-out threshold, the second effect dominates, and the contribution-based
system yields higher welfare. Conversely, combining the introduction of a premium-based system
with a redistribution of income from high incomes to low incomes compensates for the second
effect. Consequently, the premium-based system accompanied by an appropriate income redis-
tribution scheme yields higher welfare than the contribution-based system.
We conclude that an easy-to-implement policy recommendation to improve welfare is to in-
crease the opt-out threshold. If the health insurance market is changed more fundamentally to a
premium-based system, an accompanying explicit redistribution of income via an adjustment of
income taxation favoring low incomes would increase welfare and make up for the lack of implicit
redistribution inherent in the contribution-based system. 20
3.4.2 Welfare - Optimal Payments
In view of Proposition 3.4.2, we are now interested in welfare-optimal payment schemes to finance
a given level of health benefits. Understanding why these payment schemes maximize welfare,
gives us further insights into how to adjust the health insurance market in order to increase wel-
fare. Specifically, we consider the following problem: Health insurance is exclusively provided by
a benevolent authority that chooses a payment scheme to maximize welfare subject to the con-
straint of providing a given benefit level. First, we explicitly derive the welfare-optimal payment
scheme that may condition on both health and income.
Proposition 3.4.3. For given health benefits the welfare-maximizing payment scheme that may
condition on health and income, popt(h, e), is given by
popt(h, e) = min(c(h), L) + e− c(h)− E [e− c(h)] . (3.9)
Observe that popt(h, e) conditions on customer’s health. Intuitively, popt(h, e) consists of two
components. The first component charges each customer the health benefits she consumes. The
second component associates to every customer the difference between her factual and her ex-
pected net income, i.e., her income less health costs. If a customer’s net income is high relative to
the average net income of the population, her payment is augmented by the difference. Otherwise,
her payment is reduced by the difference. The first component guarantees that the population’s
health benefits are covered; the second component is a budget-balanced redistribution scheme
from customers with high net income to customers with low net income. The redistribution
scheme accounts for the positive effect of equating utility across customers on welfare, which
stems from the concavity of customers’ utility function.
20For arguments in favor of this clear separation of income redistribution and distribution across health
types see Wissenschaftlicher Beirat ??.
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In the contribution-based system PU’s payments only depend on income. Therefore, we are
now interested in the properties of welfare-optimal payment schemes which are restricted to only
depend on income. Further, we investigate whether PU’s payment satisfies these properties.
Also, recall that welfare in the premium-based system can be increased, if the introduction of a
premium-based system is combined with an appropriate redistribution in the income dimension.
Studying characteristics of welfare-optimal payments which depend on income only translates
one-to-one into studying the characteristics of welfare-optimal income redistribution schemes in
the premium-based system. Technically, we assume for the next result that the density of the
distribution of health conditional on income is continuously differentiable.
Proposition 3.4.4. The welfare-maximizing payment scheme pˆopt(e) restricted to depend on
income only satisfies
dpˆopt(e)
de
≥ 1.
Clearly we have that welfare under popt(h, e) is higher than welfare under pˆopt(e). Nevertheless,
Proposition 3.4.4 shows that pˆopt(e) takes into account the correlation between higher income and
better health. An increase in a customer’s income by one unit increases her net income by more
than a unit since by correlation higher income is associated with better health and thus lower
health costs. Payment pˆopt(e) tries to balance net incomes across customers. Thus, it not only
neutralizes the increase of income but also balances out the positive effect of an income increase
on health. Hence, pˆopt(e) increases faster in income than income itself.
Observe that the last result stands in marked contrast to PU’s factual payment: PU’s payment
increases at a rate equal to the contribution rate, which is less than one, and remains constant
above the contribution cap. This indicates that a reform to adjust PU’s payment scheme to
take the positive correlation of health and income into account has the potential of increasing
welfare. On a similar note, if the introduction of a premium-based system is combined with
an adjustment of income taxation to compensate for the redistribution that is lost through the
abolishment of the contribution-based system, an adjustment of income taxation to account for
correlation between health and income would be welfare enhancing.
3.5 Extensions
3.5.1 Health Signals
To single out the effect of the organizational structure of the health insurance market, we assume
that insurances perfectly observe customers’ characteristics such as their health types. By this
we shut down confounding channels like adverse selection as a result of asymmetric information.
Nevertheless, to demonstrate robustness of our findings to private information of customers, we
consider the following variation of our model. In addition to her income and health type, each
customer is characterized by a health signal. We can interpret the signal, as the customer’s
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answer to a health questionnaire. The customer’s health signal is positively correlated with her
health type.21 Insurances observe customers’ health signal but not their health type. As PU
discriminates only based on income, PU is not directly affected by the change in modeling. PR’s
ability to discriminate across health types is however hampered; PR has to devise a payment
scheme that only depends on income and health signal to maximize profits.
We can reproduce our findings from Section 3.3 following the same steps: As before, customers
choose the insurance which offers the lower payment. For insurances, observe that we can replicate
our analysis by replacing the health benefit by the expected health benefit conditional on income
and health signal. Intuitively, as PR cannot observe customers’ health, it estimates health using
income and health signal. Due to positive correlation, high income and a favorable health signal
are indicative of a good health type. Consequently, PR partially retains its ability to distinguish
profitable and unprofitable customers.
3.5.2 Endogenous Health Benefits
So far we have assumed that insurances provide the same maximum benefit level L in their con-
tracts. A careful inspection of the arguments in the proof of Lemma 3.3.1 reveals that customers
choose the insurance which offers the higher net benefit, i.e., health benefit minus payment. We
had conveniently set equal benefit levels of public and private insurance contracts to focus on
payments. The analysis is however unchanged if, PR provides an exogenously higher benefit level.
In equilibrium PR will charge higher payments such that the net benefit is unchanged. Does this
conclusion remain true if PR chooses the benefit level endogenously?
To answer this question, consider the following variant of our model. PR offers customers two
contracts: a simple contract reminiscent of PU’s contract and a more elaborate contract tailored
to its customers. Specifically, the first contract provides the same benefit level as PU, and the
contract’s payment corresponds to the highest payment which PU charges, i.e., contribution rate
times contribution cap.22 For the second contract, PR chooses a benefit level and devises an
income- and health-dependent payment scheme.
The equilibrium in this health insurance market parallels the equilibrium derived in Section 3.3.
The sets of PU and PR customers are unchanged. PR finetunes the elaborate contract to cream
skim profitable customers with income above the opt-out threshold. Unprofitable customers
with income above the opt-out threshold and the contribution cap choose PR’s simple contract.
In equilibrium only the net benefit of the elaborate contract is uniquely determined echoing
the remarks made at the beginning of this section. Thus, without additional assumptions no
prediction about the relative benefit level of PU and PR can be made.
21Specifically, we assume that health signal and health type are affiliated.
22In the German health insurance system, private insurances have to offer this baseline contract to every
customer.
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3.5.3 Private Competition
We are now interested in how redistribution streams change if we introduce competition among
private insurances. Assume that in addition to PU and the population there are two private
insurances, PR1 and PR2.
23 All insurances offer contracts with equal maximum benefit level
L. PR1 and PR2 maximize profits by devising a payment scheme that conditions on customers’
health and income. In the first period insurances simultaneously design their type dependent
contracts. In the second period customers choose the contract that maximizes their utility. For
simplicity assume that customers randomize with equal probability if they are indifferent between
PR1 and PR2.
In equilibrium, the set of PU customers is unchanged. By budget balancing thus, public health
contribution remains the same. Former PR customers split equally between PR1 and PR2 and
private health premia change. The payments of PR1 customers and PR2 customers are equal to
the minimum of their health benefit from the contract and the upper bound on PR’s payment.
In particular, they pay less than before. Intuitively, competition pushes the premiums payable
by PR1 and PR2 customers down to the cost they impose on the insurance, i.e., their health
benefit. Redistribution streams are as follows. Profitable customers with income below the opt-
out threshold have to insure with PU. and pay more than their health benefits. They subsidize
unprofitable parts of the population insured with PU. Profitable customers with income above
the opt-out threshold opt out of the redistribution scheme by insuring with one of the PRs and
pay an amount equal to or less than their health benefit. As a consequence, they do not generate
a gain to the PRs. Unprofitable customers with income above the opt-out threshold but below
the maximum price the PR may set are deterred from entering either of the PRs and insure with
PU. Unprofitable customers with income above the maximum price for insurance enter either of
the PRs.24
3.6 Conclusion
This paper studies redistributional effects of competition between private and public insurance
on health insurance markets based on the example of Germany. Public and private insurance co-
exist and are mutually exclusive. Private insurance maximizes profits. Public insurance balances
budget and is financed by an income tax with a cap. In addition, customers of public insurance
have the option to opt out once income is sufficiently large.
On a more abstract level, we study a two-dimensional linear taxation problem with price cap,
23Analogous results hold if there are more than two private insurances.
24Note that as a consequence, PRs do not survive competition with other PRs since very wealthy but
unprofitable customers cannot be deterred from entering and cause a loss to the insurance.
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opt-out for high types under a budget balancing constraint and regulation. Public health premia
may only depend on income types but health costs depend on health types of customers. This
regulation in combination with the potential of opt-out gives rise to cream skimming (risk selec-
tion) by a competing private insurance.
Private insurance discriminates between healthy and unhealthy customers. If possible, she de-
ters unprofitable customers while attracting customers who will generate a gain by varying the
premium. In the face of cream skimming, opt-out by rich customers and budget balancing, the
public insurance sets the public contribution rate.
As first result, we derive a condition under which a unique, redistributive, budget balancing
public contribution rate exists. We show, increasing the opt-out threshold up to the level of
the public insurance’s price cap decreases the premium for all customers, public and private,
since the type area where the private insurance may cream skim vanishes. Increasing the opt-out
threshold further, leads to even lower public and private premia since health and income types
are positively correlated.
Considering a systematic improvement of the population’s health and income25, we show that
even though the change clearly improves the population’s characteristics, the public contribution
rate might increase. Healthy and wealthy customers may opt out and insure privately so that an
improvement does not benefit all customers via redistribution in the public insurance but instead
is pocketed by private insurance.
Increases in correlation between income and health may increase public health prices to keep a
balanced budget: On the one hand, less wealthy types insure publicly and become on average
less healthy which causes additional costs to public insurance. On the other hand, higher earning
types become more healthy after the increase in positive correlation but may opt out so that the
gain in health and decrease in costs is lost to private insurance.
While some characteristics of our model are Germany specific (opt-out and price cap), simpler
versions still constitute a contribution to the literature: Health and income types are continuous
which in combination with regulation of public insurance and budget balancing leads insurance
markets to collapse under voluntary insurance. In particular, this result is not due to adverse
selection and may deliver a rationale for why health insurance is compulsory in Germany, France
and Switzerland.
In addition, continuous types allow for modeling of maximum and factual health benefit levels
and thus over insurance which drives customers’ contract choice.
In Germany as in Italy, customers have the choice between public and private insurance. When
setting the opt-out threshold at infinity our model corresponds to a completely public, non-profit,
earnings-based redistributive health insurance system as in France.
25In the sense of first-order stochastic dominance
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We formulate the model under the assumption that private insurance perfectly observes cus-
tomers’ health types. We believe this is plausible since private insurances in Germany often
require potential customers to fill out binding questionnaires about their medical history. More-
over, insurances can draw on internal statistics to precisely estimate the likelihood that a customer
falls sick with a certain disease. We think of an agents’ health type as average health over her life
time rather than a reflection of a particular moment. By modeling health types as observable and
fix over lifetime, we circumvent the moral hazard problem in health insurance: Insured agents
do not overuse their insurances. The motive to insure is hence not by risk-sharing but imposed
by regulation to redistribute along the income and health dimension. Public health premium as
percentage of income is set at an ex ante stage by the public insurance for we implicitly assume
that the general income-health risk distribution of the population is known to both public and
private insurance.
In our model, the public insurance commits to running a balanced budget rather than maximiz-
ing profits. We offer two possible justifications for this behavior. First, we may assume that a
benevolent government sets up a health insurance fund to provide large parts of the population
with health insurance at lowest possible costs.26 Second, we can regard public insurance as a
representative for an entire competitive public insurance market in which every public health in-
surance operates at her (identical) costs.27 Either explanation motivates the objective to balance
budget.
26In fact, in years in which German public health insurances make significant profits, customers obtain
a refund in form of a price deduction.
27In Germany, for example, customers can choose from several similar public health insurances, and
switching insurances within the public sector is simple.
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3.7 Appendix: Proofs
3.7.1 Proofs for Voluntary Health Insurance
Proof of Proposition 3.3.1. If health insurance is voluntary, every customer type’s contract
set contains, in addition to PU’s and PR’s contract, contract (0, 0), i.e., (0, 0) ∈ C(h, e), ∀(h, e).
Assume there exists an equilibrium (α∗, p∗pr, (L∗, p∗(h, e))). Optimal choice of customers requires:
u(e+ min(L∗ − c(h), 0)− p∗(h, e)) ≥ u(e+ min(L′ − c(h), 0)− p(h, e)),
for all contracts (L′, p(h, e)) ∈ C(h, e). As the utility function is strictly increasing this is equiva-
lent to
min(L∗, c(h))− p∗(h, e) ≥ min(L′, c(h))− p(h, e),
for all contracts (L′, p(h, e)) ∈ C(h, e). In particular, with voluntary health insurance we have
that
min(L∗, c(h))− p∗(h, e) ≥ 0. (3.10)
(3.10) implies that PU and PR incur a weak loss for every insured customer. We will now argue
that (3.10) holds with strict inequality on a set of PU customers with positive measure. Thus,
PU’s equilibrium condition
α∗ E[min(K2, e)1PU(α∗)] = E[min(L, c(h))1PU(α∗)]
does not hold, a contradiction. Let α∗ PU’s equilibrium contribution rate under voluntary insur-
ance. Consider the part of the population with e < K2 and
α∗min(K2, e)−min(L, c(h)) < 0.
These are (strictly) unprofitable customers. Because K2, L, c(h) > 0 and the support of income is
continuous [0, e¯] this part of the population has positive measure for every α∗. These customers
prefer being insured with PU over remaining uninsured. Also, PR does not want to attract this
part of the population because PR would need to set pPR(h, e) ≤ α∗min(K2, e), incurring a loss
on these customers. As e < K2, PR can and will set p
∗
PR(h, e) ≥ α∗min(K2, e) to deter these
unprofitable customers. We have argued that this strictly unprofitable part of the population
will insure with PU. The strictly profitable part of the population will decide to remain unin-
sured. How the part of the poplulation that is indifferent between insuring or not, i.e. for which
α∗min(K2, e)−min(L, c(h)) = 0 (zero profit zero loss), decides is irrelevant for PU, PR and the
outcome since they neither bring a loss or a profit. To sum up, we have shown that for any
contribution rate PU might set strictly unprofitable customers exist, insure with PU and cause a
loss, while zero profit zero loss customers may insure with PU but do not generate a profit either.
Hence, PU cannot run a balanced budget for any contribution rate α it might set.
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3.7.2 Proofs for Equilibrium Existence
Proof of Lemma 3.3.1. Given any contribution rate α ∈ [0, 1] and any feasible choice of pPR(·),
the contract set of a customer with type (h, e) is
C(h, e) =
{(L,αmin(K2, e))} if e < K1,{(L,αmin(K2, e)), (L, pPR(h, e))} else.
It is optimal for a type-(h, e) customer to choose (L, p∗(h, e)) ∈ C(h, e) if and only if
u(e+ min(L− c(h), 0)− p∗(h, e)) ≥ u(e+ min(L− c(h), 0)− p(h, e)),
for all (L, p(h, e)) ∈ C(h, e). As u(·) is strictly increasing, this is equivalent to
min(L, c(h))− p∗(h, e) ≥ min(L, c(h))− p(h, e),
for all (L, p(h, e)) ∈ C(h, e). Because health benefits L are equal, the latter expression reduces to
p∗(h, e) ≤ p(h, e),
which concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3.3.2. Fix any contribution rate α. Consider a feasible payment scheme p(·).
Optimal customer choice, Lemma 3.3.1, implies that the set of PR customers is given by
PR(α) = {(h, e) : e ≥ K1, p(h, e) ≤ αmin(K2, e)}.
Thus, spelling out the expectation, we can rewrite PR’s objective as
pPR(·) ∈ arg max
p(·) feasible
∫
E
∫
H
(
p(h, e)−min(L, c(h))1{e≥K1, p(h,e)≤αmin(K2,e)}(h, e) f(h, e) dh de.
Because PR’s objective involves no derivatives of p(h, e), we can solve it pointwise. Carefully
inspecting (
p(h, e)−min(L, c(h))1{e≥K1, p(h,e)≤αmin(K2,e)}(h, e) f(h, e)
reveals that
pPR(h, e) =
αmin(K2, e) if αmin(K2, e) ≥ min(L, c(h)),αK2 else,
is an optimal policy.
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Proof of Theorem 3.3.1. Let customers’ and PR’s behavior be as described in Lemma 3.3.1
and Lemma 3.3.2, respectively. Fix a contribution rate α. Formally, the set of PU customers is
PU(α) = {(h, e) : e < K1}∪˙{(h, e) : K1 ≤ e < K2, αe < min(L, c(h))},
and the set of PR customers is
PR(α) ={(h, e) : e ≥ K1, αmin(K2, e) ≥ min(L, c(h))}
∪˙{(h, e) : e ≥ max(K1,K2), αK2 < min(L, c(h))}.
PU seeks a contribution rate α∗ such that
α∗ E[min(K2, e)1PU(α∗)] = E[min(L, c(h))1PU(α∗)].
Reformulating gives
α∗ =
E[min(L, c(h))1PU(α∗)]
E[min(K2, e)1PU(α∗)]
.
Define the function T (α):
T (α) :=
E[min(L, c(h))1PU(α)]
E[min(K2, e)1PU(α)]
.
An equilibrium contribution rate α∗ corresponds to a fixed point of T (·). First, we show that
T (·) is well-defined, i.e., that the denominator cannot become zero:
E
[
min(K2, e)
(
1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2, αe<min(L,c(h))}
)] ≥ E [e1{e<min(K1,K2)}] > 0,
where the last inequality follows from the assumption that f(h, e) has full support and the fact
that K1 and K2 are strictly positive.
Existence. We prove existence of a fixed point using the intermediate value theorem. Firstly,
note
T (0) =
E[min(L, c(h))
(
1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2}
)
]
E[min(K2, e)
(
1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2}
)
]
> 0.
The inequality follows from both numerator and denominator being strictly positive because of
full support of f(h, e) and K1,K2, L, c(·) > 0. Secondly, we have
T (1) =
E[min(L, c(h))
(
1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2, e<min(L,c(h))}
)
]
E[min(K2, e)
(
1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2, e<min(L,c(h))}
)
]
≤ E[min(L, c(h))]
E[e1{e<min(K1,K2)}]
< 1,
where the last inequality follows from Assumption 1. It remains to be shown that T (·) is contin-
uous.28 First, consider the numerator of T (·). The first addend does not depend on α, thus, we
28Continuity does not follow from standard results for parameter integrals because these require that
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only need to check continuity of
g(α) :=
∫
H
∫
E
min(L, c(h))
(
1{K2>e≥K1, αe<min(L,c(h))}
)
f(h, e) de dh .
Fix α and α˜, and assume without loss of generality that α > α˜.
|g(α)− g(α˜)|
≤
∫
H
∫
E
min(L, c(h)) 1{K2>e≥K1}
∣∣1{αe<min(L,c(h))} − 1{α˜e<min(L,c(h))}∣∣f(h, e) de dh
=
∫
H
∫
E
min(L, c(h)) 1{K2>e≥K1} 1{α˜<min(L,c(h))
e
≤α} f(h, e) de dh. (3.11)
Because f(h, e) has no atoms, the integrand converges pointwise to zero as α˜→ α. Thus, by the
dominated convergence theorem, (3.11) converges to zero as α˜→ α. Continuity of the denomina-
tor follows from an analogous argument. Hence, T (·) is continuous, and the existence of a fixed
point follows from the intermediate value theorem.
Uniqueness. If K1 ≥ K2, T (·) is constant in α and thus the fixed point is unique. For K2 > K1
we argue that
(i) T (·) is increasing left of the first fixed-point,
(ii) T (·) is decreasing right of the first fixed-point,
together with the existence result above, this yields uniqueness of α∗. Note the following elemen-
tary equivalence for a, b, c, d > 0
a+ c
b+ d
<
a
b
⇔ a
b
>
c
d
. (3.12)
For (i) recall that T (0) > 0. Let α˜, α be left of the first fixed-point and α˜ > α, then T (α˜) > α˜ > α.
We argue that T (α˜) > T (α):
T (α˜)− T (α)
=
∫
H
∫
E min(L, c(h))
(
1{e<K1} + 1{K2>e≥K1, α˜<min(L,c(h))e }
)
f(h, e) de dh∫
H
∫
E e
(
1{e<K1} + 1{K2>e≥K1, α˜<min(L,c(h))e }
)
f(h, e) de de
−
∫
H
∫
E min(L, c(h))
(
1{e<K1} + 1{K2>e≥K1}
(
1{α<min(L,c(h))
e
≤α˜} + 1{α˜<min(L,c(h))
e
}
))
f(h, e) de dh∫
H
∫
E e
(
1{e<K1} + 1{K2>e≥K1}
(
1{α<min(L,c(h))
e
≤α˜} + 1{α˜<min(L,c(h))
e
}
))
f(h, e) de dh
.
(3.13)
Analyzing the indicator functions, we see that
α ≤
∫
H
∫
E min(L, c(h)) 1{K2>e≥K1, α<min(L,c(h))e ≤α˜}
f(h, e) de dh∫
H
∫
E e1{K2>e≥K1, α<min(L,c(h))e ≤α˜}
f(h, e) de dh
≤ α˜. (3.14)
the integrand is a continuous function of α for almost all h, e.
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Using T (α˜) > α˜ and (3.14), we apply (3.12) to obtain T (α˜) > T (α).
For (ii) assume that T (α) is not decreasing right of the first fixed-point. Because T (1) < 1 and
T (·) is continuous, there exist α˜, α, α˜ > α, such that α > max(T˜ (α˜), T˜ (α)) and T˜ (α˜) > T˜ (α).
However, replicating the computations in (3.13) and (3.14), we observe
T˜ (α˜)− T˜ (α) ≤ 0,
a contradiction. We conclude that there exists a unique contribution rate α∗ that balances PU’s
budget.
Profits of PR. Start by observing that
1PR(α) = 1{e≥max
(
K1, min
(
min(L,c(h))
α
, K2
))
}
is increasing in h and e. Analogously,
1PU(α) = 1{e<max
(
K1, min
(
min(L,c(h))
α
, K2
))
}
is decreasing in h and e. Furthermore, min(K2, e) is increasing in e, and min(L, c(h)) is decreasing
in h. These observations together with the fact that f(h, e) is affiliated, i.e., log-supermodular,
allow us to apply the Fortuin-Kasteleyn-Ginibre (FKG) inequality to obtain:
E
[
min(L, c(h))1PR(α)
] ≤ E [min(L, c(h))] E [1PR(α)] ,
E
[
min(K2, e)1PR(α)
] ≥ E [min(K2, e)] E [1PR(α)] ,
E
[
min(L, c(h))1PU(α)
] ≥ E [min(L, c(h))] E [1PU(α)] ,
E
[
min(K2, e))1PU(α)
] ≤ E [min(K2, e)] E [1PU(α)] .
The four inequalities above yield
E
[
min(L, c(h))1PR(α)
]
E
[
min(K2, e)1PR(α)
] ≤ E [min(L, c(h))]
E [min(K2, e)]
≤ E
[
min(L, c(h))1PU(α)
]
E
[
min(K2, e)1PU(α)
] . (3.15)
In equilibrium we have
E
[
min(L, c(h))1PR(α∗)
]
E
[
min(K2, e)1PR(α∗)
] ≤ E [min(L, c(h))1PU(α∗)]
E
[
min(K2, e)1PU(α∗)
] = α∗.
Rearranging terms gives
E
[
(α∗min(K2, e)−min(L, c(h))) 1PR(α∗)
] ≥ 0,
which concludes the proof.
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3.7.3 Proofs for Comparative Statics in Policy Parameters
Proof of Proposition 3.3.2. Consider an increase of K1 to K˜1, K1 ≤ K˜1. For this proof, we
make the dependence of T (·) on K1 explicit and write TK1(·). Similarly, we denote the set of PU
customers by PUK1(α). Let the contribution rates α
∗ and α˜∗ be the unique fixed points of TK1(·)
and TK˜1(·) respectively. We argue that TK1(α˜∗) ≥ TK˜1(α˜∗) which implies α∗ ≥ α˜∗ because the
fixed point is unique. Spelling out TK1(α˜
∗) ≥ TK˜1(α˜∗), we obtain
E[min(L, c(h))1PUK1 (α˜∗)]
E[min(K2, e))1PUK1 (α˜∗)]
≥
E[min(L, c(h))1PUK˜1 (α˜∗)]
E[min(K2, e))1PUK˜1 (α˜∗)]
. (3.16)
We distinguish two cases.
Case 1. First, let K1 ≤ K˜1 ≤ K2. Observe that
1PUK1 (α˜∗) = 1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2, α˜∗e<min(L,c(h))}
= 1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K˜1} − 1{K1≤e<K˜1, α˜∗e≥min(L,c(h))} + 1{K˜1≤e<K2, α˜∗e<min(L,c(h))}
= 1PUK˜1 (α˜
∗) − 1{K1≤e<K˜1, α˜∗e≥min(L,c(h))}.
Hence, we can rewrite (3.16) as
E[min(L, c(h))(1PUK˜1 (α˜∗) − 1{K1≤e<K˜1, α˜∗e≥min(L,c(h))})]
E[min(K2, e)(1PUK˜1 (α˜∗) − 1{K1≤e<K˜1, α˜∗e≥min(L,c(h))})]
≥
E[min(L, c(h))1PUK˜1 (α˜∗)]
E[min(K2, e))1PUK˜1 (α˜∗)]
. (3.17)
Similarly as in (3.12), we have
a− b
c− d ≥
a
c
⇔ b
d
≤ a
c
for c− d > 0, a, b, c, d ≥ 0. Therefore, (3.17) is equivalent to
E[min(L, c(h))1{K1≤e<K˜1, α˜∗e≥min(L,c(h))}]
E[min(K2, e)1{K1≤e<K˜1, α˜∗e≥min(L,c(h))}]
≤
E[min(L, c(h))1PUK˜1 (α˜∗)]
E[min(K2, e))1PUK˜1 (α˜∗)]
.
Exploiting the indicator function of term on the left side of the above inequality and the fact
that α˜∗ is a fixed point of TK˜1(·), we obtain
E[min(L, c(h))1{K1≤e<K˜1, α˜∗e≥min(L,c(h))}]
E[min(K2, e)1{K1≤e<K˜1, α˜∗e≥min(L,c(h))}]
≤ α˜∗ =
E[min(L, c(h))1PUK˜1 (α˜∗)]
E[min(K2, e))1PUK˜1 (α˜∗)]
.
Thus, (3.16) holds in this case.
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Case 2. Second, consider the case K2 ≤ K1 ≤ K˜1. (3.16) becomes
E[min(L, c(h))1{e<K1}]
E[min(K2, e)1{e<K1}]
≥
E[min(L, c(h))(1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K˜1})]
E[min(K2, e)(1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K˜1})]
.
Using (3.12), the latter inequality is equivalent to
∫ K˜1
0
∫ h
h min(L, c(h))1{e<K1}f(h, e) dh de∫ K˜1
0
∫ h
h min(K2, e)1{e<K1}f(h, e) dh de
≥
∫ K˜1
0
∫ h
h min(L, c(h))1{K1≤e}f(h, e) dh de∫ K˜1
0
∫ h
h min(K2, e)1{K1≤e}f(h, e) dh de
. (3.18)
Now, we proceed as in the proof Theorem 3.3.1 where we showed that PR’s profit is positive.
Note that 1{e<K1} is a decreasing function of h, e, and that 1{K1≤e} is an increasing function of
h, e. Together with the affiliation of f(h, e) and the monotonicity of min(L, c(h)) and min(K2, e),
these observations imply, using the FKG inequality,
∫ K˜1
0
∫ h
h min(L, c(h))1{K1≤e}f(h, e) dh de∫ K˜1
0
∫ h
h min(K2, e)1{K1≤e}f(h, e) dh de
≤
∫ K˜1
0
∫ h
h min(L, c(h))f(h, e) dh de∫ K˜1
0
∫ h
h min(K2, e)f(h, e) dh de
and ∫ K˜1
0
∫ h
h min(L, c(h))f(h, e) dh de∫ K˜1
0
∫ h
h min(K2, e)f(h, e) dh de
≤
∫ K˜1
0
∫ h
h min(L, c(h))1{e<K1}f(h, e) dh de∫ K˜1
0
∫ h
h min(K2, e)1{e<K1}f(h, e) dh de
.
Thus, (3.18) holds, implying that (3.16) holds also in this case which concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.3. We proceed similar as in the proof of Proposition 3.3.2. Consider
a decrease of K2 to K˜2, K˜2 ≤ K2. For this proof, we make the dependence of T (·) on K2 explicit
and write TK2(·). Similarly, we denote the set of PU customers by PUK2(α). Let the contribution
rates α∗ and α˜∗ be the unique fixed points of TK2(·) and TK˜2(·) respectively.
Proof of (i). First, consider the case K1 ≤ K˜2 ≤ K2. We argue that TK2(α˜∗) ≥ TK˜2(α˜∗) which
implies α∗ ≥ α˜∗ because the fixed point is unique. Spelling out TK2(α˜∗) ≥ TK˜2(α˜∗), we obtain
E[min(L, c(h))1PUK2 (α˜∗)]
E[min(K2, e))1PUK2 (α˜∗)]
≥
E[min(L, c(h))1PUK˜2 (α˜∗)]
E[min(K˜2, e))1PUK˜2 (α˜∗)]
. (3.19)
Observe that
1PUK2 (α˜∗) = 1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2, α˜∗e<min(L,c(h))}
= 1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K˜2, α˜∗e<min(L,c(h))} − 1{K˜2≤e<K2, α˜∗e<min(L,c(h))}
= 1PUK˜2 (α˜
∗) − 1{K˜2≤e<K2, α˜∗e<min(L,c(h))}.
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Hence, we can rewrite (3.19) as
E[min(L, c(h))(1PUK˜2 (α˜∗) + 1{K˜2≤e<K2, α˜∗e<min(L,c(h))})]
E[e(1PUK˜2 (α˜∗) + 1{K˜2≤e<K2, α˜∗e<min(L,c(h))})]
≥
E[min(L, c(h))1PUK˜2 (α˜∗)]
E[e1PUK˜2 (α˜∗)]
, (3.20)
where we used the indicator functions to simplify the denominators. The latter inequality is
equivalent to
E[min(L, c(h))1{K˜2≤e<K2, α˜∗e<min(L,c(h))})]
E[e1{K˜2≤e<K2, α˜∗e<min(L,c(h))}]
≥
E[min(L, c(h))1PUK˜2 (α˜∗)]
E[e1PUK˜2 (α˜∗)]
by (3.12). Exploiting the indicator function of term on the left side of the above inequality and
the fact that α˜∗ is a fixed point of TK˜2(·), we obtain
E[min(L, c(h))1{K˜2≤e<K2, α˜∗e<min(L,c(h))})]
E[e1{K˜2≤e<K2, α˜∗e<min(L,c(h))}]
≥ α˜∗ =
E[min(L, c(h))1PUK˜2 (α˜∗)]
E[e1PUK˜2 (α˜∗)]
.
Thus, (3.19) holds.
Proof of (ii). Second, consider the case K˜2 ≤ K2 ≤ K1. Observe that T (·) is constant in α in
this case. We argue that TK˜2(·) ≥ TK2(·) which implies α˜∗ ≥ α∗. Spelling out TK˜2(·) ≥ TK2(·),
we obtain
E[min(L, c(h))1{e<K1}]
E[min(K˜2, e))1{e<K1}]
≥ E[min(L, c(h))1{e<K1}]
E[min(K2, e))1{e<K1}]
,
which holds as K˜2 < K2.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.4. Consider an increase of L to L˜, L ≤ L˜. For this proof, we
make the dependence of T (·) on L explicit and write TL(·). Similarly, we denote the set of PU
customers by PUL(α). Let the contribution rates α
∗ and α˜∗ be the unique fixed points of TL(·)
and TL˜(·) respectively. We argue that TL˜(α∗) ≥ TL(α∗) = α∗ which implies α˜∗ ≥ α∗ because the
fixed point is unique. TL˜(α
∗) is given by
E[min(L˜, c(h))1PUL˜(α∗)]
E[min(K2, e))1PUL˜(α∗)]
.
Consider the numerator of this fraction
E[min(L˜, c(h))(1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2, α∗e<min(L˜,c(h))})]
= E[min(L˜, c(h))(1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2, α∗e<min(L,c(h))} + 1{K1≤e<K2, min(L,c(h))≤α∗e<min(L˜,c(h))})]
≥ E[min(L˜, c(h))(1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2, α∗e<min(L,c(h))})] + E[α∗e1{K1≤e<K2, min(L,c(h))≤α∗e<min(L˜,c(h))})]
≥ E[min(L, c(h))(1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2, α∗e<min(L,c(h))})] + E[α∗e1{K1≤e<K2, min(L,c(h))≤α∗e<min(L˜,c(h))})].
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To get from the second to the third line, we exploit the third indicator function. From the third
to the fourth line we use min(L, c(h)) ≤ min(L˜, c(h)). Thus, we obtain
TL˜(α
∗)
≥
E[min(L, c(h))(1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2, α∗e<min(L,c(h))})] + E[α∗e1{K1≤e<K2, min(L,c(h))≤α∗e<min(L˜,c(h))})]
E[e (1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2, α∗e<min(L˜,c(h)})]
=
E[min(L, c(h))(1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2, α∗e<min(L,c(h))})] + E[α∗e1{K1≤e<K2, min(L,c(h))≤α∗e<min(L˜,c(h))})]
E[e (1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2, α∗e<min(L,c(h)})] + E[e1{K1≤e<K2, min(L,c(h))≤α∗e<min(L˜,c(h))}]
.
Observe that
E[min(L, c(h))(1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2, α∗e<min(L,c(h))})]
E[e (1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2, α∗e<min(L,c(h)})]
= TL(α
∗) = α∗
and
E[α∗e1{K1≤e<K2, min(L,c(h))≤α∗e<min(L˜,c(h))})]
E[e1{K1≤e<K2, min(L,c(h))≤α∗e<min(L˜,c(h))}]
= α∗.
Because
a+ b
c+ d
=
a
c
⇔ a
c
=
b
d
.
for a, b, c, d > 0, we conclude that
TL˜(α
∗) ≥ α∗.
3.7.4 Proofs for Structural Population Changes
Proofs for Systematic Improvement of Health and Income
Preliminaries. We make the dependence of the expectation operator on the distribution f
explicit and write Ef [·]. Throughout the proof we use the following characterization of (multi-
variate) first-order stochastic dominance, cf. Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007),
Theorem 3.7.1. Consider two probability distributions over Rn with densities f˜ and f respec-
tively. f˜ first-order stochastically dominates f if and only if Ef˜ [φ] ≥ Ef [φ] for all increasing
functions φ : Rn → R for which the expectations exist.
Let f˜(h, e) first-order stochastically dominate f(h, e). Other than that, we assume that f˜(h, e)
satisfies the same assumptions as f(h, e). As before, we are interested in fixed-points of the
function
Tf (α) =
Ef [min(c(h), L)1PU(α)]
Ef [min(K2, e)1PU(α)]
, (3.21)
119
where we made the dependence of T (·) on the distribution explicit. By the proof of Theorem
3.3.1, Tf (α) has a unique fixed-point α
∗ and is increasing for α ≤ α∗ and decreasing for α ≥ α∗.
Denote by α∗ the equilibrium contribution rate associated with f(h, e) and by α˜∗ the equilibrium
contribution rate associated with f˜(h, e). If we argue that
Tf˜ (α
∗) ≥ (≤)Tf (α∗) = α∗,
then we know that α˜∗ ≥ (≤)α∗.
Start by observing that
Ef˜ [α
∗min(K2, e)−min(c(h), L)] ≥ Ef [α∗min(K2, e)−min(c(h), L)] = 0. (3.22)
because α∗min(K2, e)−min(c(h), L) is an increasing function of (h, e). Hence, if the entire popu-
lation would insure with PU, the contribution rate could be adjusted downward. Also, note that
PR’s profit from an (h, e)-type customer, (αmin(K2, e) − min(c(h), L))1PR(α), is an increasing
function of α, for all h, e.
Formally, the decomposition outlined in the text is given by
PU+(α∗) = {(h, e)| α∗min(K2, e)−min(c(h), L) ≥ 0, e < K1}, (3.23)
PU−(α∗) = {(h, e)| α∗min(K2, e)−min(c(h), L) < 0, e < max(K1,K2)}, (3.24)
PR+(α∗) = {(h, e)| α∗min(K2, e)−min(c(h), L) ≥ 0, e ≥ K1}, (3.25)
PR−(α∗) = {(h, e)| α∗min(K2, e)−min(c(h), L) < 0, e ≥ max(K1,K2)}. (3.26)
See also Figure ??. Define Ef˜−f [·] := Ef˜ [·] − Ef [·]. Consider the difference in insurances’ profit
under f˜(h, e) and f(h, e) on each set of customers (3.23)-(3.26),
Ef˜−f [(α
∗min(K2, e)−min(c(h), L))1PU+(α∗)], (3.27)
Ef˜−f [(α
∗min(K2, e)−min(c(h), L))1PU−(α∗)], (3.28)
Ef˜−f [(α
∗min(K2, e)−min(c(h), L))1PR+(α∗)], (3.29)
Ef˜−f [(α
∗min(K2, e)−min(c(h), L))1PR−(α∗)]. (3.30)
By (3.22) we have
(3.27) + (3.28) + (3.29) + (3.30) ≥ 0. (3.31)
We verify the statements about the impact of customers’ movements on insurances’ profit from
each subgroup made in the main body of the text. Checking monotonicity of the appropri-
ate functions and applying Theorem 3.7.1 yields (3.28)≥ 0, (3.28)+(3.30)≥ 0, (3.29)≥ 0, and
(3.29)+(3.27)≥ 0.
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Proof of Proposition 3.3.5.
Proof of (i). By assumption (3.27)+(3.28)≤0, which is equivalent to
α∗ = Tf (α∗) ≤ Tf˜ (α∗),
hence, α˜∗ ≥ α∗. Furthermore, by (3.27)+(3.28)≤0 and (3.31), we have 0≤(3.29)+(3.30), i.e.,
Ef˜ [(α
∗min(K2, e)−min(c(h), L))1PR(α∗)]− Ef [(α∗min(K2, e)−min(c(h), L))1PR(α∗)] ≥ 0.
(3.32)
(3.32) and α˜∗ ≥ α∗, together with monotonicity of PR’s profit in α show that PR’s profit increase
under f˜ .
Proof of (ii). By assumption (3.29)+(3.30)≤ 0. This implies (3.27)+(3.28)≥ 0, i.e.,
α∗ = Tf (α∗) ≥ Tf˜ (α∗),
therefore, α˜∗ ≤ α∗. Also, by (3.29)+(3.30)≤ 0,
Ef˜ [(α
∗min(K2, e)−min(c(h), L))1PR(α∗)]− Ef [(α∗min(K2, e)−min(c(h), L))1PR(α∗)] ≤ 0.
(3.33)
(3.33) and α˜∗ ≤ α∗ show that PR’s profit decreases.
Proof of (iii). By assumption (3.27)+(3.28)≥ 0, which is equivalent to
α∗ = Tf (α∗) ≥ Tf˜ (α∗),
and hence, α˜∗ ≤ α∗. Furthermore, (3.29)+(3.30)≥ 0, i.e.,
Ef˜ [(α
∗min(K2, e)−min(c(h), L))1PR(α∗)]− Ef [(α∗min(K2, e)−min(c(h), L))1PR(α∗)] ≥ 0.
(3.34)
The positive effect of the shift from f to f˜ on PR’s profit, (3.34), may be mitigated by the
decrease of the equilibrium contribution rate. The exact effect on PR’s profit depends on the
specific shift f˜ .
Proofs for Increase in Correlation Between Health and Income
Preliminaries. We make the dependence of the expectation operator on the distribution f
explicit and write Ef [·]. Throughout the proof we use the following characterization of the
supermodular order, see Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007).
Definition 3.7.1. A function f : R2 → R is called supermodular if for every two points
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(x1, y1), (x2, y2) ∈ R2 it holds
f(max(x1, x2),max(y1, y2)) + f(min(x1, x2),min(y1, y2)) ≥ f(x1, y1) + f(x2, y2) (3.35)
Theorem 3.7.2. Consider two probability distributions over Rn with respective densities g and
f which coincide on their marginal distributions. g is larger than f in the supermodular order if
and only if Eg[φ] ≥ Ef [φ] for all supermodular functions φ : Rn → R for which the expectations
exist.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.6. Assume that g(h, e) is larger than f(h, e) in the supermodular
order. As before, we are interested in fixed-points of the function
Tf (α) =
Ef [min(c(h), L)1PU(α)]
Ef [min(K2, e)1PU(α)]
, (3.36)
where we made the dependence of T (·) on the distribution explicit. By the proof of Theorem
3.3.1, Tf (α) has a unique fixed-point α
∗ and is increasing for α ≤ α∗ and decreasing for α ≥ α∗,
i.e. for every density f the according operator Tf is maximized in the fixed point. Denote by α
∗
the equilibrium contribution rate associated with f(h, e) and by α˜∗ the equilibrium contribution
rate associated with g(h, e). If we argue that
Tg(α
∗) ≥ Tf (α∗) = α∗,
then we know that α˜∗ ≥ α∗. Observe that if K1 ≥ K2, the patient set of PU reduces to the set
{e < K1} and we have
Tg(α) =
Eg[min(c(h), L)1{e<K1}]
Eg[min(K2, e)1{e<K1}]
. (3.37)
First, consider the denominator of the latter expression
Eg[min(K2, e)1{e<K1}] =
∫ e¯
0
min(K2, e)1{e<K1}g(e) de = Ef [min(K2, e)1{e<K1}], (3.38)
where the last equality follows from the fact that g and f have the same marginals. Second, we
analyze the numerator of (3.37). Let e′ ≥ e and h′ ≥ h, then
min(c(h′), L)1{e′<K1} + min(c(h), L)1{e<K1} ≥ min(c(h′), L)1{e<K1} + min(c(h), L)1{e′<K1}
holds since in case 1{e′<K1} = 0 we have min(c(h), L)1{e<K1} ≥ min(c(h′), L)1{e<K1} because
min(c(h), L) is decreasing in h and in case 1{e′<K1} = 1 both sides are equal as 1{e′<K1} decreases
in e. Consequently, min(c(h), L)1{e<K1} is a supermodular function, and by definition of the
supermodular order we obtain
Eg[min(c(h), L)1{e<K1}] ≥ Ef [min(c(h), L)1{e<K1}]. (3.39)
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Putting (3.38) and (3.39) together, we get
Tg(α
∗) =
Eg[min(c(h), L)1{e<K1}]
Eg[min(K2, e)1{e<K1}]
≥ Ef [min(c(h), L)1{e<K1}]
Ef [min(K2, e)1{e<K1}]
= Tf (α
∗) = α∗
which concludes the proof.
3.7.5 Proofs for Applications
Proofs for Health Premia
Proof of Proposition 3.4.1. Fix any two premia A1 and A2 set by PM1 and PM2 respectively.
The contract set C(h, e) of a customer with type (h, e) is
C(h, e) = {(L,A1), (L,A2)}.
Because health benefits are equal, it is optimal for every customer to choose contract (L,Ai) with
Ai = min(A1, A2).
Start by observing that the following is an equilibrium: A1 ≥ A2, A2 = E[min(c(h), L)] and all
customers choose PM2. We now deduce more generally that the premium paid by all customers
is E[min(c(h), L)] in any equilibrium of the premium-based health insurance market. It is conve-
nient to denote by β(h, e) ∈ {0, 1} customer-(h, e)’s choice of insurance, where β(h, e) = 1 means
that the customer chooses PM1, and β(h, e) = 0 means that the customer chooses PM2. Let
(A∗1, A∗2, β∗(h, e)) be an equilibrium of the premium-based health insurance market.
Case 1. If A∗1 > A∗2, then β∗(h, e) = 0, for all (h, e). PM2’s equilibrium condition requires
A∗2 = E[min(c(h), L)]. The case A∗1 < A∗2 is symmetric.
Case 2. If A∗1 = A∗2, PM1’s and PM2’s equilibrium condition requires
E [β∗(h, e) min(c(h), L)] = E [A∗1β∗(h, e)] (3.40)
and
E [(1− β∗(h, e)) min(c(h), L)] = E [A∗2(1− β∗(h, e))] . (3.41)
Adding up (3.40) and (3.41) and using A∗1 = A∗2 yields
E [min(c(h), L)] = A∗1 = A∗2,
which concludes the proof.29
29Strictly speaking, we restrict attention to equilibria where β(·, ·) is measurable with respect to (h, e).
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Proof of Corollary 3.4.1. Comparing the income-increasing payment of the contribution-based
system
α∗min(K2, e)
to the income-constant payment of the premium-based system
E[min(L, c(h))]
yields the existence of a threshold e∗ ∈ [0, e¯] such that for all e < e∗ we have α∗min(K2, e) <
E[min(L, c(h))], and for all e > e∗ we have α∗min(K2, e) > E[min(L, c(h))]. As health benefits
are equal in both system customers with income e > e∗ enjoy a higher utility and customers with
income e < e∗ enjoy a lower utility in the premium-based system.
We now argue that e∗ ∈ (0, e¯). Firstly, observe that
α∗ =
E[min(L, c(h))1PU(α∗)]
E[min(K2, e)1PU(α∗)]
≥ E[min(L, c(h))]
E[min(K2, e)]
,
where the equality follows from α∗ being a fixed point of T (·), and the inequality follows from
(3.15). Therefore, we can conclude that
α∗min(K2, e¯) ≥ E[min(L, c(h))]E[min(K2, e)] min(K2, e¯) > E[min(L, c(h))].
Secondly, note that
α∗min(K2, 0) = 0 < E[min(L, c(h)],
which concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.2. Fix a payment p(h, e) for each customer type. Given this set of
payments, welfare is
W(p(h, e)) = E [u(min(c(h), L)− c(h) + e− p(h, e))] . (3.42)
Proof of (i). SetK1 = e¯. Recall that the payment in the contribution-based system is α
∗min(K2, e),
whereas it is A∗ = E[min(L, c(h))] in the premium-based system. As K1 = e¯, PU insures all cus-
tomers, 1PU = 1 and budget-balancing of PU implies
α∗ E[min(K2, e)] = E[min(L, c(h))] = A∗. (3.43)
Note that the result still holds if customers are allowed to randomize, i.e., if β(h, e) ∈ [0, 1] denotes the
probability that customer-(h, e) chooses PM1.
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To save on notation define ψ(h, e) = min(c(h), L) − c(h) + e and note that ψ(·, ·) is increasing
in both arguments. Consider the welfare difference between the premium-based system and the
contribution-based system, with (3.43)
E [u (ψ(h, e)− α∗ E[min(K2, e)])]− E [u (ψ(h, e)− α∗min(K2, e))]
< E
[
u′ (ψ(h, e)− α∗min(K2, e)) (α∗min(K2, e)− α∗ E[min(K2, e)])
]
, (3.44)
where the inequality follows from strict concavity of u(·) . Observe that
1. u′ (ψ(h, e)− α∗min(K2, e)) is decreasing in (h, e) because u′(·) is decreasing and ψ(h, e)−
α∗min(K2, e) is increasing in (h, e) as α∗ ≤ 1.
2. α∗min(K2, e)− α∗ E[min(K2, e)] is weakly increasing in (h, e).
Hence, the FKG inequality implies that (3.44) is bounded from above by the constant
E
[
u′ (ψ(h, e)− α∗min(K2, e))
]
E [α∗ (min(K2, e)− E[min(K2, e)])] = 0,
where the last equality follows from
E [α∗ (min(K2, e)− E[min(K2, e)])] = 0. (3.45)
Therefore, the contribution-based system with K1 = e¯ gives the population a strictly higher
welfare than the premium-based system. Recall that welfare is increasing in K1. Thus, for suffi-
ciently high K1 the contribution-based system is welfare-dominant.
Proof of (ii). Consider the income redistribution scheme that is defined by the transfer τ(e) to
agent with income e, where
τ(e) = α∗ E[min(K2, e)]− α∗min(K2, e).
By definition the premium-based system together with this income redistribution scheme gives the
population the same welfare as the welfare-optimal contribution-based system, i.e., the system
with K1 = e¯. Furthermore, (3.45) implies that the income redistribution scheme is budget-
balanced.
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Proofs for Welfare-Optimal Payments
Proof of Proposition 3.4.3. Let A := E [min(c(h), L)] be the aggregate health benefits of the
population. Formally, we consider the problem
max
p(h,e)
E [u(min(c(h), L)− c(h) + e− p(h, e))] , (3.46)
s.t. A ≤ E [p(h, e)] . (3.47)
The Lagrangian
E [u(min(c(h), L)− c(h) + e− p(h, e)) + λ(p(h, e)−A)]
yields the first-order condition
u′(min(c(h), L)− c(h) + e− p(h, e)) = λ. (3.48)
Note that u′(·) is strictly decreasing. Solving for p(h, e) and inserting into the constraint, (3.47),
gives
A = E
[−u′−1(λ) + min(c(h), L)− c(h) + e] .
Using the definition of A, we obtain
λ = u′ (E [e− c(h)]) . (3.49)
Equating (3.48) and (3.49) yields
u′(min(c(h), L)− c(h) + e− p(h, e)) = u′ (E [e− c(h)]) . (3.50)
Again exploiting that u′(·) is strictly decreasing and after rearranging terms we obtain
popt(h, e) = min(c(h), L) + e− c(h)− E [e− c(h)] .
Proof of Proposition 3.4.4. We start by rewriting (3.46) to account for the fact that the
payment may not depend on h. For clarity we spell out all expectations explicitly.
max
p(e)
∫
E
∫
H
u(min(c(h), L)− c(h) + e− p(e)) f(h|e) dh f(e) de, (3.51)
s.t. A ≤
∫
E
p(e)f(e) de. (3.52)
The Lagrangian for the problem is∫
E
∫
H
u(min(c(h), L)− c(h) + e− p(e))f(h|e) dh+ λ(p(e)−A)f(e) de.
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Using Leibniz’s integral rule we obtain the first-order condition∫
H
u′(min(c(h), L)− c(h) + e− p(e))f(h|e) dh− λ = 0. (3.53)
(3.53) defines p as an implicit function of e. Denote the left side of (3.53) by G(e, p). Then
∂G(e, p)
∂p
=
∫
H
−u′′(min(c(h), L)− c(h) + e− p)f(h|e) dh > 0, (3.54)
where the last inequality follows from strict concavity of u(·). Furthermore
−∂G(e, p)
∂e
=
∂G(e, p)
∂p
+
∫
H
−u′(min(c(h), L)− c(h) + e− p) ∂f(h|e)
∂e
dh. (3.55)
Rewrite the second term on the right side of inequality (3.55) as∫
H
−u′(min(c(h), L)− c(h) + e− p) ∂ log f(h|e)
∂e
f(h|e) dh.
Observe that:
1. By affiliation ∂ log f(h|e)∂e is increasing in h. Indeed, we have
0 ≤ ∂
2 log f(h, e)
∂e ∂h
=
∂2 log(f(h|e)f(e))
∂e ∂h
=
∂
∂h
(
∂ log f(h|e)
∂e
)
.
2. −u′(min(c(h), L)− c(h) + e− p) is increasing in h because min(c(h), L)− c(h) is increasing
and −u′(·) is increasing by concavity.
Neglecting the argument of −u′(·) for convenience and applying the FKG inequality we get∫
H
−u′(·) ∂ log f(h|e)
∂e
f(h|e) dh ≥
∫
H
−u′(·) f(h|e) dh
∫
H
∂ log f(h|e)
∂e
f(h|e) dh. (3.56)
Rewriting the second term on the right hand side of inequality (3.56) and using Lebesgue’s
dominated convergence theorem we see that∫
H
∂ log f(h|e)
∂e
f(h|e) dh =
∫
H
∂f(h|e)
∂e
dh =
∂
∂e
(∫
H
f(h|e) dh
)
= 0.
since
∫
H f(h|e) dh = 1. Consequently, note that∫
H
−u′(·) ∂ log f(h|e)
∂e
f(h|e) dh ≥ 0. (3.57)
Applying the implicit function theorem, we conclude that
dpˆopt
de
=
−∂G(e,p)∂e
∂G(e,p)
∂p
=
∂G(e,p)
∂p
∂G(e,p)
∂p
+
∫
H−u′(·) ∂ log f(h|e)∂e f(h|e) dh
∂G(e,p)
∂p
≥ 1,
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where the inequality follows from (3.54) and (3.57).
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